TWO

# DISSERTATIONS

CONCERNING THE END FOR WHICH

## GOD CREATED THE WORLD;

AND THE

## NATURE OF TRUE VIRTUE.

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BY THE LATE REVEREND, LEARNED, AND PIOUS,

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# THE

# PREFACE.

THE Author had deſigned theſe Diſſertations for the public view; and wrote them out as they now appear: though it is probable, that if his life had been ſpared, he would have reviſed them, and rendered them in ſome reſpects more complete. Some new ſentiments, here and there, might probably have been added; and ſome paſſages brightened with farther illuſtrations. This may be conjectured from ſome brief hints, or ſentiments minuted down on looſe papers, found in the manuſcripts.

But thoſe ſentiments conciſely ſketched out, which, it is thought, the Author intended to enlarge, and digeſt into the body of the work,——cannot be ſo amplified by any other hand, as to do juſtice to the Author: it is therefore probably beſt that nothing of this kind ſhould be attempted.

As theſe Diſſertations were more eſpecially deſigned for the learned and inquiſitive, it is expected that the judicious and candid will not be diſpoſed to object, that the manner in which theſe ſubjects are treated is ſomething above the level of common readers. For though a ſuperficial way of diſcourſe and looſe harangues may well enough ſuit ſome ſubjects, and anſwer ſome valuable purpoſes; yet other ſubjects demand more cloſeneſs and accuracy. And if an Author ſhould neglect to do juſtice to a ſubject, for fear that the ſimpler ſort

ſhould not fully underſtand him, he might expect to be deemed a trifler by the more intelligent.

Our Author had a rare talent to penetrate deep in ſearch of truth: to take an extenſive ſurvey of a ſubject, and look through it into remote conſequences. Hence many theorems, that appeared hard and barren to others, were to him pleaſant and fruitful fields, where his mind would expatiate with peculiar eaſe, profit and entertainment. Thoſe ſtudies, which to ſome were too fatiguing to the mind, and wearying to the conſtitution, were to him but a natural play of genius; and which his mind without labour would freely and ſpontaneouſly perform. A cloſe and concluſive way of reaſoning upon a controverſial point was eaſy and natural to him.

This may ſerve, it is conceived, to account for his uſual manner of treating obſtruſe and controverted ſubjects, which ſome have thought has been too metaphyſical. But the truth is, that his critical method of looking through the nature of his ſubject; his accuracy and preciſion in canvaſſing truth, comparing ideas, drawing conſequences, pointing out and expoſing abſurdities, ——nat urally led him to reduce the evidence in favour of truth into the form of demonſtration. Which, doubtleſs, where it can be obtained, is the moſt eligible, and by far the moſt ſatisfying to great and noble minds. And though ſome readers may find the labour hard to keep pace with the writer, in the advances he makes, where the aſcent is arduous; yet in general all was eaſy to him: ſuch was his peculiar love and diſcernment of truth, and natural propenſity to ſearch after it. His own ideas were clear to him, where ſome readers have thought them obſcure. Thus many things in the works of *Newton* and *Locke*, which appear either quite unintelligible,

unintelligible, or very obſcure to the illiterate, were clear and bright to thoſe illuſtrious Authors, and their learned readers.

The ſubjects here handled are ſublime and important. The *end* which God had in view in creating the world, was doubtleſs worthy of him; and conſequently the moſt excellent and glorious poſſible. This therefore muſt be worthy to be known by all the intelligent creation, as excellent in itſelf, and worthy of their purſuit. And as true virtue diſtinguiſhes the inhabitants of heaven, and all the happy candidates for that world of glory, from all others;——there cannot ſurely be a more intereſting ſubject.

The notions which ſome men entertain concerning God's end in creating the world, and concerning true virtue, in our late Author's opinion, have a natural tendency to corrupt Chriſtianity, and to deſtroy the goſpel of our divine Redeemer. It was therefore, no doubt, in the exerciſe of a pious concern for the honour and glory of God, and a tender reſpect to the beſt intereſts of his fellow-men, that this devout and learned writer undertook the following work.

May the Father of lights ſmile upon the pious and benevolent aims and labours of his ſervant, and crown them with his bleſſing!

THE EDITOR.

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# Concerning the End for which God created the World.

## INTRODUCTION.

### Containing Explanations of Terms and general Poſitions.

TO avoid all confuſion in our inquiries and reaſonings concerning the end for which God created the world a diſtinction ſhould be obſerved between the chief end for which an agent or efficient exerts any act, and performs any work, and the ultimate end. Theſe two phraſes are not always preciſely of the ſame ſignification: and though the *chief* end be always an *ultimate* end, yet every ultimate end is not always a chief end.

A chief end is oppoſite to an inferior end: An ultimate end is oppoſite to a ſubordinate end. A ſubordinate end is ſomething that an agent ſeeks and aims at in what he does; but yet do not ſeek it, or regard it at all upon its own account, but wholly on the account of a further end, or in order to ſome other

thing, which it is conſidered as a means of. Thus when a man that goes a journey to obtain a medicine to cure him of ſome diſeaſe, and reſtore his health,—the obtaining that medicine is his ſubordinate end; becauſe it is not an end that he ſeeks for itſelf, or values at all upon its own account; but wholly as a means of a further end, *viz.* his health: Separate the medicine from that further end, and it is eſteemed good for nothing; nor is it at all deſired.

An ultimate end is that which the agent ſeeks in what he does, for its own ſake: That he has reſpect to, as what he loves, values, and takes pleaſure in on its own account, and not merely as a means of a further end: As when a man loves the taſte of ſome particular ſort of fruit, and is at pains and coſt to obtain it, for the ſake of the pleaſure of that taſte which he values upon its own account, as he loves his own pleaſure; and not merely for the ſake of any other good, which he ſuppoſes his enjoying that pleaſure will be the means of.

Some ends are ſubordinate ends, not only as they are ſubordinated to an ultimate end; but alſo to another end that is itſelf but a ſubordinate end: Yea, there may be a ſucceſſion or chain of many ſubordinate ends, one dependent on another,—one ſought for another: The firſt for the next; and that for the ſake of the next to that,—and ſo on in a long ſeries, before you come to any thing that the agent aims at, and ſeeks for its own ſake:—As when a man ſells a garment to get money—to buy tools—to till his land—to obtain a crop—to ſupply him with food—to gratify the appetite. And he ſeeks to gratify his appetite, on its own account, as what is grateful in itſelf. Here the end of his ſelling his garment is to get money; but getting money is only a ſubordinate end: It is not only ſubordinate to the laſt end, his gratifying his appetite; but to a nearer end, *viz.* his buying huſbandry tools; and his obtaining theſe is only a ſubordinate end, being only for the ſake of tilling land: And the tillage of land is an end not ſought on its own account,

count, but for the ſake of the crop to be produced: And the crop produced is not an ultimate end, or an end ſought for itſelf, but only for the ſake of making bread: And the having bread, is not ſought on its own account, but for the ſake of gratifying the appetite.

Here the gratifying the appetite is called the ultimate end; becauſe it is the laſt in the chain where a man's aim and purſuit ſtops and reſts, obtaining in that the thing finally aimed at. So whenever a man comes to that in which his deſire terminates and reſts, it being ſomething valued on its own account, then he comes to an ultimate end, let the chain be longer or ſhorter; yea, if there be but one link or one ſtep that he takes before he comes to this end. As when a man that loves honey puts it into his mouth, for the ſake of the pleaſure of the taſte, without aiming at any thing further. So that an end which an agent has in view, may be both his immediate and his ultimate end; his next and his laſt end. That end which is ſought for the ſake of itſelf, and not for the ſake of a further end, is an ultimate end; it is ultimate or laſt, as it has no other beyond it, for whoſe ſake it is, it being for the ſake of itſelf: So that here the aim of the agent ſtops and reſts, (without going further), being come to the good which he eſteems a recompence of its purſuit for its own value.

Here it is to be noted, that a thing ſought may have the nature of an ultimate, and alſo of a ſubordinate end; as it may be ſought partly on its own account, and partly for the ſake of a further end. Thus a man, in what he does, may ſeek the love and reſpect of a particular perſon, partly on its own account, becauſe it is in itſelf agreeable to men to be the objects of others eſteem and love; and partly, becauſe he hopes, through the friendſhip of that perſon, to have his aſſiſtance in other affairs; and ſo to be put under advantage for the obtaining further ends.

A chief end, or higheſt end, which is oppoſite not properly to a ſubordinate end, but to an inferior end,

is ſomething diverſe from an ultimate end. The chief end is an end that is moſt valued; and therefore moſt ſought after by the agent in what he does. It is evident, that to be an end more valued than another end, is not exactly the ſame thing as to be an end valued ultimately, or for its own ſake. This will appear, if it be conſidered.

1. That two different ends may be both ultimate ends, and yet not be chief ends. They may be both valued for their own ſake, and both ſought in the ſame work or acts, and yet one valued more highly, and ſought more than another: Thus a man may go a journey to obtain two different benefits or enjoyments, both which may be agreeable to him in themſelves conſidered, and ſo both may be what he values on their own account, and ſeeks for their own ſake; and yet one may be much more agreeable than the other; and ſo be what he ſets his heart chiefly upon, and ſeeks moſt after in his going a journey. Thus a man may go a journey partly to obtain the poſſeſſion and enjoyment of a bride that is very dear to him, and partly to gratify his curioſity in looking in a teleſcope, or ſome new-invented and extraordinary optic glaſs: Both may be ends he ſeeks in his journey, and the one not properly ſubordinate or in order to another. One may not depend on another; and therefore both may be ultimate ends: But yet the obtaining his beloved bride may be his chief end; and the benefit of the optic glaſs his inferior end. The former may be what he ſets his heart vaſtly moſt upon; and ſo be properly the chief end of his journey.

2. An ultimate end is not always the chief end, becauſe ſome ſubordinate ends may be more valued and ſought after than ſome ultimate ends. Thus, for inſtance, a man may aim at theſe two things in his going a journey; one may be to viſit his friends, and another to receive a great eſtate, or a large ſum of money, that lies ready for him at the place to which he is going. The latter, *viz.* his receiving the ſum of money, may be but a ſubordinate end: He may not

not value the ſilver and gold on their own account, but only for the pleaſure, gratifications, and honour; that is the ultimate end, and not the money, which is valued only as a means of the other. But yet the obtaining the money may be what is more valued, and ſo an higher end of his journey than the pleaſure of ſeeing his friends; though the latter is what is valued on its own account, and ſo is an ultimate end.

But here ſeveral things may noted:

*Firſt*, That when it is ſaid, that ſome ſubordinate ends may be more valued than ſome ultimate ends, it is not ſuppoſed that ever a ſubordinate end is more valued than that ultimate end or ends to which it is ſubordinate; becauſe a ſubordinate end has no value, but what it derives from its ultimate end: For that reaſon it is called a ſubordinate end, becauſe it is valued and ſought not for its own ſake, or its own value, but only in ſubordination to a further end, or for the ſake of the ultimate end, that it is in order to: But yet a ſubordinate end may be valued more than ſome other ultimate end that it is not ſubordinate to, but is independent of it, and do not belong to that ſeries, or chain of ends. Thus, for inſtance, if a man goes a journey to receive a ſum of money; not at all as an ultimate end, or becauſe he has any value for the ſilver and gold for their own ſake, but only for the value of the pleaſure and honour that the money may be a means of. In this caſe it is impoſſible that the ſubordinate end, *viz.* his having the money, ſhould be more valued by him than the pleaſure and honour for which he values it. It would be abſurd to ſuppoſe that he values the means more than the end, when he has no value for the means, but for the ſake of the end of which it is the means: But yet he may value the money, though but a ſubordinate end, more than ſome other ultimate end to which it is not ſubordinate, and with which it has no connection. For inſtance, more than the comfort of a friendly viſit, which was one end of his journey.

*Secondly*, Not only is a ſubordinate end never ſuperior to that ultimate end to which it is ſubordinate; but the ultimate end is always (not only equal but) ſuperior to its ſubordinate end, and more valued by the agent; unleſs it be when the ultimate end entirely depends on the ſubordinate: So that he has no other means by which to obtain his laſt end, and alſo is looked upon as certainly connected with it,—then the ſubordinate end may be as much valued as the laſt end; becauſe the laſt end, in ſuch a caſe does altogether depend upon, and is wholly and certainly conveyed, by it. As for inſtance, if a pregnant woman has a peculiar appetite to a certain rare fruit that is to be found only in the garden of a particular friend of hers, at a diſtance; and ſhe goes a journey to go to her friend's houſe or garden, to obtain that fruit—the ultimate end of her journey is to gratify that ſtrong appetite: The obtaining that fruit, is the ſubordinate end of it. If ſhe looks upon it, that the appetite can be gratified by no other means than the obtaining that fruit; and that it will certainly be gratified if ſhe obtains it, then ſhe will value the fruit as much as ſhe values the gratification of her appetite. But otherwiſe, it will not be ſo. If ſhe be doubtful whether that fruit will ſatisfy her craving, then ſhe will not value it equally with the gratification of her appetite itſelf; or if there be ſome other fruit that ſhe knows of, that will gratify her deſire, at leaſt in part, which ſhe can obtain without ſuch inconvenience or trouble, as ſhall countervail the gratification; which is in effect fruſtrating her of her laſt end, becauſe her laſt end is the pleaſure of gratifying her appetite, without any trouble that ſhall countervail, and in effect deſtroy it; or if it be ſo, that her appetite cannot be gratified without this fruit, nor yet with it alone, without ſomething elſe to be compounded with it,—then her value for her laſt end will be divided between theſe ſeveral ingredients as ſo many ſubordinate, and no one alone will be equally valued with the laſt end.

Hence it rarely happens among mankind, that a ſubordinate

ſubordinate end is equally valued with its laſt end; becauſe the obtaining of a laſt end rarely depends on one ſingle, uncompounded means, and is infallibly connected with that means: Therefore, mens laſt ends are commonly their higheſt ends.

*Thirdly*, If any being has but one ultimate end, in all that he does, and there be a great variety of operations, his laſt end may juſtly be looked upon as his *ſupreme* end: For in ſuch a caſe, every other end but that one, is an end to that end; and therefore no other end can be ſuperior to it. Becauſe, as was obſerved before, a ſubordinate end is never more valued than the end to which it is ſubordinate.

Moreover, the ſubordinate effects, events, or things brought to paſs, which all are means of this end, all uniting to contribute their ſhare towards the obtaining the one laſt end, are very various; and therefore, by what has been now obſerved, the ultimate end of all muſt be valued more than any one of the particular means. This ſeems to be the caſe with the works of God, as may more fully appear in the ſequel.

From what has been ſaid, to explain what is intended by an ultimate end, the following things may be obſerved concerning ultimate ends in the ſenſe explained.

*Fourthly*, Whatſoever any agent has in view in any thing he does, which he loves, or which is an immediate gratification of any appetite or inclination of nature; and is agreeable to him in itſelf, and not merely for the ſake of ſomething elſe, is regarded by that agent as his laſt end. The ſame may be ſaid of avoiding of that which is in itſelf painful or diſagreeable: For the avoiding of what is diſagreeable is agreeable. This will be evident to any bearing in mind the meaning of the terms. By laſt end being meant, that which is regarded and ſought by an agent, as agreeable or deſireable for its own ſake; a ſubordinate, that which is ſought only for the ſake of ſomething elſe.

*Fifthly*, From hence it will follow, that, if an agent in his works has in view more things than one that will

will be brought to paſs by what he does, that are agreeable to him, conſidered in themſelves, or what he loves and delights in on their own account,---then he muſt have more things than one that he regards as his laſt ends in what he does. But if there be but one thing that an agent ſeeks, as the conſequence of what he does that is agreeable to him, on its own account, then there can be but one laſt end which he has in all his actions and operations.

But only here a diſtinction muſt be obſerved of things which may be ſaid to be agreeable to an agent, in themſelves conſidered in two ſenſes. (1.) What is in itſelf grateful to an agent, and valued and loved on its own account, *ſimply* and *abſolutely* conſidered, and is ſo univerſally and originally antecedent to, and *independent* of all conditions, or any ſuppoſition of particular caſes and circumſtances. And, (2.) What may be ſaid to be in itſelf agreeable to an agent, *hypothetically* and conſequentially; or, on ſuppoſition or condition of ſuch and ſuch circumſtances, or on the happening of ſuch a particular caſe. Thus, for inſtance, a man may originally love ſociety. An inclination to ſociety may be implanted in his very nature; and ſociety may be agreeable to him antecedent to all preſuppoſed caſes and circumſtances; and this may cauſe him to ſeek a family. And the comfort of ſociety may be originally his laſt end, in ſeeking a family. But after he has a family, peace, good order, and mutual juſtice and friendſhip in his family, may be agreeable to him, and what he delights in for their own ſake; and therefore theſe things may be his laſt end in many things he does in the government and regulation of his family. But they were not his original end with reſpect to his family. The juſtice and peace of a family was not properly his laſt end before he had a family, that induced him to ſeek a family, but conſequentially. And the caſe being put of his having a family, then theſe things wherein the good order and beauty of a family conſiſt, become his laſt end in many things he does in ſuch circumſtances. In like manner we muſt ſuppoſe that God,

before

before he created the world, had ſome good in view, as a conſequence of the world's exiſtence, that was originally agreeable to him in itſelf conſidered, that inclined him to create the world, or bring the univerſe, with various intelligent creatures into exiſtence, in ſuch a manner as he created it. But after the world was created, and ſuch and ſuch intelligent creatures actually had exiſtence, in ſuch and ſuch circumſtances, then a wiſe, juſt regulation of them was agreeable to God, in itſelf conſidered. And God's love of juſtice, and hatred of injuſtice, would be ſufficient in ſuch a caſe to induce God to deal juſtly with his creatures, and to prevent all injuſtice in him towards them. But yet there is no neceſſity of ſuppoſing, that God's love of doing juſtly to intelligent beings, and hatred of the contrary, was what originally induced God to create the world, and make intelligent beings; and ſo to order the occaſion of doing either juſtly or unjuſtly. The juſtice of God's nature makes a juſt regulation agreeable, and the contrary diſagreeable, as there is occaſion, the ſubject being ſuppoſed, and the occaſion given: But we muſt ſuppoſe ſomething elſe that ſhould incline him to create the ſubjects, or order the occaſion.

So that perfection of God which we call his faithfulneſs, or his inclination to fulfil his promiſes to his creatures, could not properly be what moved him to create the world; nor could ſuch a fulfilment of his promiſes to his creatures be his laſt end in giving the creatures being. But yet after the world is created, after intelligent creatures are made, and God has bound himſelf by promiſe to them, then that diſpoſition, which is called his faithfulneſs, may move him in his providential diſpoſals towards them; and this may be the end of many of God's works of providence, even the exerciſe of his faithfulneſs in fulfilling his promiſes, and may be in the lower ſenſe his laſt end; becauſe faithfulneſs and truth muſt be ſuppoſed to be what is in itſelf amiable to God, and what he delights in for its own ſake. Thus God may have ends of particular works of providence, which are ultimate ends

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in a lower ſenſe, which were not ultimate ends of the creation.

So that here we have two ſorts of ultimate ends; one of which may be called an original and independent ultimate end; the other conſequential and dependent; for it is evident, the latter ſort are truly of the nature of ultimate ends: Becauſe, tho' their being agreeable to the agent, or the agent's deſire of them be conſequential on the exiſtence, or ſuppoſition of proper ſubjects and occaſion, yet the ſubject and occaſion being ſuppoſed, they are agreeable and amiable in themſelves. We may ſuppoſe, that to a righteous Being, the doing juſtice between two parties, with whom he is concerned, is agreeable in itſelf, and is loved for its own ſake, and not merely for the ſake of ſome other end: And yet we may ſuppoſe, that a deſire of doing juſtice between two parties, may be conſequential on the being of thoſe parties, and the occaſion given.

Therefore I make a diſtinction between an end that in this manner is *conſequential*, and a *ſubordinate* end.

It may be obſerved, that when I ſpeak of God's ultimate end in the creation of the world, in the following diſcourſe, I commonly mean in that higheſt ſenſe, *viz.* the original ultimate end.

*Sixthly*, It may be further obſerved, that the original ultimate end or ends of the creation of the world is *alone*, that which induces God to give the occaſion for conſequential ends, by the firſt creation of the world, and the original diſpoſal of it. And the more original the end is, the more extenſive and univerſal it is. That which God had primarily in view in creating, and the original ordination of the world, muſt be conſtantly kept in view, and have a governing influence in all God's works, or with reſpect to every thing that he does towards his creatures. And therefore,

*Seventhly*, If we uſe the phraſe ultimate end in this higheſt ſenſe, then the ſame that is God's ultimate end in creating the world, if we ſuppoſe but one ſuch end, muſt be what he makes his ultimate aim in all his works,

works, in every thing he does either in creation or providence. But we muſt ſuppoſe, that in the uſe which God puts the creatures to that he hath made, he muſt evermore have a regard to the end for which he has made them. But if we take *ultimate end* in the other lower ſenſe, God may ſometimes have regard to thoſe things as ultimate ends, in particular works of providence, which could not in any proper ſenſe be his laſt end in creating the world.

*Eighthly*, On the other hand, whatever appears to be God's ultimate end in any ſenſe, of his works of providence in general, that muſt be the ultimate end of the work of creation itſelf. For though it be ſo that God may act for an end that is an ultimate end in a lower ſenſe, in ſome of his works of providence, which is not the ultimate end of the creation of the world, yet this doth not take place with regard to the works of providence in general. But we may juſtly look upon whatſoever has the nature of an ultimate end of God's works of providence in general, that the ſame is alſo an ultimate end of the creation of the world; for God's works of providence in general, are the ſame with the general uſe that he puts the world to that he has made. And we may well argue from what we ſee of the general uſe which God makes of the world, to the general end for which he deſigned the world. Though there may be ſome things that are ends of particular works of providence, that were not the laſt end of the creation, which are in themſelves grateful to God in ſuch particular emergent circumſtances, and ſo are laſt ends in an inferior ſenſe; yet this is only in certain caſes, or particular occaſions. But if they are laſt ends of God's proceedings in the uſe of the world in general, this ſhews that his making them laſt ends do not depend on particular caſes and circumſtances, but the nature of things in general, and his general deſign in the being and conſtitution of the univerſe.

*Ninthly*, If there be but one thing that is originally and independent on any future ſuppoſed caſes, agree-

able to God, to be obtained by the creation of the world, then there can be but one laſt end of God's work, in this higheſt ſenſe: But if there are various things, properly diverſe one from another, that are abſolutely and independently on the ſuppoſition of any future given caſes, agreeable to the divine Being, which are actually obtained by the creation of the world, then there were ſeveral ultimate ends of the creation in that higheſt ſenſe.

## CHAPTER I.

### Wherein is conſidered, what Reaſon teaches concerning this Affair.

### SECTION I.

#### Some Things obſerved in general, which Reaſon dictates.

HAVING obſerved theſe things which are proper to be taken notice of, to prevent confuſion in diſcourſes on this ſubject, I now proceed to conſider what *may*, and what may *not*, be ſuppoſed to be God's ultimate end in the creation of the world.

And, in the *firſt* place, I would obſerve ſome things which reaſon ſeems to dictate in this matter. Indeed this affair ſeems properly to be an affair of divine revelation. In order to be determined what was aimed at, or deſigned, in the creating of the aſtoniſhing fabric of the univerſe which we behold, it becomes us to attend to, and rely on, what he has told us who was the Architect that built it. He beſt knows his own

own heart, and what his own ends and deſigns were in the wonderful works which he has wrought. Nor is it to be ſuppoſed that mankind, who, while deſtitute of revelation, by the utmoſt improvements of their own reaſon, and advances in ſcience and philoſophy, could come to no clear and eſtabliſhed determination who the author of the world was, would ever have obtained any tolerable ſettled judgment of the end which the author of it propoſed to himſelf in ſo vaſt, complicated, and wonderful a work of his hands. And though it be true, that the revelation which God has given to men, which has been in the world, as a light ſhining in a dark place, has been the occaſion of great improvement of their faculties, has taught men how to uſe their reaſon; (in which regard, notwithſtanding the nobleneſs and excellency of the faculties which God had given them, they ſeemed to be in themſelves almoſt helpleſs.) And though mankind now, through the long continual aſſiſtance they have had by this divine light, have come to attainments in the habitual exerciſe of reaſon, which are far beyond what otherwiſe they would have arrived to; yet I confeſs it would be relying too much on reaſon, to determine the affair of God's laſt end in the creation of the world only by our own reaſon, or without being herein principally guided by divine revelation, ſince God has given a revelation containing inſtructions concerning this matter. Nevertheleſs, as in the diſputes, and wranglings which have been about this matter thoſe objections, which have chiefly been made uſe of againſt what I think the ſcriptures have truly revealed, have been from the pretended dictates of reaſon,—*I would, in the firſt place, ſoberly conſider in a few things, what ſeems rational to be ſuppoſed concerning this affair*;—*and then proceed to conſider what light divine revelation gives us in it.*

As to the firſt of theſe, *viz.* what ſeems in itſelf rational to be ſuppoſed concerning this matter, I think the following things appear to be the dictates of reaſon:

1. That no notion of God's laſt end in the creation of the world is agreeable to reaſon, which would truly imply or infer any indigence, inſufficiency and mutability in God; or any dependence of the Creator on the creature, for any part of his perfection or happineſs. Becauſe it is evident, by both ſcripture and reaſon, that God is infinitely, eternally, unchangeably, and independently glorious and happy; that he ſtands in no need of, cannot be profited by, or receive any thing from the creature; or be truly hurt, or be the ſubject of any ſufferings or *impair* of his glory and felicity from any other being. I need not ſtand to produce the proofs of God's being ſuch a one, it being ſo univerſally allowed and maintained by ſuch as call themſelves Chriſtians.—The notion of God's creating the world in order to receive any thing properly from the creature, is not only contrary to the nature of God, but inconſiſtent with the notion of creation; which implies a being's receiving its exiſtence, and all that belongs to its being, out of nothing. And this implies the moſt perfect, abſolute, and univerſal derivation and dependence. Now, if the creature receives its all from God entirely and perfectly, how is it poſſible that it ſhould have any thing to add to God, to make him in any reſpect more than he was before, and ſo the Creator become dependent on the creature?

2. Whatſoever is good and valuable in itſelf, is worthy that God ſhould value for itſelf, and on its own account; or which is the ſame thing, value it with an ultimate value or reſpect. It is therefore worthy to be ultimately ſought by God, or made the laſt end of his action and operation; if it be a thing of ſuch a nature as to be properly capable of being attained in any divine operation. For it may be ſuppoſed that ſome things, which are valuable and excellent in themſelves, are not properly capable of being attained in any divine operation; becauſe they do not remain to be attained; but their exiſtence in all poſſible reſpects, muſt be conceived of as prior to any divine operation. Thus God's exiſtence and infinite perfection, though infinitely

infinitely valuable in themſelves, and infinitely valued by God, yet cannot be ſuppoſed to be the end of any divine operation. For we cannot conceive of them as in any reſpect conſequent on any works of God: —But *whatever is in itſelf valuable, abſolutely ſo, and that is capable of being ſought and attained, is worthy to be made a laſt end of the divine operation.*——Therefore,

3. Whatever that be which is in itſelf moſt valuable, and was ſo originally, prior to the creation of the world, and which is attainable by the creation, if there be any thing which was ſuperior in value to all others, *that* muſt be worthy to be God's laſt end in the creation; and alſo worthy to be his higheſt end.—In conſequence of this it will follow.

4. That if God himſelf be in any reſpect properly capable of being his own end in the creation of the world, then it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe that he had reſpect to *himſelf* as his laſt and higheſt end in this work; becauſe he is worthy in himſelf to be ſo, being infinitely the greateſt and beſt of beings. All things elſe, with regard to worthineſs, importance, and excellence, are perfectly as nothing in compariſon of him. And therefore, if God eſteems, values, and has reſpect to things according to their nature and proportions, he muſt neceſſarily have the greateſt reſpect to himſelf. It would be againſt the perfection of his nature, his wiſdom, holineſs, and perfect rectitude, whereby he is diſpoſed to do every thing that is fit to be done, to ſuppoſe otherwiſe. At leaſt a great part of the moral rectitude of the heart of God, whereby he is diſpoſed to every thing that is fit, ſuitable, and amiable in itſelf, conſiſts in his having infinitely the higheſt regard to that which is in itſelf infinitely higheſt and beſt: Yea it is in this that it ſeems chiefly to conſiſt.—The moral rectitude of God's heart muſt conſiſt in a proper and due reſpect of his heart to things that are objects of moral reſpect; that is, to intelligent beings capable of moral actions and relations. And therefore it muſt chiefly conſiſt in giving due reſpect to that Being to whom

moſt is due; yea, infinitely moſt, and in effect all. For God is infinitely the moſt worthy of regard. The worthineſs of others is as nothing to his: So that to him belongs all poſſible reſpect. To him belongs the whole of the reſpect that any moral agent, either God, or any intelligent being is capable of. To him belongs all the heart. Therefore, if moral rectitude of heart conſiſts in paying the reſpect or regard of the heart which is due, or which fitneſs and ſuitableneſs requires, fitneſs requires infinitely the greateſt regard to be paid to God; and the denying ſupreme regard here would be a conduct infinitely the moſt unfit. Therefore a proper regard to this Being, is what the fitneſs of regard does infinitely moſt conſiſt in. Hence it will follow—*that the moral rectitude and fitneſs of the diſpoſition, inclination, or affection of God's heart, does chiefly conſiſt in a reſpect or regard to himſelf, infinitely above his regard to all other beings*; or, in other words, his holineſs conſiſts in this.

And if it be thus fit that God ſhould have a ſupreme regard to himſelf, then it is fit that this ſupreme regard ſhould appear in thoſe things by which he makes himſelf known, or by his *word* and *works*, *i. e.* in what he ſays, and in what he does. If it be an infinitely amiable thing in God that he ſhould have a ſupreme regard to himſelf, then it is an amiable thing that he ſhould act as having a chief regard to himſelf; or act in ſuch a manner, as to ſhew that he has ſuch a regard; that what is higheſt in God's heart, may be higheſt in his actions and conduct. And if it was God's intention, as there is great reaſon to think it was, that his works ſhould exhibit an image of himſelf their author, that it might brightly appear by his works what manner of being he is, and afford a proper repreſentation of his divine excellencies, and eſpecially his *moral* excellence, conſiſting in the *diſpoſition of his heart*; then it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe that his works are ſo wrought as to ſhew this ſupreme reſpect to himſelf, wherein his moral excellency does primarily conſiſt.

When we are conſidering with ourſelves, what would

would be moſt fit and proper for God to have a chief reſpect to, in his proceedings in general, with regard to the univerſality of things, it may help us to judge of the matter with the greater eaſe and ſatisfaction, to conſider what we can ſuppoſe would be judged and determined by ſome third being of perfect wiſdom and rectitude, neither the Creator nor one of the creatures, that ſhould be perfectly indifferent and diſintereſted. Or if we make the ſuppoſition, that wiſdom itſelf, or infinitely wiſe juſtice and rectitude, were a diſtinct diſintereſted perſon, whoſe office it was to determine how things ſhall be moſt fitly and properly ordered in the whole ſyſtem, or kingdom of exiſtence, including king and ſubjects, God and his creatures; and upon a view of the whole, to decide what regard ſhould prevail and govern in all proceedings. Now ſuch a judge, in adjuſting the proper meaſures and kinds of regard that every part of exiſtence is to have, would weigh things in an even balance; taking care, that greater or more exiſtence ſhould have a greater ſhare than leſs, that a greater part of the whole ſhould be more looked at and reſpected, than the leſſer in proportion (other things being equal) to the meaſure of exiſtence,—that the more excellent ſhould be more regarded than the leſs excellent:—So that the *degree of regard* ſhould always be in a *proportion compounded* of the *proportion* of *exiſtence*, and *proportion* of *excellence*, or according to the degree of *greatneſs* and *goodneſs*, conſidered *conjunctly*.—Such an arbiter, in conſidering the ſyſtem of created intelligent beings by itſelf, would determine, that the ſyſtem in general, conſiſting of many millions, was of greater importance, and worthy of a greater ſhare of regard, than only one individual. For however conſiderable ſome of the individuals might be, ſo that they might be much greater and better, and have a greater ſhare of the ſum total of exiſtence and excellence than another individual, yet no one exceeds others ſo much as to countervail all the reſt of the ſyſtem. And if this judge conſider not only the ſyſtem of created be-

ings, but the ſyſtem of being in general, comprehending the ſum total of univerſal exiſtence, both Creator and creature; ſtill every part muſt be conſidered according to its weight and importance, or the meaſure it has of exiſtence and excellence. To determine then, what proportion of regard is to be alloted to the Creator, and all his creatures taken together, both muſt be as it were put in the balance;—the *ſupreme Being*, with all in him that is great, conſiderable, and excellent, is to be eſtimated and compared with all that is to be found in the whole creation: And according as the former is found to out-weigh, in ſuch proportion is he to have a greater ſhare of regard.—And in this caſe, as the whole ſyſtem of created beings in compariſon of the Creator, would be found as the light duſt of the balance, (which is taken notice of by him that weighs) and as nothing and vanity; ſo the arbiter muſt determine accordingly with reſpect to the degree in which God ſhould be regarded by all intelligent exiſtence, and the degree in which he ſhould be regarded in all that is done thro' the whole univerſal ſyſtem, in all actions and proceedings, determinations and effects whatever, whether creating, preſerving, uſing, diſpoſing, changing, or deſtroying. And as the Creator is infinite, and has all poſſible exiſtence, perfection and excellence, ſo he muſt have all poſſible regard. As he is every way the firſt and ſupreme, and as his excellency is in all reſpects the ſupreme beauty and glory, the original good, and fountain of all good; ſo he muſt have in all reſpects the ſupreme regard. And as he is God over all, to whom all are properly ſubordinate, and on whom all depend, worthy to reign as ſupreme head with abſolute and univerſal dominion; ſo it is fit that he ſhould be ſo regarded by all, and in all proceedings and effects thro' the whole ſyſtem: That univerſality of things in their whole compaſs and ſeries ſhould look to him, and reſpect him in ſuch a manner, as that reſpect to him ſhould reign over all reſpect to other things, and that regard to creatures ſhould univerſally be ſubordinate and ſubject.

When I ſpeak of regard to be thus adjuſted in the univerſal

univerſal ſyſtem, or ſum total of exiſtence, I mean the regard of the ſum total; not only the regard of individual creatures, or all creatures, but of all intelligent exiſtence, created, and uncreated. For it is fit, that the regard of the Creator ſhould be proportioned to the worthineſs of objects, as well as the regard of creatures. Thus we muſt conclude ſuch an arbiter, as I have ſuppoſed would determine in this buſineſs, being about to decide how matters ſhould proceed moſt fitly, properly, and according to the nature of things. He would therefore determine, that the whole univerſe, including all creatures, animate and inanimate, in all its actings, proceedings, revolutions, and entire ſeries of events, ſhould proceed from a regard and with a view to *God*, as the ſupreme and laſt end of all: That every wheel, both great and ſmall, in all its rotations, ſhould move with a conſtant invariable regard to him as the ultimate end of all; as perfectly and uniformly, as if the whole ſyſtem were animated and directed by one common ſoul: Or, as if ſuch an arbiter as I have before ſuppoſed, one poſſeſſed of perfect wiſdom and rectitude, became the common ſoul of the univerſe, and actuated and governed it in all its motions.

Thus I have gone upon the ſuppoſition of a third perſon, neither Creator nor creature, but a diſintereſted perſon ſtepping in to judge of the concerns of both, and ſtate what is moſt fit and proper between them. The thing ſuppoſed is impoſſible; but the caſe is nevertheleſs juſt the ſame as to what is moſt fit and ſuitable in itſelf. For it is moſt certainly proper for God to act, according to the greateſt *fitneſs*, in his proceedings, and he knows what the greateſt *fitneſs* is, as much as if perfect rectitude were a diſtinct perſon to direct him. As therefore there is no third being, beſide God and the created ſyſtem, nor can be, ſo there is no need of any; ſeeing God himſelf is poſſeſſed of that perfect diſcernment and rectitude which have been ſuppoſed. It belongs to him as ſupreme arbiter, and to his infinite wiſdom and rectitude, to ſtate all rules and meaſures of proceedings. And ſeeing

ing theſe attributes of God are infinite, and moſt abſolutely perfect, they are not the leſs fit to order and diſpoſe, becauſe they are in him, who is a being concerned, and not a third perſon that is diſintereſted.—For being intereſted unfits a perſon to be an arbiter or judge, no otherwiſe than as intereſt tends to blind and miſlead his judgment, or incline him to act contrary to it. But that God ſhould be in danger of either, is contrary to the ſuppoſition of his being poſſeſſed of diſcerning, and juſtice abſolutely perfect. And as there muſt be ſome ſupreme judge of fitneſs and propriety in the univerſality of things, as otherwiſe there could be no order nor regularity, it therefore belongs to God, whoſe are all things, who is perfectly fit for this office, and who alone is ſo, to ſtate all things according to the moſt perfect fitneſs and rectitude, as much as if perfect rectitude were a diſtinct perſon. We may therefore be ſure it is and will be done.

I ſhould think that theſe things might incline us to ſuppoſe, that God has not forgot himſelf, in the ends which he propoſed in the creation of the world; but that he has ſo ſtated theſe ends, (however he is ſelf-ſufficient, immutable and independent), as therein plainly to ſhew a ſupreme regard to himſelf. Whether this can be, or whether God has done thus, muſt be conſidered afterwards, as alſo what may be objected againſt this view of things.

5. Whatſoever is good, amiable, and valuable in itſelf, abſolutely and originally, which facts and events ſhew that God aimed at in the creation of the world, muſt be ſuppoſed to be regarded, or aimed at by God *ultimately*, or as an ultimate end of creation.—For we muſt ſuppoſe from the perfection of God's nature, that whatſoever is valuable and amiable in itſelf, ſimply and abſolutely conſidered, God values ſimply for itſelf; it is agreeable to him abſolutely on its own account; becauſe God's judgment and eſteem are according to truth. He values and loves things accordingly, as they are worthy to be valued and loved. But if God values a thing, ſimply and abſolutely for itſelf,

itſelf, and on its own account, then it is the ultimate object of his value; he does not value it merely for the ſake of a further end to be attained by it. For to ſuppoſe that he values it only for ſome farther end, is in direct contradiction to the preſent ſuppoſition, which is, that he values it abſolutely, and for itſelf.—Hence it moſt clearly follows, that if that which God values ultimately, and for itſelf, appears in fact and experience to be what he ſeeks by any thing he does, he muſt regard it as an ultimate end. And, therefore, if he ſeeks it in creating the world, or any part of the world, it is an ultimate end of the work of creation.—Having got thus far, we may now proceed a ſtep farther, and aſſert.

6. Whatſoever thing is actually the effect or conſequence of the creation of the world, which is ſimply and abſolutely good and valuable in itſelf, that thing is an ultimate end of God's creating the world.—We ſee that it is a good that God aimed at by the creation of the world; becauſe he has actually attained it by that means. This is an evidence that he intended to attain, or aimed at it. For we may juſtly infer what God intends, by what he actually does; becauſe he does nothing inadvertently, or without deſign. But whatever God intends to attain from a value for it; or, in other words whatever he aims at in his actions and works that he values; he ſeeks that thing in thoſe acts and works. Becauſe, for an agent to intend to attain ſomething he values by means he uſes, is the ſame thing as to ſeek it by thoſe means. And this is the ſame as to make that thing his end in thoſe means. Now, it being by the ſuppoſition what God values ultimately, it muſt therefore, by the preceding poſition, be aimed at by God as an ultimate end of creating the world.

SECT.

## SECT. II.

SOME farther obſervations concerning thoſe things which reaſon leads us to ſuppoſe God aimed at in the creation of the world, ſhewing particularly what things that are abſolutely good, are actually the conſequence of the creation of the world.

From what was laſt obſerved, it ſeems to be the moſt proper and juſt way of proceeding, as we would ſee what light reaſon will give us reſpecting the particular end or ends God had ultimately in view in the creation of the world, to conſider what thing or things are actually the effect or conſequence of the creation of the world, that are ſimply and originally valuable in themſelves. And this is what I would directly proceed to, without entering on any tedious metaphyſical enquiries, wherein fitneſs, amiableneſs, or valuableneſs conſiſts; or what that is in the nature of ſome things, which is properly the foundation of a worthineſs of being loved and eſteemed on their own account. In this, I muſt at preſent refer what I ſay to the ſenſe and dictates of the reader's mind, on ſedate and calm reflection.——I proceed to obſerve,

1. It ſeems a thing in itſelf fit, proper, and deſirable, that the glorious attributes of God, which conſiſt in a ſufficiency to certain acts and effects, ſhould be exerted in the production of ſuch effects, as might manifeſt the infinite power, wiſdom, righteouſneſs, goodneſs, &c. which are in God. If the world had not been created, theſe attributes never would have had any exerciſe. The power of God, which is a ſufficiency in him to produce great effects, muſt for ever have been dormant and uſeleſs as to any effect. The divine wiſdom and prudence would have had no exerciſe in any wiſe contrivance, any prudent proceeding or diſpoſal of things; for there would have been no objects of contrivance or diſpoſal. The ſame might be obſerved of God's juſtice, goodneſs, and truth.—Indeed God might have known as perfectly that he poſſeſſed

poſſeſſed theſe attributes, if they had never been exerted or expreſſed in any effect. But then, if the attributes which conſiſt in a ſufficiency for correſpondent effects, are in themſelves excellent, the exerciſes of them muſt likewiſe be excellent. If it be an excellent thing, that there ſhould be a ſufficiency for a certain kind of action or operation, the excellency of ſuch a ſufficiency muſt conſiſt in its relation to this kind of operation or effect; but that could not be, unleſs the operation itſelf were excellent. A ſufficiency for any act or work is no farther valuable than the work or effect is valuable.* As God therefore eſteems theſe attributes themſelves valuable, and delights in them; ſo it is natural to ſuppoſe that he delights in their proper exerciſe and expreſſion. For the ſame reaſon that he eſteems his own ſufficiency wiſely to contrive and diſpoſe effects, he alſo will eſteem the wiſe contrivance and diſpoſition itſelf. And for the ſame reaſon, as he delights in his own diſpoſition to do juſtly, and to diſpoſe of things according to truth and juſt proportion; ſo he muſt delight in ſuch a righteous diſpoſal itſelf.

2. It ſeems to be a thing in itſelf fit and deſirable, that the glorious perfections of God ſhould be known, and the operations and expreſſions of them ſeen by other beings beſides himſelf. If it be fit that God's power and wiſdom, &c. ſhould be exerciſed and expreſſed in ſome effects, and not lie eternally dormant, then it ſeems proper

* As we muſt conceive of things, the end and perfection of theſe attributes does a it were conſiſt in their exerciſe: "The end of wiſdom (ſays Mr G. Tennent, in his Sermon at the opening of the preſbyterian church of Philadelphia) is deſign; the end of power is action; the end of goodneſs is doing good. To ſuppoſe theſe perfections not to be exerted, would be to repreſent them as inſignificant. Of what uſe would God's wiſdom be, if it had nothing to deſign or direct? To what purpoſe his almightineſs, if it never brought any thing to paſs? And of what avail his goodneſs, if it never did any good?"

proper that theſe exerciſes ſhould appear, and not be totally hidden and unknown. For if they are, it will be juſt the ſame as to the above purpoſe, as if they were not. God as perfectly knew himſelf and his perfections, had as perfect an idea of the exerciſes and effects they were ſufficient for, antecedently to any ſuch actual operations of them, as ſince. If, therefore, it be nevertheleſs a thing in itſelf valuable, and worthy to be deſired, that theſe glorious perfections be actually expreſſed and exhibited in their correſpondent effects; then it ſeems alſo, that the knowledge of theſe perfections, and the expreſſions and diſcoveries that are made of them, is a thing valuable in itſelf abſolutely conſidered; and that it is deſirable that this knowledge ſhould exiſt. As God's perfections are things in themſelves excellent, ſo the expreſſion of them in their proper acts and fruits is excellent; and the knowledge of theſe excellent perfections, and of theſe glorious expreſſions of them, is an excellent thing, the exiſtence of which, is in itſelf valuable and deſirable.—It is a thing infinitely good in itſelf, that God's glory ſhould be known by a glorious ſociety of created beings. And that there ſhould be in them an increaſing knowledge of God to all eternity, is an exiſtence, a reality infinitely worthy to be, and worthy to be valued and regarded by him, to whom it belongs to order that to be, which, of all things poſſible, is fitteſt and beſt. If exiſtence is more worthy than defect and non-entity, and if any created exiſtence is in itſelf worthy to be, then knowledge or underſtanding is a thing worthy to be; and if any knowledge, then the moſt excellent ſort of knowledge, *viz.* that of God and his glory. The exiſtence of the created univerſe conſiſts as much in it as in any thing: Yea this knowledge, is one of the higheſt, moſt real and ſubſtantial parts of all created exiſtence, moſt remote from non-entity and defect.

3. As it is a thing valuable and deſirable in itſelf that God's glory ſhould be ſeen and known, ſo when known, it ſeems equally reaſonable and fit it ſhould be

be valued and eſteemed, loved and delighted in, anſwerably to its dignity. There is no more reaſon to eſteem it a fit and ſuitable thing that God's glory ſhould be known, or that there ſhould be an idea in the underſtanding correſponding unto the glorious object, than that there ſhould be a correſponding diſpoſition or affection in the will. If the perfection itſelf be excellent, the knowledge of it is excellent, and ſo is the eſteem and love of it excellent. And as it is fit that God ſhould love and eſteem his own excellence, it is alſo fit that he ſhould value and eſteem the love of his excellency. For if it becomes any being greatly to value another, then it becomes him to love to have him valued and eſteemed: And if it becomes a being highly to value himſelf, it is fit that he ſhould love to have himſelf valued and eſteemed. If the idea of God's perfection in the underſtanding be valuable, then the love of the heart ſeems to be more eſpecially valuable, as moral beauty eſpecially conſiſts in the diſpoſition and affection of the heart.

4. As there is an infinite fulneſs of all poſſible good in God, a fulneſs of every perfection, of all excellency and beauty, and of infinite happineſs. And as this fulneſs is capable of communication or emanation *ad extra*; ſo it ſeems a thing amiable and valuable in itſelf that it ſhould be communicated or flow forth; that this infinite fountain of good ſhould ſend forth abundant ſtreams; that this infinite fountain of light ſhould, diffuſing its excellent fulneſs, pour forth light all around.—And as this is in itſelf excellent, ſo a diſpoſition to this, in the divine being, muſt be looked upon as a perfection or an excellent diſpoſition, ſuch an emanation of good is, in ſome ſenſe, a multiplication of it; ſo far as the communication or external ſtream may be looked upon as any thing beſides the fountain, ſo far it may be looked on as an increaſe of good. And if the fulneſs of good that is in the fountain, is in itſelf excellent and worthy to exiſt, then the emanation, or that which is as it were an increaſe, repetition, or multiplication of it, is excellent and worthy to exiſt. Thus it is fit, ſince

there is an infinite fountain of light and knowledge, that this light ſhould ſhine forth in beams of communicated knowledge and underſtanding; and as there is an infinite fountain of holineſs, moral excellence and beauty, ſo it ſhould flow out in communicated holineſs. —And that as there is an infinite fulneſs of joy and happineſs, ſo theſe ſhould have an emanation, and become a fountain flowing out in abundant ſtreams, as beams from the ſun.

From this view, it appears another way to be a thing in itſelf valuable, that there ſhould be ſuch things as the knowledge of God's glory in other beings, and an high eſteem of it, love to it, and delight and complacence in it: This appears I ſay in another way, viz. as theſe things are but the emanations of God's own knowledge, holineſs and joy.

Thus it appears reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that it was what God had reſpect to as an ultimate end of his creating the world, to communicate of his own infinite fulneſs of good; or rather it was his laſt end, that there might be a glorious and abundant emanation of his infinite fulneſs of good *ad extra*, or without himſelf, and the diſpoſition to communicate himſelf, or diffuſe his own FULNESS, * which we muſt conceive of as being originally in God as a perfection of his nature, was what moved him to create the world. But here as much as poſſible, to avoid confuſion, I obſerve, that there is ſome impropriety in ſaying that a diſpoſition in God to communicate himſelf *to the creature*, moved him to create the world. For tho' the diffuſive diſpoſition in the nature of God, that moved him to

* I ſhall often uſe the phraſe *God's fulneſs*, as ſignifying and comprehending all the good which is in God natural and moral, either excellence or happineſs: partly, becauſe I know of no better phraſe to be uſed in this general meaning; and partly, becauſe I am led hereto by ſome of the inſpired writers, particularly the apoſtle Paul, who often uſeth the phraſe in this ſenſe.

to create the world, doubtleſs inclines him to communicate himſelf to the creature, when the creature exiſts; yet this cannot be all: Becauſe an inclination in God to communicate himſelf to an object, ſeems to preſuppoſe the exiſtence of the object, at leaſt in idea. But the diffuſive diſpoſition that excited God to give creatures exiſtence, was rather a communicative diſpoſition in general, or a diſpoſition in the fulneſs of the divinity to flow out and diffuſe itſelf. Thus the diſpoſition there is in the root and ſtock of a tree, to diffuſe and ſend forth its ſap and life, is doubtleſs the reaſon of the communication of its ſap and life to its buds, leaves and fruits, after theſe exiſt. But a diſpoſition to communicate of its life and ſap to its fruits, is not ſo properly the cauſe of its producing thoſe fruits, as its diſpoſition to communicate itſelf, or diffuſe its ſap and life in general. Therefore to ſpeak more ſtrictly according to truth, we may ſuppoſe, *that a diſpoſition in God, as an original property of his nature, to an emanation of his own infinite fulneſs, was what excited him to create the world; and ſo that the emanation itſelf was aimed at by him as a laſt end of the creation.*

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## SECT. III.

WHEREIN it is conſidered *how*, on the ſuppoſition of God's making the forementioned things his laſt end, he manifeſts a ſupreme and ultimate regard to himſelf in all his works.

In the laſt ſection I obſerved ſome things, which are actually the conſequence of the creation of the world, which ſeem abſolutely valuable in themſelves, and ſo worthy to be made God's laſt end in this work. I now proceed to enquire, how God's making ſuch things as theſe his laſt end, is conſiſtent with his making himſelf his laſt end, or his manifeſting an ultimate reſpect to himſelf in his acts and works. Becauſe this is a thing I have obſerved as agreeable to the dictates

of reaſon, that in all his proceedings he ſhould ſet himſelf higheſt.—Therefore, I would endeavour to ſhew, with reſpect to each of the forementioned things, that God, in making them his end, makes himſelf his end, ſo as in all to ſhew a ſupreme and ultimate reſpect to himſelf; and how his infinite love to himſelf, and delight in himſelf, will naturally cauſe him to value and delight in theſe things: or rather how a value to theſe things is implied in his love to himſelf, or value of that infinite fulneſs of good that is in himſelf.

Now, with regard to the firſt of the particulars mentioned above, *viz.* God's regard to the exerciſe and expreſſion of thoſe attributes of his nature, in their proper operations and effects, which conſiſt in a ſufficiency for theſe operations, it is not hard to conceive that God's regard to himſelf, and value for his own perfections, ſhould cauſe him to value theſe exerciſes and expreſſions of his perfections; and that a love to them will diſpoſe him to love their exhibition and exertment: Inaſmuch as their excellency conſiſts in their relation to uſe, exerciſe, and operation; as the excellency of wiſdom conſiſts in its relation to, and ſufficiency for, wiſe deſigns and effects. God's love to himſelf, and his own attributes, will therefore make him delight in that, which is the uſe, end, and operation of theſe attributes. If one highly eſteem and delight in the virtues of a friend, as wiſdom, juſtice, &c. that have relation to action, this will make him delight in the exerciſe and genuine effects of theſe virtues: So if God both eſteem and delight in his own perfections and virtues, he cannot but value and delight in the expreſſions and genuine effects of them. So that in delighting in the expreſſions of his perfections, he manifeſts a delight in his own perfections themſelves; or in other words, he manifeſts a delight in himſelf; and in making theſe expreſſions of his own perfections his end, *he makes himſelf his end.*

And with reſpect to the ſecond and third particulars, the matter is no leſs plain. For he that loves any being, and has a diſpoſition highly to prize, and greatly

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to delight in his virtues and perfections, muſt from the ſame diſpoſition be well pleaſed to have his excellencies known, acknowledged, eſteemed, and prized by others. He that loves and approves any being or thing, he naturally loves and approves the love and approbation of that thing, and is oppoſite to the diſapprobation and contempt of it. Thus it is when one loves another, and highly prizes the virtues of a friend. And thus it is fit it ſhould be, if it be fit that the other ſhould be beloved, and his qualification prized. And therefore thus it will neceſſarily be, if a being loves himſelf and highly prizes his own excellencies: And thus it is fit it ſhould be, if it be fit he ſhould thus love himſelf, and prize his own valuable qualities; that is, it is fit that he ſhould take delight in his own excellencies being ſeen, acknowledged, eſteemed, and delighted in. This is implied in a love to himſelf and his own perfections. And in ſeeking this, and making this his end, he ſeeks himſelf, and makes himſelf his end.

And with reſpect to the fourth and laſt particular, *viz.* God's being diſpoſed to an abundant communication, and glorious emanation, of that infinite fulneſs of good which he poſſeſſes in himſelf; as of his own knowledge, excellency, and happineſs, in the manner which he does; if we thoroughly and properly conſider the matter, it will appear, that herein alſo God makes himſelf his end, in ſuch a ſenſe, as plainly to manifeſt and teſtify a ſupreme and ultimate regard to himſelf.

Merely in this diſpoſition to diffuſe himſelf, or to cauſe an emanation of his glory and fulneſs, which is prior to the exiſtence of any other being, and is to be conſidered as the inciting cauſe of creation, or giving exiſtence to other beings, God cannot ſo properly be ſaid to make the creature his end as himſelf.—For the creature is not as yet conſidered as exiſting. This diſpoſition or deſire in God muſt be prior to the exiſtence of the creature, even in intention and foreſight. For it is a diſpoſition that is the original ground of the exiſtence of the creature; and even of the future intended and foreſeen exiſtence of the creature.—God's

love or benevolence, as it reſpects the creature, may be taken either in a larger, or ſtricter ſenſe. In a larger ſenſe, it may ſignify nothing diverſe from that good diſpoſition in his nature to communicate of his own fulneſs in general; as his knowledge, his holineſs, and happineſs; and to give creatures exiſtence in order to it. This may be called benevolence or love, becauſe it is the ſame good diſpoſition that is exerciſed in love: It is the very fountain from whence love originally proceeds, when taken in the moſt proper ſenſe; and it has the ſame general tendency and effect in the creature's well-being.——But ye tthis cannot have any particular preſent or future created exiſtence for its object; becauſe it is prior to any ſuch object, and the very ſource of the futurition of the exiſtence of it. Nor is it really diverſe from God's love to himſelf; as will more clearly appear afterwards.

But God's love may be taken more ſtrictly, for this general diſpoſition to communicate good, as directed to particular objects: Love, in the moſt ſtrict and proper ſenſe, preſuppoſes the exiſtence of the object beloved, at leaſt in idea and expectation, and repreſented to the mind as future. God did not love angels in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, but in conſequence of his intending to create them, and ſo having an idea of future exiſting angels. Therefore his love to them was not properly what excited him to intend to create them. Love or benevolence ſtrictly taken, preſuppoſes an exiſting object, as much as pity a miſerable ſuffering object.

This propenſity in God to diffuſe himſelf, may be conſidered as a propenſity to himſelf diffuſed; or to his own glory exiſting in its emanation. A reſpect to himſelf, or an infinite propenſity to, and delight in his own glory, is that which cauſes him to incline to its being abundantly diffuſed, and to delight in the emanation of it. Thus, that nature in a tree, by which it puts forth buds, ſhoots out branches, and brings forth leaves and fruit, is a diſpoſition that terminates in its own complete ſelf. And ſo the diſpoſition

ſition in the ſun to ſhine, or abundantly to diffuſe its fulneſs, warmth, and brightneſs, is only a tendency to its own moſt glorious and complete ſtate. So God looks on the communication of himſelf, and the emanation of the infinite glory and good that are in himſelf to belong to the fulneſs and completeneſs of himſelf; as though he were not in his moſt complete and glorious ſtate without it. Thus the church of Chriſt, (toward whom, and in whom are the emanations of his glory and communications of his fulneſs), is called the fulneſs of Chriſt: As though he were not in his complete ſtate without her; as Adam was in a defective ſtate without Eve. And the church is called the glory of Chriſt, as the woman is the glory of the man, 1 Cor. xi. 7.—Iſa. xlvi. 13. I will place ſalvation in Zion, for Iſrael *my glory*.*——Indeed, after the creatures are intended to be created, God may be conceived of as being moved by benevolence to theſe creatures, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, in his dealings with, and works about them. His exerciſing his goodneſs, and gratifying his benevolence to them in particular, may be the ſpring of all God's proceedings through the

* Very remarkable is that place, John xii 23, 24 "And Jeſus anſwered them, ſaying, The hour is come that the Son of man ſhould be glorified. Verily, I ſay unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." He had reſpect herein, to the bleſſed fruits of Chriſt's death, in the converſion, ſalvation, and eternal happineſs and holineſs of thoſe that ſhould be redeemed by him. This conſequence of his death, he calls his glory; and his obtaining this fruit, he calls his being glorified: As the flouriſhing beautiful produce of a corn of wheat ſown in the ground is its glory. Without this, he is alone as Adam was before Eve was created: But from him, by his death, proceeds a glorious offſpring; in which he is communicated, that is his fulneſs and glory: As from Adam, in his deep ſleep, proceeds the woman, a beautiful companion to fill his emptineſs, and relieve his ſolitarineſs. By Chriſt's death, his fulneſs is abundantly diffuſed in many ſtreams; and expreſſed in the beauty and glory of a great multitude of his ſpiritual offſpring.

the univerſe; as being now the determined way of gratifying his general inclination to diffuſe himſelf. Here God's acting for himſelf, or making himſelf his laſt end, and his acting for their ſake, are not to be ſet in oppoſition; or to be conſidered as the oppoſite parts of a disjunction: they are rather to be conſidered as coinciding one with the other, and implied one in the other. But yet God is to be conſidered as firſt and original in his regard; and the creature is the object of God's regard conſequentially and by implication, as being as it were comprehended in God; as ſhall be more particularly obſerved preſently.

But how God's value for and delight in the emanations of his fulneſs in the work of creation, argues his delight in the infinite fulneſs of good there is in himſelf, and the ſupreme reſpect and regard he has for himſelf; and that in making theſe emanations of himſelf his end, he does ultimately make himſelf his end in creation, will more clearly appear by conſidering more particularly the nature and circumſtances of theſe communications of God's fulneſs which are made, and which we have reaſon either from the nature of things, or the word of God, to ſuppoſe ſhall be made.

One part of that divine fulneſs which is communicated, is the divine knowledge. That communicated knowledge, which muſt be ſuppoſed to pertain to God's laſt end in creating the world, is the creatures knowledge of him. For this is the end of all other knowledge; and even the faculty of underſtanding would be vain without this. And this knowledge is moſt properly a communication of God's infinite knowledge, which primarily conſiſts in the knowledge of himſelf. God, in making this his end, makes himſelf his end. This knowledge in the creature, is but a conformity to God. It is the image of God's own knowledge of himſelf. It is a participation of the ſame: It is as much the ſame as it is poſſible for that to be, which is infinitely leſs in degree: As particular beams of the ſun communicated, are the light and glory of the ſun in part.

Beſides

Beſides God's perfections, or his glory, is the object of this knowledge, or the thing known; ſo that God is glorified in it, as hereby his excellency is ſeen. As therefore God values himſelf, as he delights in his own knowledge; he muſt delight in every thing of that nature: As he delights in his own light, he muſt delight in every beam of that light: And as he highly values his own excellency, he muſt be well pleaſed in having it manifeſted, and ſo glorified.

Another thing wherein the emanation of divine fulneſs, that is and will be made in conſequence of the creation of the world, is the communication of virtue and holineſs to the creature. This is a communication of God's holineſs; ſo that hereby the creature partakes of God's own moral excellency; which is properly the beauty of the divine nature. And as God delights in his own beauty, he muſt neceſſarily delight in the creatures holineſs; which is a conformity to, and participation of it, as truly as the brightneſs of a jewel, held in the ſun's beams, is a participation or derivation of the ſun's brightneſs, though immenſely leſs in degree.——And then it muſt be conſidered wherein this holineſs in the creature conſiſts, *viz.* in love, which is the comprehenſion of all true virtue; and primarily in love to God, which is exerciſed in an high eſteem of God, admiration of his perfections, complacency in them, and praiſe of them. All which things are nothing elſe but the heart's exalting, magnifying, or glorifying God; which, as I ſhewed before, God neceſſarily approves of, and is pleaſed with, as he loves himſelf, and values the glory of his own nature.

Another part of God's fulneſs which he communicates, is his happineſs. This happineſs conſiſts in enjoying and rejoicing in himſelf; and ſo does alſo the creatures happineſs. It is, as has been obſerved of the other, a participation of what is in God; and God and his glory are the objective ground of it. The happineſs of the creature conſiſts in rejoicing in God; by which alſo God is magnified and exalted. Joy, or

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the exulting of the heart in God's glory, is one thing that belongs to praiſe.——So that God is all in all, with reſpect to each part of that communication of the divine fulneſs which is made to the creature. What is communicated is divine, or ſomething of God; and each communication is of that nature, that the creature to whom it is made, is thereby conformed to God, and united to him; and that in proportion as the communication is greater or leſs. And the communication itſelf is no other, in the very nature of it, than that wherein the very honour, exaltation, and praiſe of God conſiſts.

And it is farther to be conſidered, that the thing which God aimed at in the creation of the world, as the end which he had ultimately in view, was that communication of himſelf, which he intended throughout all eternity. And if we attend to the nature and circumſtances of this eternal emanation of divine good, it will more clearly ſhew how in making this his end, God teſtifies a ſupreme reſpect to himſelf, and makes himſelf his end. There are many reaſons to think that what God has in view, in an increaſing communication of himſelf throughout eternity, is an increaſing knowledge of God, love to him, and joy in him.——And it is to be conſidered that the more thoſe divine communications increaſe in the creature, the more it becomes one with God: For ſo much the more is it united to God in love, the heart is drawn nearer and nearer to God, and the union with him becomes more firm and cloſe: and, at the ſame time, the creature becomes more and more conformed to God. The image is more and more perfect, and ſo the good that is in the creature comes for ever nearer and nearer to an identity with that which is in God. In the view therefore of God, who has a comprehenſive proſpect of the increaſing union and conformity through eternity, it muſt be an infinitely ſtrict and perfect nearneſs, conformity, and oneneſs. For it will for ever come nearer and nearer to that ſtrictneſs and perfection of union which there is between the Father and the

the Son: So that in the eyes of God, who perfectly ſees the whole of it, in its infinite progreſs and increaſe, it muſt come to an eminent fulfilment of Chriſt's requeſt, in John xvii. 21, 23.—"That they all may be *one*, as thou Father art in me, and I in thee, that they alſo may be one in us; I in them and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in *one*." In this view, thoſe elect creatures, which muſt be looked upon as the end of all the reſt of the creation, conſidered with reſpect to the whole of their eternal duration, and as ſuch made God's end, muſt be viewed as being, as it were, one with God. They were reſpected as brought home to him, united with him, centering moſt perfectly in him, and as it were ſwallowed up in him: ſo that his reſpect to them finally coincides and becomes one and the ſame with reſpect to himſelf.——The intereſt of the creature is, as it were, God's own intereſt, in proportion to the degree of their relation and union to God. Thus the intereſt of a man's family is looked upon as the ſame with his own intereſt; becauſe of the relation they ſtand in to him; his propriety in them, and their ſtrict union with him. But conſider God's elect creatures with reſpect to their eternal duration, ſo they are infinitely dearer to God, than a man's family is to him.——What has been ſaid, ſhews, that as all things are from God as their firſt cauſe and fountain; ſo all things tend to him, and in their progreſs come nearer and nearer to him through all eternity: which argues, that he who is their firſt cauſe is their laſt end.

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## SECT. IV.

SOME objections conſidered, which may be made againſt the reaſonableneſs of what has been ſaid of God's making himſelf his laſt end.

*Object.* 1. Some may object againſt what has been ſaid, as inconſiſtent with God's abſolute independence and

and immutability: particularly the repreſentation that has been made, as though God were inclined to a communication of his fulneſs and emanations of his own glory, as being his own moſt glorious and complete ſtate. It may be thought that this does not well conſiſt with God's being ſelf-exiſtent from all eternity; abſolutely perfect in himſelf, in the poſſeſſion of infinite and independent good. And that in general, to ſuppoſe that God makes himſelf his end, in the creation of the world, ſeems to ſuppoſe that he aims at ſome intereſt or happineſs of his own, not eaſily reconcileable with his being happy, perfectly and infinitely happy in himſelf. If it could be ſuppoſed that God needed any thing; or that the goodneſs of his creatures could extend to him; or that they could be profitable to him; it might be fit, that God ſhould make himſelf, and his own intereſt, his higheſt and laſt end in creating the world: and there would be ſome reaſon and ground for the preceding diſcourſe. But ſeeing that God is above all need and all capacity of being added to and advanced, made better or happier in any reſpect; to what purpoſe ſhould God make himſelf his end; or ſeek to advance himſelf in any reſpect by any of his works? How abſurd is it to ſuppoſe that God ſhould do ſuch great things, with a view to obtain what he is already moſt perfectly poſſeſſed of, and was ſo from all eternity; and therefore cannot now poſſibly need, nor with any colour of reaſon be ſuppoſed to ſeek?

*Anſwer* 1. Many have wrong notions of God's happineſs, as reſulting from his abſolute ſelf-ſufficience, independence, and immutability. Tho' it be true, that God's glory and happineſs are in and of himſelf, are infinite and cannot be added to, unchangeable for the whole and every part of which he is perfectly independent of the creature; yet it does not hence follow, nor is it true, that God has no real and proper delight, pleaſure or happineſs, in any of his acts or communications relative to the creature, or effects he produces in them; or in any thing he ſees in the creature's qualifications,

lifications, diſpoſitions, actions and ſtate. God may have a real and proper pleaſure or happineſs in ſeeing the happy ſtate of the creature; yet this may not be different from his delight in himſelf; being a delight in his own infinite goodneſs; or the exerciſe of that glorious propenſity of his nature to diffuſe and communicate himſelf, and ſo gratifying this inclination of his own heart.—This delight which God has in his creature's happineſs, cannot properly be ſaid to be what God receives from the creature. For it is only the effect of his own work in, and communications to the creature; in making it, and admitting it to a participation of his fulneſs. As the ſun receives nothing from the jewel that receives its light, and ſhines only by a participation of its brightneſs.

With reſpect alſo to the creature's holineſs; God may have a proper delight and joy in imparting this to the creature, as gratifying hereby his inclination, to communicate of his own excellent fulneſs. God may delight with true and great pleaſure in beholding that beauty which is an image and communication of his own beauty, an expreſſion and manifeſtation of his own lovelineſs. And this is ſo far from being an inſtance of his happineſs not being in and from himſelf, that it is an evidence that he is happy in himſelf, or delights and has pleaſure in his own beauty. If he did not take pleaſure in the expreſſion of his own beauty, it would rather be an evidence that he does not delight in his own beauty; that he hath not his happineſs and enjoyment in his own beauty and perfection.——So that if we ſuppoſe God has real pleaſure and happineſs in the holy love and praiſe of his ſaints, as the image and communication of his own holineſs, it is not properly any pleaſure diſtinct from the pleaſure he has in himſelf; but is truly an inſtance of it.

And with reſpect to God's being glorified in this reſpect, that thoſe perfections wherein his glory conſiſts, are exerciſed and expreſſed in their proper and correſponding effects; as his wiſdom in wiſe deſigns and well contrived works,—his power in great effects—his ju-

ſtice in acts of righteouſneſs— his goodneſs in communicating happineſs; and ſo his ſhewing forth the glory of his own nature, in its being exerciſed, exhibited, communicated, known, and eſteemed: his having delight herein does not argue that his pleaſure or happineſs is not in himſelf, and his own glory; but the contrary. This is the neceſſary conſequence of his delighting in the glory of his nature, that he delights in the emanation and effulgence of it.

Nor do any of theſe things argue any dependence in God on the creature for happineſs. Though he has real pleaſure in the creature's holineſs and happineſs, yet this is not properly any pleaſure which he receives from the creature. For theſe things are what he gives the creature. They are wholly and entirely from him. Therefore they are nothing that they give to God by which they add to him. His rejoicing therein, is rather a rejoicing in his own acts, and his own glory expreſſed in thoſe acts, than a joy derived from the creature. God's joy is dependent on nothing beſides his own act, which he exerts with an abſolute and independent power. And yet, in ſome ſenſe, it can be truly ſaid, that God has the more delight and pleaſure for the holineſs and happineſs of his creatures. Becauſe God would be leſs happy, if he was leſs good: or if he had not that perfection of nature which conſiſts in a propenſity of nature to diffuſe of his own fulneſs. And he would be leſs happy, if it were poſſible for him to be hindered in the exerciſe of his goodneſs, and his other perfections, in their proper effects. But he has complete happineſs, becauſe he has theſe perfections, and cannot be hindered in exerciſing and diſplaying them in their proper effects. And this ſurely is not thus, becauſe he is dependent; but becauſe he is independent on any other that ſhould hinder him.

From this view, it appears, that nothing that has been ſaid is in the leaſt inconſiſtent with thoſe expreſſions in the ſcripture, that ſignify that man cannot be profitable to God, that he receives nothing of us by any of our wiſdom and righteouſneſs. For theſe expreſſions

preſſions plainly mean no more than that God is abſolutely independent of us; that we have nothing of our own, no ſtock from whence we can give to God; and that no part of his happineſs originates from man.

From what has been ſaid, it appears, that the pleaſure that God hath in theſe things which have been mentioned, is rather a pleaſure in diffuſing and communicating to the creature, than in receiving from the creature. Surely, it is no argument of indigence in God, that he is inclined to communicate of his infinite fulneſs. It is no argument of the emptineſs or deficiency of a fountain, that it is inclined to overflow.—Another thing ſignified by theſe expreſſions of ſcripture is, that nothing that is from the creature, adds to or alters God's happineſs, as though it were changeable either by increaſe or diminution. Nor does any thing that has been advanced in the leaſt ſuppoſe or infer that it does, or is it in the leaſt inconſiſtent with the eternity, and moſt abſolute immutability of God's pleaſure and happineſs.——For though theſe communications of God, theſe exerciſes, operations, effects and expreſſions of his glorious perfections, which God rejoices in, are in time; yet his joy in them is without beginning or change. They were always equally preſent in the divine mind. He beheld them with equal clearneſs, certainty and fulneſs, in every reſpect, as he doth now. They were always equally preſent; as with him there is no variableneſs or ſucceſſion. He ever beheld and enjoyed them perfectly in his own independent and immutable power and will. And his view of, and joy in them is eternally, abſolutely perfect, unchangeable and independent. It cannot be added to or diminiſhed by the power or will of any creature: nor is in the leaſt dependent on any thing mutable or contingent.

2. If any are not ſatisfied with the preceeding anſwer, but ſtill inſiſt on the objection, let them conſider whether they can deviſe any other ſcheme of God's laſt end in creating the world, but what will be equally obnoxious to this objection in its full force, if there be any force in it. For if God had any laſt end in crea-

ting the world, then there was ſomething, in ſome reſpect future, that he aimed at, and deſigned to bring to paſs by creating the world: ſomething that was agreeable to his inclination or will: let that be his own glory, or the happineſs of his creatures, or what it will. Now, if there be ſomething that God ſeeks as agreeable, or grateful to him, then, in the accompliſhment of it, he is gratified. If the laſt end which he ſeeks in the creation of the world, be truly a thing grateful to him, (as certainly it is, if it be truly his end and truly the object of his will), then it is what he takes a real delight and pleaſure in. But then, according to the argument of the objection, how he can have any thing future to deſire or ſeek, who is already perfectly, eternally, and immutably ſatisfied in himſelf? What can remain for him to take any delight in, or to be further gratified by, whoſe eternal and unchangeable delight is in himſelf as his own complete object of enjoyment. Thus the objector will be preſſed with his own objection; let him embrace what notion he will of God's end in the creation. And I think he has no way left to anſwer but that which has been taken above.

It may therefore be proper here to obſerve, that let what will be God's laſt end, that, he muſt have a real and proper pleaſure in: Whatever be the proper object of his will, he is gratified in. And the thing is either grateful to him in itſelf; or for ſomething elſe for which he wills it: And ſo is his further end. But whatever is God's laſt end, that he wills *for its own ſake*; as grateful to him in itſelf: or which is the ſame thing; it is that which he truly delights in; or in which he has ſome degree of true and proper pleaſure. Otherwiſe we muſt deny any ſuch thing as will in God with reſpect to any thing brought to paſs in time; and ſo muſt deny his work of creation, or any work of his providence to be truly voluntary. But we have as much reaſon to ſuppoſe, that God's works in creating and governing the world, are properly the fruits of his will, as of his underſtanding. And if there be any ſuch thing at all, as what we mean by *acts of will* in God;

God; then he is not indifferent whether his will be fulfilled or not. And if he is not indifferent, then he is truly gratified and pleaſed in the fulfilment of his will: or, which is the ſame thing, he has a pleaſure in it. And if he has a real pleaſure in attaining his end, then the attainment of it belongs to his happineſs. That in which God's delight or pleaſure in any meaſure conſiſts, his happineſs in ſome meaſure conſiſts. To ſuppoſe that God has pleaſure in things, that are brought to paſs in time, only figuratively and metaphorically; is to ſuppoſe that he exerciſes will about theſe things, and makes them his end only metaphorically.

3. The doctrine that makes God's creatures and not himſelf to be his laſt end, is a doctrine the fartheſt from having a favourable aſpect on God's abſolute ſelf-ſufficience and independence. It far leſs agrees therewith than the doctrine againſt which this is objected. For we muſt conceive of the efficient as depending on his ultimate end. He depends on this end, in his deſires, aims, actions and purſuits; ſo that he fails in all his deſires, actions and purſuits, if he fails of his end. ——Now if God himſelf be his laſt end, then in his dependence on his end, he depends on nothing but himſelf. If all things be of him, and to him, and he the firſt and the laſt, this ſhews him to be all in all: He is all to himſelf. He goes not out of himſelf in what he ſeeks; but his deſires and purſuits as they originate from, ſo they terminate in himſelf; and he is dependent on none but himſelf in the beginning or end of any of his exerciſes or operations. But if not himſelf, but the creature, be his laſt end, then as he depends on his laſt end, he is in ſome ſort dependent on the creature.

*Object.* 2. Some may object, that to ſuppoſe that God makes himſelf his higheſt and laſt end, is diſhonourable to him; as it in effect ſuppoſes, that God does every thing from a ſelfiſh ſpirit. Selfiſhneſs is looked upon as mean and ſordid in the creature! unbecoming and even hateful in ſuch a worm of the duſt as man. We ſhould look upon a man as of a baſe and contemptible

character, that ſhould in every thing he did, be governed by ſelfiſh principles; ſhould make his private intereſt his governing aim in all his conduct in life. How far then ſhould we be from attributing any ſuch thing to the ſupreme Being, the bleſſed and only Potentate! Does it not become us to aſcribe to him, the moſt noble and generous diſpoſitions; and thoſe qualities that are the moſt remote from every thing that is private, narrow and ſordid?

*Anſwer* 1. Such an objection muſt ariſe from a very ignorant or inconſiderate notion of the vice of ſelfiſhneſs, and the virtue of generoſity. If by ſelfiſhneſs be meant, a diſpoſition in any being to regard himſelf; this is no otherwiſe vicious or unbecoming, than as one is leſs than a multitude; and ſo the public weal is of greater value than his particular intereſt. Among created beings one ſingle perſon muſt be looked upon as inconſiderable in compariſon of the generality; and ſo his intereſt is of little importance compared with the intereſt of the whole ſyſtem: Therefore in them, a diſpoſition to prefer ſelf, as if it were more than all, is exceeding vicious. But it is vicious on no other account, than as it is a diſpoſition that does not agree with the nature of things; and that which is indeed the greateſt good. And a diſpoſition in any one to forego his own intereſt for the ſake of others, is no further excellent, no further worthy the name of generoſity, than it is a treating things according to their true value; a proſecuting ſomething moſt worthy to be proſecuted; an expreſſion of a diſpoſition to prefer ſomething to ſelf-intereſt, that is indeed preferable in itſelf. —But if God be indeed ſo great, and ſo excellent, that all other beings are as nothing to him, and all other excellency be as nothing and leſs than nothing, and vanity in compariſon of his; and God be omniſcient and infallible, and perfectly knows that he is infinitely the moſt valuable being; then it is fit that his heart ſhould be agreeable to this, which is indeed the true nature and proportion of things, and agreeable to this infallible and all-comprehending underſtanding which he has

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of them: and that perfectly clear light in which he views him; and so it is fit and suitable that he should value himself infinitely more than his creatures.

2. In created beings, a regard to self-interest may properly be set in opposition to the public welfare; because the private interest of one person may be inconsistent with the public good: at least it may be so in the apprehension of that person. That, which this person looks upon as his interest, may interfere with, or oppose the general good.—Hence his private interest may be regarded and pursued in opposition to the public.—But this cannot be with respect to the supreme Being, the author and head of the whole system; on whom all absolutely depend; who is the fountain of being and good to the whole. It is more absurd to suppose that his interest should be opposite to the interest of the universal system, than that the welfare of the head, heart, and vitals of the natural body, should be opposite to the welfare of the body. And it is impossible that God, who is omniscient, should apprehend the matter thus; *viz.* his interest, as being inconsistent with the good and interest of the whole.

3. God's seeking himself in the creation of the world, in the manner which has been supposed, is so far from being inconsistent with the good of his creatures, or any possibility of being so; that it is a kind of regard to himself that inclines him to seek the good of his creature. It is a regard to himself that disposes him to diffuse and communicate himself. It is such a delight in his own internal fulness and glory, that disposes him to an abundant effusion and emanation of that glory. The same disposition, that inclines him to delight in his glory, causes him to delight in the exhibitions, expressions, and communications of it. This is a natural conclusion—If there were any person of such a taste and disposition of mind, that the brightness and light of the sun seemed unlovely to him, he would be willing that the sun's brightness and light should be retained within itself: But they that delight in it, to whom it appears lovely and glorious, will esteem it an amiable and glo-

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rious thing to have it diffuſed and communicated thro' the world.

Here, by the way, it may be properly conſidered, whether ſome writers are not chargeable with inconſiſtence in this reſpect, *viz.* that whereas they ſpeak againſt the doctrine of God's making himſelf his own higheſt and laſt end, as though this were an ignoble ſelfiſhneſs in God: when indeed he only is fit to be made the higheſt end, by himſelf and all other beings; in as much as he is the higheſt Being, and infinitely greater and more worthy than all others.—Yet with regard to creatures, who are infinitely leſs worthy of ſupreme and ultimate regard, they (in effect at leaſt) ſuppoſe, that they neceſſarily at all times ſeek their own happineſs, and make it their ultimate end in all, even their moſt virtuous actions: And that this principle, regulated by wiſdom and prudence, as leading to that which is their true and higheſt happineſs, is the foundation of all virtue, and every thing that is morally good and excellent in them.

*Object.* 3. To what has been ſuppoſed, that God makes himſelf his end in this way, *viz.* in ſeeking that his glory and excellent perfection ſhould be known, eſteemed, loved, and delighted in by his creatures, it may be objected, that this ſeems unworthy of God. It is conſidered as below a truly great man, to be much influenced in his conduct, by a deſire of popular applauſe. The notice and admiration of a gazing multitude, would be eſteemed but a low end, to be aimed at by a prince or philoſopher, in any great and noble enterprize. How much more is it unworthy the great God, to perform his magnificent works, e. g. the creation of the vaſt univerſe, out of regard to the notice and admiration of worms of the duſt, that the diſplays of his magnificence may be gazed at, and applauded by thoſe who are infinitely more beneath him, than the meaneſt rable are beneath the greateſt prince or philoſopher.

This objection is ſpecious. It hath a ſhew of argument;

ment; but it will appear to be nothing but a ſhew, if we conſider,

1. Whether or no it be not worthy of God, to regard and value what is excellent and valuable in itſelf; and ſo to take pleaſure in its exiſtence.

It ſeems not liable to any doubt, that there could be nothing future, or no future exiſtence worthy to be deſired or ſought by God, and ſo worthy to be made his end, if no future exiſtence was valuable and worthy to be brought to effect. If, when the world was not, there was any poſſible future thing fit and valuable in itſelf, I think the knowledge of God's glory, and the eſteem and love of it muſt be ſo. Underſtanding and will are the higheſt kind of created exiſtence. And if they be valuable, it muſt be in their exerciſe. But the higheſt and moſt excellent kind of their exerciſe, is in ſome actual knowledge and exerciſe of will. And certainly the moſt excellent actual knowledge and will, that can be in the creature, is the knowledge and the love of God. And the moſt true excellent knowledge of God, is the knowledge of his glory or moral excellence: and the moſt excellent exerciſe of the will conſiſts in eſteem and love, and a delight in his glory.——If any created exiſtence is in itſelf worthy to be, or any thing that ever was future is worthy of exiſtence, ſuch a communication of divine fulneſs, ſuch an emanation and expreſſion of the divine glory is worthy of exiſtence. But if nothing that ever was future was worthy to exiſt, then no future thing was worthy to be aimed at by God in creating the world. And if nothing was worthy to be aimed at in creation, then nothing was worthy to be God's end in creation.

If God's own excellency and glory is worthy to be highly valued and delighted in by him, then the value and eſteem hereof by others, is worthy to be regarded by him: for this is a neceſſary conſequence. To make this plain, let it be conſidered how it is with regard to the excellent qualities of another. If we highly value the virtues and excellencies of a friend, in proportion as we do ſo, we ſhall approve of and like others

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eſteem of them; and ſhall diſapprove and diſlike the contempt of them. If theſe virtues are truly valuable, they are worthy that we ſhould thus approve others eſteem, and diſapprove their contempt of them. —And the caſe is the ſame with reſpect to any Being's own qualities or attributes. If he highly eſteems them, and greatly delights in them, he will naturally and neceſſarily love to ſee eſteem of them in others, and diſlike their diſeſteem. And if the attributes are worthy to be highly eſteemed by the Being who hath them, ſo is the eſteem of them in others worthy to be proportionably approved and regarded.——I deſire it may be conſidered, whether it be unfit that God ſhould be diſpleaſed with contempt of himſelf? If not, but on the contrary it be fit and ſuitable that he ſhould be diſpleaſed with this, there is the ſame reaſon that he ſhould be pleaſed with the proper love, eſteem and honour of himſelf.

The matter may be alſo cleared, by conſidering what it would become us to approve of and value with reſpect to any public ſociety we belong to, e. g. our nation or country. It becomes us to love our country; and therefore it becomes us to value the juſt honour of our country. But the ſame that it becomes us to value and deſire for a friend, and the ſame that it becomes us to deſire and ſeek for the community, the ſame does it become God to value and ſeek for himſelf; that is, on ſuppoſition, it becomes God to love himſelf as well as it does men to love a friend or the public; which I think has been before proved.——

Here are two things that ought particularly to be adverted to.—1. That in God, the love of himſelf and the love of the public, are not to be diſtinguiſhed, as in man. Becauſe God's being as it were comprehends all. His exiſtence, being infinite, muſt be equivalent to univerſal exiſtence. And for the ſame reaſon that public affection in the creature is fit and beautiful, God's regard to himſelf muſt be ſo likewiſe.— 2. In God, the love of what is fit and decent, or the love of virtue, cannot be a diſtinct thing from the love

of

of himſelf. Becauſe the love of God is that wherein all virtue and holineſs does primarily and chiefly conſiſt, and God's own holineſs muſt primarily conſiſt in the love of himſelf; as was before obſerved. And if God's holineſs conſiſts in love to himſelf, then it will imply an approbation of, and pleaſedneſs with the eſteem and love of him in others. For a Being that loves himſelf, neceſſarily loves love to himſelf. If holineſs in God conſiſt chiefly in love to himſelf, holineſs in the creature muſt chiefly conſiſt in love to him. And if God loves holineſs in himſelf, he muſt love it in the creature.

Virtue, by ſuch of the late philoſophers as ſeem to be in chief repute, is placed in public affection or general benevolence. And if the eſſence of virtue lies primarily in this, then the love of virtue itſelf is virtuous, no otherwiſe, than as it is implied in, or ariſes from, this public affection, or extenſive benevolence of mind. Becauſe if a man truly loves the public, he neceſſarily loves love to the public.

Now therefore, for the ſame reaſon, if univerſal benevolence in the higheſt ſenſe, be the ſame thing with benevolence to the divine Being, who is in effect univerſal Being, it will follow, that love to virtue itſelf is no otherwiſe virtuous, than as it is implied in or ariſes from love to the divine Being. Conſequently God's own love to virtue is implied in love to himſelf: and is virtuous no otherwiſe than as it ariſes from love to himſelf. So that God's virtuous diſpoſition, appearing in love to holineſs in the creature, is to be reſolved into the ſame thing with love to himſelf. And conſequently, whereinſoever he makes virtue his end he makes himſelf his end.—In fine, God being as it were an all-comprehending Being, all his moral perfections, as his holineſs, juſtice, grace and benevolence, are ſome way or other to be reſolved into a ſupreme and infinite regard to himſelf; and if ſo, it will be eaſy to ſuppoſe that it becomes him to make himſelf his ſupreme and laſt end in his works.

I would here obſerve, by the way, that if any inſiſt that

that it becomes God to love and take delight in the virtue of his creatures for its own ſake, in ſuch a manner as not to love it from regard to himſelf; and that it ſuppoſeth too much ſelfiſhneſs to ſuppoſe that all God's delight in virtue is to be reſolved into delight in himſelf: This will contradict a former objection againſt God's taking pleaſure in communications of himſelf; *viz.* that inaſmuch as God is perfectly independent and ſelf-ſufficient, therefore all his happineſs and pleaſure conſiſts in the enjoyment of himſelf. For in the preſent objection it is inſiſted, that it becomes God to have ſome pleaſure, love or delight, in virtue diſtinct from his delight in himſelf. So that if the ſame perſons make both objections, they muſt be inconſiſtent with themſelves.

2. In anſwer to the objection we are upon; as to God's creatures, whoſe eſteem and love he ſeeks, being infinitely inferior to God, as nothing and vanity,—I would obſerve, that it is not unworthy of God to take pleaſure in that which in itſelf is fit and amiable, even in thoſe that are infinitely below him. If there be infinite grace and condeſcenſion in it, yet theſe are not unworthy of God; but infinitely to his honour and glory.

They who inſiſt that God's own glory was not an ultimate end of his creation of the world; but that all that he had any ultimate regard to, was the happineſs of his creatures; and ſuppoſe that he made his creatures, and not himſelf, his laſt end; do it under a colour of exalting and magnifying God's benevolence and love to his creatures.——But if his love to them be ſo great, and he ſo highly values them as to look upon them worthy to be his end in all his great works as they ſuppoſe; they are not conſiſtent with themſelves, in ſuppoſing that God has ſo little value for their love and eſteem. For as the nature of love, eſpecially great love, cauſes him that loves to value the eſteem of the perſon beloved; ſo that God ſhould take pleaſure in the creature's juſt love and eſteem, will follow both from God's love to himſelf and his love to his creatures. If he eſteem and love

love himſelf, he muſt approve of eſteem and love to himſelf; and diſapprove the contrary. And if he loves and values the creature, he muſt value and take delight in their mutual love and eſteem; becauſe he loves not becauſe he needs them.

3. As to what is alledged, of its being unworthy of great men to be governed in their conduct and atchievements by a regard to the applauſe of the populace; I would obſerve, what makes their applauſe to be worthy of ſo little regard, is their ignorance, giddineſs, and injuſtice. The applauſe of the multitude very frequently is not founded on any juſt view and underſtanding of things, but on humour, miſtake, folly, and unreaſonable affections. Such applauſe is truly worthy to be diſregarded.——But it is not beneath a man of the greateſt dignity and wiſdom, to value the wiſe and juſt eſteem of others, however inferior to him. The contrary, inſtead of being an expreſſion of greatneſs of mind, would ſhew an haughty and mean ſpirit. It is ſuch an eſteem in his creatures only, that God hath any regard to: for it is ſuch an eſteem only that it is fit and amiable in itſelf.

*Object.* 4. To ſuppoſe that God makes himſelf his ultimate end in the creation of the world derogates from the freeneſs of his goodneſs, in his beneficence to his creatures: and from their obligations to gratitude for the good communicated. For if God, in communicating his fulneſs, makes himſelf and not the creatures his end; then what good he does, he does for himſelf, and not for them; for his own ſake, and not theirs.

*Anſwer.* God and the creature in this affair of the emanation of the divine fulneſs, are not properly ſet in oppoſition; or made the oppoſite parts of a disjunction. Nor ought God's glory and the creatures good, to be ſpoken of as if they were properly and entirely diſtinct, as they are in the objection. This ſuppoſeth, that God's having reſpect to his glory, and the communication of good to his creatures, are things altogether different: that God's communicating his fulneſs for himſelf, and his doing it for them, are things ſtanding in a proper

diſjunction and oppoſition.——Whereas, if we were capable of having more full and perfect views of God and divine things, which are ſo much above us, it is probable it would appear very clear to us, that the matter is quite otherwiſe: and that theſe things, inſtead of appearing entirely diſtinct, are implied one in the other. That God in ſeeking his glory, therein ſeeks the good of his creatures. Becauſe the emanation of his glory (which he ſeeks and delights in, as he delights in himſelf and his own eternal glory) implies the communicated excellency and happineſs of his creature. And that in communicating his fulneſs for them, he does it for himſelf. Becauſe their good, which he ſeeks, is ſo much in union and communion with himſelf. God is their good. Their excellency and happineſs is nothing, but the emanation and expreſſion of God's glory: God, in ſeeking their glory and happineſs, ſeeks himſelf: and in ſeeking himſelf, *i. e.* himſelf diffuſed and expreſſed, (which he delights in, as he delights in his own beauty and fulneſs) he ſeeks their glory and happineſs.

This will the better appear, if we conſider the degree and manner in which he aimed at the creature's excellency and happineſs in his creating the world; *viz.* the degree and manner of the creature's glory and happineſs during the whole of the deſigned eternal duration of the world he was about to create: which is in greater and greater nearneſs and ſtrictneſs of union with himſelf, and greater and greater communion and participation with him in his own glory and happineſs, in conſtant progreſſion, throughout all eternity. As the creature's good was viewed in this manner when God made the world for it, *viz.* with reſpect to the whole of the eternal duration of it, and the eternally progreſſive union and communion with him; ſo the creature muſt be viewed as in infinite ſtrict union with himſelf. In this view it appears, that God's reſpect to the creature, in the whole, unites with his reſpect to himſelf. Both regards are like two lines which ſeem at the beginning to be ſeparate, but aim finally to meet in one, both being directed to the ſame center.——And as to the

good

good of the creature itſelf, if viewed in its whole duration, and infinite progreſſion, it muſt be viewed as infinite; and ſo not only being ſome communication of God's glory, but as coming nearer and nearer to the ſame thing in its infinite fulneſs. The nearer any thing comes to infinite, the nearer it comes to an identity with God. And if any good, as viewed by God, is beheld as infinite, it cannot be viewed as a diſtinct thing from God's own infinite glory.

The apoſtle's diſcourſe of the great love of Chriſt to men, Eph. v. 25. to the end, leads us thus to think of the love of Chriſt to his church; as coinciding with his love to himſelf, by virtue of the ſtrict union of the church with him. Thus, "huſbands love your wives, as Chriſt alſo loved the church, and gave himſelf for it —that he might preſent it to himſelf a glorious church. So ought men to love their wives, as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himſelf—even as the Lord the church; for we are members of his body, of his fleſh, and of his bones."

Now I apprehend, that there is nothing in this manner of God's ſeeking the good of the creatures, or in his diſpoſition to communicate of his own fulneſs to them, that at all derogates from the excellence of it, or the creature's obligation.

God's diſpoſition to communicate good, or to cauſe his own infinite fulneſs to flow forth, is not the thing properly called God's goodneſs, becauſe the good that he communicates, is ſomething of himſelf; a communication of his own glory, and what he delights in as he delights in his own glory. The creature has no leſs benefit by it; neither has ſuch a diſpoſition leſs of a direct tendency to the creature's benefit; or the leſs of a tendency to love to the creature, when the creature comes to exiſt. Nor is this diſpoſition in God to communicate of and diffuſe his own good the leſs excellent, becauſe it is implied in his love and regard to himſelf. For his love to himſelf does not imply it any otherwiſe, but as it implies a love to whatever is worthy and excellent. The emanation of God's

glory is in itſelf worthy and excellent, and ſo God delights in it: and his delight in this excellent thing, is implied in his love to himſelf, or his own fulneſs; becauſe that is the fountain, and ſo the ſum and comprehenſion of every thing that is excellent. And the matter ſtanding thus, it is evident, that theſe things cannot derogate from the excellency of this diſpoſition in God, to an emanation of his own fulneſs, or communication of good to the creature.

Nor does God's inclination to communicate good in this manner, *i. e.* from regard to himſelf, or delight in his own glory, at all diminiſh the freeneſs of his beneficence in this communication. This will appear, if we conſider particularly, in what ways doing good to others from ſelf-love, may be inconſiſtent with the freeneſs of beneficence. And I conceive there are only theſe two ways,

1. When any does good to another from confined ſelf-love, that is oppoſite to a general benevolence. This kind of ſelf-love is properly called *ſelfiſhneſs*. In ſome ſenſe, the moſt benevolent generous perſon in the world ſeeks his own happineſs in doing good to others; becauſe he places his happineſs in their good. His mind is ſo enlarged as to take them, as it were into himſelf. Thus when they are happy, he feels it; he partakes with them, and is happy in their happineſs. This is ſo far from being inconſiſtent with the freeneſs of beneficence, that, on the contrary, free benevolence and kindneſs conſiſts in it. The moſt free beneficence that can be in men is doing good, not from a confined ſelfiſhneſs, but from a diſpoſition to general benevolence, or love to beings in general.

But now, with reſpect to the divine Being, there is no ſuch thing as ſuch confined ſelfiſhneſs in him, or a love to himſelf, oppoſite to general benevolence. It is impoſſible, becauſe he comprehends all entity, and all excellence in his own eſſence. The firſt Being, the eternal and infinite Being, is in effect, *Being in general*; and comprehends univerſal exiſtence, as was obſerved before. God, in his benevolence to his creatures, cannot

not have his heart enlarged in ſuch a manner as to take in beings that he finds, who are originally out of himſelf diſtinct and independent. This cannot be in an infinite being, who exiſts alone from eternity. But he, from his goodneſs, as it were enlarges himſelf in a more excellent and divine manner. This is by communicating and diffuſing himſelf; and ſo, inſtead of finding, making objects of his benevolence; not by taking into himſelf what he finds diſtinct from himſelf, and ſo partaking of their good, and being happy in them; but by flowing forth and expreſſing himſelf in them, and making them to partake of him, and rejoicing in himſelf expreſſed in them, and communicated to them.

2. Another thing, in doing good to others from ſelf-love, that derogates from the freeneſs of the goodneſs; is doing good to others from dependence on them for the good we need or deſire: which dependence obliges. So that in our beneficence we are not ſelf-moved, but as it were conſtrained by ſomething without ourſelves. But it has been particularly ſhewn already, that God's making himſelf his end, in the manner that has been ſpoken of, argues no dependence; but is conſiſtent with abſolute independence and ſelf-ſufficience.

And I would here obſerve, that there is ſomething in that diſpoſition in God to communicate goodneſs, which ſhews him to be independent and ſelf-moved in it, in a manner that is peculiar, and above what is in the beneficence of creatures. Creatures, even the moſt gracious of them, are not ſo independent and ſelf-moved in their goodneſs; but that in all the exerciſes of it, they are excited by ſome object that they find: ſomething appearing good, or in ſome reſpect worthy of regard, preſents itſelf, and moves their kindneſs. But God, being all and alone, is abſolutely ſelf-moved. The exerciſes of his communicative diſpoſition are abſolutely from within himſelf, not finding any thing, or any object, to excite them or draw them forth: but all that is good and worthy in the object, and the very *being* of the object, proceeding from the overflowing of his fulneſs.

Theſe things ſhew, that the ſuppoſition of God's making himſelf his laſt end, in the manner ſpoken of, does not at all diminiſh the creature's obligation to gratitude for communications of good it receives. For if it leſſen its obligation, it muſt be on one of the following accounts. Either, that the creature has not ſo much benefit by it; or, that the diſpoſition it flows from is not proper goodneſs, not having ſo direct a tendency to the creature's benefit; or that the diſpoſition is not ſo virtuous and excellent in its kind; or that the beneficence is not ſo free. But it has been obſerved, that none of theſe things take place, with regard to that diſpoſition, which has been ſuppoſed to have excited God to create the world.

I confeſs there is a degree of indiſtinctneſs and obſcurity in the cloſe conſideration of ſuch ſubjects, and a great imperfection in the expreſſions we uſe concerning them; ariſing unavoidably from the infinite ſublimity of the ſubject, and the incomprehenſibleneſs of thoſe things that are divine. Hence revelation is the ſureſt guide in theſe matters; and what that teaches ſhall in the next place be conſidered. Nevertheleſs, the endeavours uſed to diſcover what the voice of reaſon is, ſo far as it can go, may ſerve to prepare the way, by obviating cavils inſiſted on by many; and to ſatisfy us, that what the word of God ſays of the matter is not unreaſonable; and thus prepare our minds for a more full acquieſcence in the inſtructions it gives, according to the more natural and genuine ſenſe of words and expreſſions we find often uſed there concerning this ſubject.

CHAP.

# CHAPTER II.

## Wherein it is required, what is to be learned from *holy ſcriptures*, concerning God's *laſt end* in the creation of the world.

### SECTION I.

#### The ſcriptures repreſent God as making *himſelf* his own *laſt end* in the creation of the world.

IT is manifeſt, that the ſcriptures ſpeak, on all occaſions, as tho' God made himſelf his end in all his works: and as though the ſame being, who is the firſt cauſe of all things, were the ſupreme and laſt end of all things. Thus in Iſa. xliv. 6. "Thus ſaith the Lord, the king of Iſrael, and his Redeemer the Lord of hoſts, I am the firſt, I alſo am the laſt, and beſides me there is no God." Chap. xlviii. 12. "I am the firſt and I am the laſt." Rev. i. 8. I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the ending, ſaith the Lord, which is, and was, and which is to come, the Almighty. Ver. 11. I am Alpha and Omega, the firſt and the laſt. Ver. 17. I am the firſt and the laſt." Chap. xxi. 6. "And he ſaid unto me, it is done; I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end." Chap. xxii. 13. "I am Alpha and Omega, the beginning and the end, the firſt and the laſt."

And

And when God is ſo often ſpoken of as the laſt as well as the firſt, and the end as well as the beginning, what is meant (or at leaſt implied) is, that as he is the firſt efficient cauſe and fountain from whence all things originate; ſo he is the laſt final cauſe for which they are made; the final term to which they all tend in their ultimate iſſue. This ſeems to be the moſt natural import of theſe expreſſions; and is confirmed by other parallel paſſages; as Rom. xi. 36. "For of him, and through and to him, are all things." Col. i. 16. "For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, viſible and inviſible, whether they be thrones or dominions, principalities and powers, all things were created by him, and for him." Heb. ii. 10. "For it became him, by whom are all things, and for whom are all things." In Prov. xvi. 4. it is ſaid expreſsly, "The Lord hath made all things for himſelf."

And the manner is obſervable, in which God is ſaid to be the laſt, to whom, and for whom, are all things. It is evidently ſpoken of as a meet and ſuitable thing, a branch of his glory; a meet prerogative of the great, infinite, and eternal being; a thing becoming the dignity of him who is infinitely above all other beings; from whom all things are, and by whom they conſiſt; and in compariſon with whom all other things are as nothing.

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## SECT. I.

WHEREIN ſome poſitions are advanced concerning a juſt method of arguing in this affair, from what we find in holy ſcriptures.

We have ſeen, that the ſcriptures ſpeak of the creation of the world as being for God as its end. What remains therefore to be enquired into, is, *which way do the ſcriptures repreſent God as making himſelf his end?*

It is evident, that God does not make his exiſtence or

or being the end of the creation; nor can he be ſuppoſed to do ſo without great abſurdity. His being and exiſtence cannot be conceived of but as prior to any of God's acts or deſigns; they muſt be preſuppoſed as the ground of them. Therefore, it cannot be in this way that God makes himſelf the end of his creating the world. He cannot create the world to the end that he may have exiſtence; or may have ſuch attributes and perfections, and ſuch an eſſence. Nor do the ſcriptures give the leaſt intimation of any ſuch thing. Therefore, what divine effect, or what is it in relation to God, that is the thing which the ſcripture teacheth us to be the end he aimed at in his works of creation, in deſigning of which he makes *himſelf* his end?

In order to a right underſtanding of the ſcripture doctrine, and drawing juſt inferences from what we find ſaid in the word of God relative to this matter; ſo to open the way to a true and definitive anſwer to the above enquiry, I would lay down the following poſitions,

*Poſition* 1. That which appears to be ſpoken of as God's ultimate end in his works of providence in general, we may juſtly ſuppoſe to be his laſt end in the work of creation.——This appears from what was obſerved before (under the fifth particular of the introduction), which I need not now repeat.

*Poſ.* 2. When any thing appears by the ſcripture to be the laſt end of ſome of the works of God, which thing appears in fact to be the reſult, not only of this work, but of God's works in general. And although it be not mentioned as the end of thoſe works, but only of ſome of them, yet being actually the reſult of other works as well as that, and nothing appears peculiar in the nature of the caſe, that renders it a fit, and beautiful, and valuable reſult of thoſe particular works, more than of the reſt; but it appears with equal reaſon deſirable and valuable in the caſe of all works, of which it is ſpoken of in the word of God as (and ſeen in fact to be) the effect; we may juſtly infer, that thing to be the laſt end of thoſe other works alſo. For we muſt

muſt ſuppoſe it to be on account of the valuableneſs of the effect, that it is made the end of thoſe works of which it is expreſsly ſpoken of as the end; and this effect, by the ſuppoſition, being equally, and in like manner, the reſult of the work, and of the ſame value, it is but reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that it is the end of the work, of which it is naturally the conſequence, in one caſe as well as in another.

*Poſition* 3. The ultimate end of God's creating the world, being alſo (as was before obſerved) the laſt end of all God's works of providence, and that in the higheſt ſenſe, and being above all other things important, we may well preſume that this end will be chiefly inſiſted on in the word of God, in the account it gives of God's deſigns and ends in his works of providence——and therefore, if there be any particular thing, that we find more frequently mentioned in ſcripture, as God's ultimate aim in his works of providence, than any thing elſe, this is a preſumption that this is the ſupreme and ultimate end of God's works in general, and ſo the end of the work of creation.

*Poſ.* 4. That which appears from the word of God to be his laſt end with reſpect to the moral world, or God's laſt end in the creation and diſpoſal of the intelligent part of the ſyſtem, and in the moral government of the world, that is God's laſt end in the work of creation in general. Becauſe it is evident, from the conſtitution of the world itſelf, as well as from the word of God, that the moral part is the end of all the reſt of the creation. The inanimate unintelligent part is made for the rational as much as a houſe is prepared for the inhabitant. And it is evident alſo from reaſon and the word of God, that it is with regard to what is moral in them, or for the ſake of ſome moral good in them, that moral agents are made, and the world made for them.—But it is further evident, that whatſoever is the laſt end of that part of creation that is the end of all the reſt, and for which all the reſt of the world was made, muſt be the laſt end of the whole. If all the other parts of a watch are made for the hand of the watch,

watch, to move that aright, and for a due and proper regulation of that, then it will follow, that the laſt end of the hand, is the laſt end of the whole machine.

*Poſ.* 5. That which appears from the ſcripture to be God's laſt end in the chief work or works of his providence, we may well determine is God's laſt end in creating the world. For as was obſerved, we may juſtly infer the end of a thing from the uſe of it. We may juſtly infer the end of a clock, a chariot, a ſhip, or water-engine, from the main uſe to which it is applied. But God's providence is his uſe of the world he has made. And if there be any work or works of providence that are evidently God's main work or works, herein appears and conſiſts the main uſe that God makes of the creation.—From theſe two laſt poſitions we may infer the next, *viz.*

*Poſ.* 6. Whatever appears by the ſcriptures to be God's laſt end in his main work or works of providence towards the moral world, that we may juſtly infer to be the laſt end of the creation of the world. Becauſe, as was juſt now obſerved, the moral world is the chief part of the creation, and the end of the reſt; and God's laſt end in creating that part of the world, muſt be his laſt end in the creation of the whole. And it appears by the laſt poſition, that the end of God's main work or works of providence towards them, or the main uſe he puts them to, ſhews the laſt end for which he has made them; and conſequently the main end for which he has made the whole world.

*Poſ.* 7. That which divine revelation ſhews to be God's laſt end with reſpect to that part of the moral world which are good, or which are according to his mind, or ſuch as he would have them be; I ſay, that which is God's laſt end with reſpect to theſe, (*i. e.* his laſt end in their being, and in their being good), this we muſt ſuppoſe to be the laſt end of God's creating the world. For it has been already ſhewn, that God's laſt end in the moral part of creation muſt be the end of the whole. But his end in that part of the moral world that are good, muſt be the laſt end for which

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he has made the moral world in general. For therein conſiſts the goodneſs of a thing, *viz.* in its fitneſs to anſwer its end: or at leaſt this muſt be goodneſs in the eyes of the author of that thing. For goodneſs in his eyes is its agreeableneſs to his mind. But an agreeableneſs to his mind in what he makes for ſome end or uſe, muſt be an agreeableneſs or fitneſs to that end. For his end in this caſe is his mind. That which he chiefly aims at in that thing, is chiefly his mind with reſpect to that thing. And therefore, they are good moral agents who are fitted for the end for which God has made moral agents: as they are good machines, inſtruments, and utenſils, that are fitted to the end they are deſigned for. And conſequently, that which is the chief end to which in being good they are fitted, that is the chief end of utenſils. So that which is the chief end to which good created moral agents in being good are fitted, this is the chief end of moral agents, or the moral part of the creation; and conſequently of the creation in general.

*Poſ.* 8. That which the word of God requires the intelligent and moral part of the world to ſeek as their main end, or to have reſpect to in that they do, and regulate all their conduct by, as their ultimate and higheſt end, that we have reaſon to ſuppoſe is the laſt end for which God has made them; and conſequently, by poſition fourth, the laſt end for which he has made the whole world. A main difference between the intelligent and moral parts, and the reſt of the world, lies in this, that the former are capable of knowing their Creator, and the end for which he made them, and capable of actively complying with his deſign in their creation, and promoting it; while other creatures cannot promote the deſign of their creation, only paſſively and eventually. And ſeeing they are capable of knowing the end for which their author has made them, it is doubtleſs their duty to fall in with it. Their wills ought to comply with the will of the Creator in this reſpect, in mainly ſeeking the ſame as their laſt end which God mainly ſeeks as their laſt end. This muſt

muſt be the law of nature and reaſon with reſpect to them. And we muſt ſuppoſe that God's revealed law, and the law of nature agree; and that his will, as a lawgiver, muſt agree with his will as a Creator. Therefore we juſtly infer, that the ſame thing which God's revealed law requires intelligent creatures to ſeek as their laſt and greateſt end, that God their Creator has made their laſt end, and ſo the end of the creation of the world.

*Poſ.* 9. We may well ſuppoſe, that what ſeems in holy ſcripture, from time to time, to be ſpoken of as the main end of the goodneſs of the good part of the moral world, ſo that the reſpect and relation their virtue or goodneſs has to that end, is what chiefly makes it valuable and deſirable; I ſay, we may well ſuppoſe that to be the thing which is God's laſt end in the creation of the moral world; and ſo, by poſition fourth, of the whole world. For the end of the goodneſs of a thing, is the end of the thing. Herein, it was obſerved before, muſt conſiſt the goodneſs or valuableneſs of any thing in the eyes of him that made it for his uſe, *viz.* its being good for that uſe, or good with reſpect to the end for which he made it.

*Poſ.* 10. That which perſons who are deſcribed in ſcripture as approved ſaints, and ſet forth as examples of piety, ſought as their laſt and higheſt end in the things which they did, and which are mentioned as parts of their holy converſation, or inſtances of their good and approved behaviour; that we muſt ſuppoſe, was what they ought to ſeek as their laſt end; and conſequently, by the preceding poſition, was the ſame with God's laſt end in the creation of the world.

*Poſ.* 11. That which appears by the word of God to be that end or event, in the deſire of which the ſouls of the good parts of the moral world, eſpecially of the beſt, and in their beſt frames, do moſt naturally and directly exerciſe their goodneſs in, and in expreſſing of their deſire of this event or end, they do moſt properly and directly expreſs their reſpect to God; we may, I ſay, well ſuppoſe, that event or end to be

the chief and ultimate end of a ſpirit of piety and goodneſs, and God's chief end in making the moral world, and ſo the whole world. For, doubtleſs, the moſt direct and natural deſire and tendency of a ſpirit of true goodneſs, in the good and beſt part of the moral world, is to the chief end of goodneſs, and ſo the chief end of the creation of the moral world. And in what elſe can the ſpirit of true reſpect and friendſhip to God be expreſſed by way of deſire, than deſires of the ſame end, which God himſelf chiefly and ultimately deſires and ſeeks in making them and all other things.

*Poſ.* 12. Since the holy ſcriptures teach us that Jeſus Chriſt is the head of the moral world, and eſpecially of all the good part of it; the chief of God's ſervants, appointed to be the head of his ſaints and angels, and ſet forth as the chief and moſt perfect pattern and example of goodneſs; we may well ſuppoſe, by the foregoing poſitions, that what he ſought as his laſt end, was God's laſt end in the creation of the world.

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## SECT. III.

PARTICULAR texts of ſcripture, that ſhew that God's glory is an ultimate end of the creation.

What God ſays in Iſa. xlviii. 11. naturally leads us to ſuppoſe, that the way in which God makes himſelf his end in his work or works which he does for his own ſake, is in making his glory his end. "For my own ſake, even for my own ſake will I do it. For how ſhould my name be polluted: and I will not give my glory to another." Which is as much as to ſay, I will obtain my end; I will not forego my glory: another ſhall not take this prize from me. It is pretty evident here, that God's name and his glory, which ſeems to intend the ſame thing, (as ſhall be obſerved more particularly afterwards), are ſpoken of as his laſt end in the great work mentioned, not as an inferior ſubordinate end, ſubſervient to the intereſt of others. The words are emphatical. The emphaſis and repetition conſtrain us to underſtand, that what God does is ultimately

timately for his own ſake: "For *my own ſake*, even for *my own ſake* will I do it."

So the words of the apoſtle, in Rom. xi. 36. naturally lead us to ſuppoſe that the way in which all things are to God, is in being for his glory. "For of him, and through him, and to him are all things, to whom be glory forever and ever. Amen." In the preceding context, the apoſtle obſerves the marvellous diſpoſals of divine wiſdom, for cauſing all things to be to him in their final iſſue and reſult, as they are from him at firſt, and governed by him. His diſcourſe ſhews how God contrived and brought this to paſs in his diſpoſition of things, *viz.* by ſetting up the kingdom of Chriſt in the world; leaving the Jews, and calling the Gentiles; and in what he would hereafter do in bringing in the Jews with the fulneſs of the Gentiles; with the circumſtances of theſe wonderful works, ſo as greatly to ſhew his juſtice and his goodneſs, magnify his grace, and manifeſt the ſovereignty and freeneſs of it, and the abſolute dependence of all on him.——And then, in the four laſt verſes, breaks out into a moſt pathetic rapturous exclamation, expreſſing his great admiration of the depth of divine wiſdom in the ſteps he takes for the attaining his end, and cauſing all things to be to him: and finally, he expreſſes a joyful conſent to God's excellent deſign in all to glorify himſelf, in ſaying, "to him be glory forever;" as much as to ſay, as all things are ſo wonderfully ordered for his glory, ſo let him have the glory of all, for evermore.

2. The glory of God is ſpoken of in holy ſcripture as the laſt end for which that part of the moral world that are good were made. Thus, in Iſa. xliii. 6, 7. "I will ſay to the north give up, and to the ſouth keep not back; bring my ſons from far, and my daughters from the ends of the earth, even every one that is called by my name; for I have created him *for my glory*, I have formed him, yea I have made him." Iſa. lx. 21. "Thy people alſo ſhall be all righteous. They ſhall inherit the land forever, the branch of my planting, the work of my hand, *that I may be glorified.*"

chap. lxi. 3. "That they may be called trees of righteouſneſs, the planting of the Lord, *that he might be glorified.*"

In theſe places, we ſee, that the glory of God is ſpoken of as the end of God's ſaints, the end for which he makes them, *i. e.* either gives them being, or gives them a being as ſaints, or both. It is ſaid, that God has made and formed them to be his ſons and daughters, *for his own glory:* That they are trees of his planting, the work of his hands, as trees of righteouſneſs, *that he might be glorified.*——And if we conſider the words, eſpecially as taken with the context in each of the places, it will appear quite unnatural to ſuppoſe, that God's glory is here ſpoken of only as an end inferior and ſubordinate to the happineſs of God's people; or as a prediction that God would create, form, and plant them that he might be glorified, that ſo God's people might be happy. On the contrary, if we take the places with the context, they will appear rather as promiſes of making God's people happy, that God therein might be glorified. So is that in the 43d chap. as we ſhall ſee plainly, if we take the whole that is ſaid from the beginning of the chapter. It is wholly a promiſe of a future great and wonderful work of God's power and grace, delivering his people from all miſery, and making them exceeding happy; and then the end of all, or the ſum of God's deſign in all, is declared to be God's own glory. "I have redeemed thee, I have called thee by thy name, thou art mine.—I will be with thee.—When thou walkeſt through the fire, thou ſhalt not be burnt, nor the flame kindle upon thee,—thou art precious and honourable in my ſight. I will give men for thee, and people for thy life. Fear not, I am with thee.—I will bring my ſons from far, and my daughters from the ends of the earth; every one that is called by my name: *for I have created him for my glory.*"

So it plainly is chap. lx. ver. 21. the whole chapter is made up of nothing but promiſes of future exceeding happineſs to God's church. But, for brevity's ſake, let

let us take only the two preceding verſes. "The ſun ſhall be no more thy light by day, neither for brightneſs ſhall the moon give light unto thee: but the Lord ſhall be unto thee an everlaſting light, and thy God thy glory. Thy ſun ſhall no more go down, neither ſhall thy moon withdraw itſelf: for the Lord ſhall be thine everlaſting light, and the days of thy mourning ſhall be ended. Thy people alſo ſhall be all righteous; they ſhall inherit the land forever, the branch of my planting, the work of my hands;" and then the end of all is added, "*that I might be glorified.*" All the preceding promiſes are plainly mentioned as ſo many parts or conſtituents of the great and exceeding happineſs of God's people; and God's glory is mentioned rather as God's end, or the ſum of his deſign in this happineſs, than this happineſs as the end of this glory. Juſt in like manner is the promiſe in the third verſe of the next chapter. "To appoint to them that mourn in Zion, to give to them beauty for aſhes, the oil of joy for mourning, the garment of praiſe for the ſpirit of heavineſs, that they might be called trees of righteouſneſs, the planting of the Lord, *that he might be glorified.*" The work of God promiſed to be effected, is plainly an accompliſhment of the joy, gladneſs, and happineſs of God's people, inſtead of their mourning and ſorrow; and the end in which the work iſſues, or that in which God's deſign in this work is obtained and ſummed up, is his glory. This proves, by the ſeventh poſition, that God's glory is the end of the creation.

The ſame thing may be argued from Jer. xiii. 11. "For as a girdle cleaveth to the loins of a man, ſo have I cauſed to cleave unto me the whole houſe of Iſrael, and the whole houſe of Judah, ſaith the Lord: that they might be unto me for a people, and for a name, and for a praiſe, and *for a glory:* but they would not hear." That is, God ſought to make them to be his own holy people; or, as the apoſtle expreſſes it, his peculiar people, zealous of good works; that ſo they might be a glory to him; as girdles were uſed in

thoſe days for ornament and beauty, and as badges of dignity and honour *. Which is agreeable to the places obſerved before, that ſpeak of the church as the glory of Chriſt.

Now when God ſpeaks of himſelf, as ſeeking a peculiar and holy people for himſelf, to be for his glory and honour, as a man that ſeeks an ornament and badge of honour for his glory, it is not natural to underſtand it merely of a ſubordinate end, as though God had no reſpect to himſelf in it; but only the good of others. If ſo, the compariſon would not be natural; for men are commonly wont to ſeek their own glory and honour in adorning themſelves, and dignifying themſelves with badges of honour, out of reſpect to themſelves.

The ſame doctrine ſeems to be taught, Eph. xliv. 23. "Having predeſtinated us to the adoption of children, by Jeſus Chriſt, unto himſelf, according to the good pleaſure of his will, to the praiſe of the glory of his grace."

The ſame may be argued from Iſa. xliv. 23. "For the Lord hath redeemed Jacob, he hath glorified himſelf in Iſrael." And chap. xlix. 3. "Thou art my ſervant Jacob, in whom I will be glorified." John xvii. 10. "And all mine are thine, and thine are mine, and I am glorified in them." 2 Theſſ. i. 10. "When he ſhall come to be glorified in his ſaints." Ver. xi. 12. "Wherefore alſo we pray always for you, that our God would count you worthy of his calling, and fulfil all the good pleaſure of his goodneſs, and the work of faith with power: that the name of our Lord Jeſus may be glorified in you, and ye in him, according to the grace of God and our Lord Jeſus Chriſt."

3. The ſcripture ſpeaks from time to time of God's glory, as though it were his ultimate end of the goodneſs of the moral part of the creation; and that end, in

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* See ver. 9. and alſo Iſa. iii. 24. and xxii. 21. and xxiii. 10. 2 Sam xviii. 11. Exod. xxviii. 8.

in a reſpect and relation to which chiefly it is, that the value or worth of their virtue conſiſts. As in Phil. i. 10, 11. "That ye may approve things that are excellent, that ye may be ſincere, and without offence till the day of Chriſt: being filled with the fruits of righteouſneſs, which are by Jeſus Chriſt, unto the glory and praiſe of God." Here the apoſtle ſhews how the fruits of righteouſneſs in them are valuable, and how they anſwer their end, *viz.* in being "by Jeſus Chriſt to the praiſe and glory of God." John xv. 8. "Herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit." Signifying, that by this means it is that the great end of religion is to be anſwered. And in 1 Pet. iv. 11. the apoſtle directs the Chriſtians to regulate all their religious performances, with reference to that one end. "If any man ſpeak, let him ſpeak as the oracles of God: if any man miniſter, let him do it as of the ability which God giveth, that God in all things may be glorified; to whom be praiſe and dominion forever and ever, Amen." And, from time to time, embracing and practiſing true religion, and repenting of ſin, and turning to holineſs, is expreſſed by glorifying God, as though that were the ſum and end of the whole matter. Rev. xi. 13. "And in the earthquake were ſlain of men ſeven thouſand; and the remnant were affrighted, and gave glory to the God of heaven." So, Rev. xiv. 6, 7. "And I ſaw another angel fly in the midſt of heaven, having the everlaſting goſpel to preach to them that dwell on the earth;——ſaying, with a loud voice, Fear God, and give glory to him." As though this were the ſum and end of that virtue and religion, which was the grand deſign of preaching the goſpel every where through the world. Rev. xvi. 9.—"And repented not to give him glory." Which is as much as to ſay, they did not forſake their ſins and turn to true religion, that God might receive that which is the great end he ſeeks, in the religion he requires of men. See to the ſame purpoſe, Pſal. xxii. 21,—23. Iſa. lxvi. 19. xxiv. 15. xxv. 3. Jer. xiii. 15, 16. Dan. v. 23. Rom. xv. 5, 6.

And

And as the exerciſe of true religion and virtue in Chriſtians is ſummarily expreſſed by their glorifying God, ſo when the good influence of this on others, as bringing them by the example to turn to the ways and practice of true goodneſs, is ſpoken of, it is expreſſed in the ſame manner. Matth. v. 16. "Let your light ſo ſhine before men, that others ſeeing your good works, may glorify your Father which is in heaven." 1 Pet. ii. 12. "Having your converſation honeſt among the Gentiles, that whereas they ſpeak evil againſt you as evil-doers, they may, by your good works which they behold, glorify God in the day of viſitation.

That the ultimate end of moral goodneſs, or righteouſneſs is anſwered in God's glory being attained, is ſuppoſed in the objection which the apoſtle makes, or ſuppoſes ſome will make, in Rom. iii. 7. "For if the truth of God hath more abounded through my lie unto his glory, why am I judged as a ſinner?" *i. e.* ſeeing the great end of righteouſneſs is anſwered by my ſin, in God's being glorified, why is my ſin condemned and puniſhed: and why is not my vice equivalent to virtue?

And the glory of God is ſpoken of as that wherein conſiſts the value and end of particular graces. As of faith, Rom. iv. 20. "He ſtaggered not at the promiſe of God through unbelief: but was ſtrong in faith, giving glory to God." Phil. ii. 11. "That every tongue ſhould confeſs that Jeſus is the Lord, to the glory of God the Father." Of repentance. Joſh. vi. 19. "Give, I pray thee, glory to the Lord God of Iſrael, and make confeſſion unto him." Of charity. 2 Cor. viii. 19.—"With this grace, which is adminiſtred by us, to the glory of the ſame Lord, and declaration of your ready mind." Thankſgiving and praiſe. Luke vii. 18. "There are not found that returned to give glory to God, ſave this ſtranger." Pſal. l. 23. "Whoſo offereth praiſe glorifieth me; and to him that ordereth his converſation aright, will I ſhew the ſalvation of God." Concerning which laſt place may be obſerved;—God here

here ſeems to ſay this to ſuch as abounded in their ſacrifices and outward ceremonies of religion, as taking it for granted, and as what they knew already, and ſuppoſed in their religious performances, that the end of all religion was to glorify God. They ſuppoſed they did this in the beſt manner, in offering a multitude of ſacrifices (ſee the preceding part of the pſalm.) But here God corrects this miſtake, and informs, that this grand end of religion is not attained this way, but in offering the more ſpiritual ſacrifices of praiſe and a holy converſation.

In fine, the words of the apoſtle in 1 Cor. vi. 20. are worthy of particular notice. "Ye are not your own; for ye are bought with a price: therefore glorify God in your body and in your ſpirit, which are his." Here not only is glorifying God ſpoken of, as what ſummarily comprehends the end of that religion and ſervice of God, which is the end of Chriſt's redeeming us: but here I would further remark this—That the apoſtle in this place urges, that inaſmuch as we are not our own, but bought for God, that we might be his; therefore we ought not to act as if we were our own, but as God's; and ſhould not uſe the members of our bodies, or faculties of our ſouls, for ourſelves, as making ourſelves our end; but for God, as making him our end. And he expreſſes the way in which we are to make God our end, *viz.* in making his glory our end. "Therefore glorify God in your body and in your ſpirit, which are his." Here it cannot be pretended, that though Chriſtians are indeed required to make God's glory their end; yet it is but as a ſubordinate end, as ſubſervient to their own happineſs, as a higher end; for then, in acting chiefly and ultimately for their ownſelves, they would uſe themſelves more as their own than as God's; which is directly contrary to the deſign of the apoſtle's exhortation, and the argument he is upon; which is, that we ſhould give ourſelves as it were away from ourſelves to God, and uſe ourſelves as his, and not our own, acting for his ſake, and not our own ſakes. Thus it is evident, by

poſition

poſition ninth, that the glory of God is the laſt end for which he created the world.

4. There are ſome things in the word of God that lead us to ſuppoſe, that it requires of men that they ſhould deſire and ſeek God's glory, as their higheſt and laſt end in what they do. As particularly the paſſage laſt mentioned. This appears from what has been juſt now obſerved upon it. The ſame may be argued from 1 Cor. x. 30. "Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or whatſoever ye do, do all to the glory of God." And 1 Pet. iv. 11.—"That God in all things may be glorified." Which was mentioned before. And it may be argued, that Chriſt requires his followers ſhould deſire and ſeek God's glory in the firſt place, and above all things elſe, from that prayer which he gave his diſciples, as the pattern and rule for the direction of his followers in their prayers. The firſt petition of which is, "Hallowed be thy name." Which in ſcripture language is the ſame with glorified be thy name; as is manifeſt from Lev. x. 3. Ezek. xxviii. 22. and many other places. Now our laſt and higheſt end is doubtleſs what ſhould be firſt in our deſires, and conſequently firſt in our prayers: and therefore we may argue, that ſince Chriſt directs that God's glory ſhould be firſt in our prayers, that therefore this is our laſt end. This is further confirmed by the concluſion of the Lord's prayer, "For thine is the kingdom, the power and glory." Which, as it ſtands in connection with the reſt of the prayer, implies, that we deſire and aſk all theſe things which are mentioned in each petition, with a ſubordination, and in ſubſervience to the dominion and glory of God; in which all our deſires ultimately terminate, as their laſt end. God's glory and dominion are the two firſt things mentioned in the prayer, and are the ſubject of the firſt half of the prayer; and they are the two laſt things mentioned in the ſame prayer, in its concluſion: and God's glory is the Alpha and Omega in the prayer. From theſe things we may argue, according to poſition eighth, that God's glory is the laſt end of the creation.

5. The

5. The glory of God appears, by the account given in the word of God, to be that end or event, in the earneſt deſires of which, and in their delight in which, the beſt part of the moral world, and when in their beſt frames, do moſt naturally expreſs the direct tendency of the ſpirit of true goodneſs, and give vent to the virtuous and pious affections of their heart, and do moſt properly and directly teſtify their ſupreme reſpect to their Creator. This is the way in which the holy apoſtles, from time to time, gave vent to the ardent exerciſes of their piety, and expreſſed and breathed forth their regard to the ſupreme Being. Rom. xi. 36. "To whom be glory forever and ever. Amen." Chap. xvi. 27. "To God only wiſe, be glory, through Jeſus Chriſt, forever, Amen." Gal. i. 4, 5. "Who gave himſelf for our ſins, that he might deliver us from this preſent evil world, according to the will of God and our Father, to whom be glory, forever and ever, Amen." 2 Tim. iv. 18. "And the Lord ſhall deliver me from every evil work, and will preſerve me to his heavenly kingdom: to whom be glory, forever and ever, Amen." Eph. iii. 21. "Unto him be glory in the church by Chriſt Jeſus throughout all ages, world without end." Heb. xiii. 21.——"Through Jeſus Chriſt, to whom be glory, forever and ever, Amen." Phil. iv. 20. "Now unto God and our Father, be glory, forever and ever, Amen." 2 Pet. iii. 18. "To him be glory, both now and forever, Amen." Jude 25. "To the only wiſe God our Saviour, be glory and majeſty, dominion and power, both now and ever, Amen." Rev. i. 5, 6. "Unto him that loved us, &c.—to him be glory and dominion, forever and ever, Amen." It was in this way that holy David, the ſweet pſalmiſt of Iſrael, vented the ardent tendencies and deſires of his pious heart. 1 Chron. xvi. 28, 29. "Give unto the LORD, ye kindreds of the people, give unto the LORD, glory and ſtrength: give unto the LORD the glory due unto his name." We have much the ſame expreſſions again, Pſal. xxix, 1, 2 and lxix. 7, 8. See alſo, Pſal. lvii. 5. lxxii. 18, 19. cxv. 1. So the whole church of God through all

all parts of the earth. Iſa. xlii. 10, 11, 12. In like manner the ſaints and angels in heaven expreſs the piety of their hearts. Rev. iv. 9, 11. and v. 11, 12, 13, 14. and vii. 12. This is the event that the hearts of the ſeraphim eſpecially exult in, as appears by Iſa. vi. 2, 3. "Above it ſtood the ſeraphim.—And one cried unto another, and ſaid, Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hoſts, the whole earth is full of his glory." So at the birth of Chriſt, Luke ii. 14. "Glory to God in the higheſt," &c.

It is manifeſt that theſe holy perſons in earth and heaven, in thus expreſſing their deſires of the glory of God, have reſpect to it, not merely as a ſubordinate end, or merely for the ſake of ſomething elſe; but as that which they look upon in itſelf valuable, and in the higheſt degree ſo. It would be abſurd to ſay, that in theſe ardent exclamations, they are only giving vent to their vehement benevolence to their fellow-creatures, and expreſſing their earneſt deſires that God might be glorified, that ſo his ſubjects may be made happy by the means. It is evident, it is not ſo much love either to themſelves, or fellow-creatures, which they expreſs, as their exalted and ſupreme regard to the moſt high and infinitely glorious Being. When the church ſays, "Not unto us, not unto us, O Jehovah, but to thy name give glory," it would be abſurd to ſay, that ſhe only deſires that God may have glory, as a neceſſary or convenient means of their own advancement and felicity. From theſe things it appears, by the eleventh poſition, that God's glory is the end of the creation.

6. The ſcripture leads us to ſuppoſe, that Chriſt ſought God's glory, as his higheſt and laſt end. John vii. 18. "He that ſpeaketh of himſelf, ſeeketh his own glory: but he that ſeeketh his glory that ſent him, the ſame is true, and no unrighteouſneſs is in him." When Chriſt ſays, he did not ſeek his own glory, we cannot reaſonably underſtand him, that he had no regard to his own glory, even the glory of the human nature; for the glory of that nature was part of the reward promiſed him, and of the joy ſet before him.

him. But we muſt underſtand him, that this was not his ultimate aim; it was not the end that chiefly governed his conduct: and therefore, when in oppoſition to this, in the latter part of the ſentence, he ſays, "But he that ſeeketh his glory that ſent him, the ſame is true," &c. It is natural from the antitheſis to underſtand him, that this was his ultimate aim, his ſupreme governing end. John xii. 27, 28. "Now is my ſoul troubled, and what ſhall I ſay? Father, ſave me from this hour: But for this cauſe came I unto this hour, Father, glorify thy name." Chriſt was now going to Jeruſalem, and expected in a few days there to be crucified: and the proſpect of his laſt ſufferings, in this near approach, was very terrible to him. Under this diſtreſs of mind, in ſo terrible a view, he ſupports himſelf with a proſpect of what would be the conſequence of his ſufferings, *viz.* God's glory. Now, it is the end that ſupports the agent in any difficult work that he undertakes, and above all others, his ultimate and ſupreme end; for this is above all others valuable in his eyes; and ſo, ſufficient to countervail the difficulty of the means: that is the end, which is in itſelf agreeable and ſweet to him, which ultimately terminates his deſires, is the center of reſt and ſupport; and ſo muſt be the fountain and ſum of all the delight and comfort he has in his proſpects, with reſpect to his work. Now Chriſt has his ſoul ſtraitened and diſtreſſed with a view of that which was infinitely the moſt difficult part of his work, which was juſt at hand. Now certainly, if his mind ſeeks ſupport in the conflict from a view of his end, it muſt moſt naturally repair to the higheſt end, which is the proper fountain of all ſupport in this caſe. We may well ſuppoſe, that when his ſoul conflicts with the appearance of the moſt extreme difficulties, it would reſort for ſupport to the idea of his ſupreme and ultimate end, the fountain of all the ſupport and comfort he has in the means, or the work. The ſame thing, *viz.* Chriſt's ſeeking the glory of God as his ultimate end, is manifeſt by what Chriſt ſays, when he comes yet nearer to the

hour of his laſt ſufferings, in that remarkable prayer, the laſt he ever made with his diſciples, on the evening before his crucifixion; wherein he expreſſes the ſum of his aims and deſires. His firſt words are, "Father, the hour is come, glorify thy Son, that thy Son alſo may glorify thee." As this is his firſt requeſt, we may ſuppoſe it to be his ſupreme requeſt and deſire, and what he ultimately aimed at in all. If we conſider what follows to the end, all the reſt that is ſaid in the prayer, ſeems to be but an amplification of this great requeſt.

On the whole, I think it is pretty manifeſt, that Jeſus Chriſt ſought the glory of God as his higheſt and laſt end; and that therefore, by poſition twelfth, this was God's laſt end in the creation of the world.

7. It is manifeſt from ſcripture, that God's glory is the laſt end of that great work of providence, the work of redemption by Jeſus Chriſt. This is manifeſt from what is juſt now obſerved, of its being the end ultimately ſought by Jeſus Chriſt the Redeemer. And if we further conſider the texts mentioned in the proof of that, and take notice of the context, it will be very evident, that it was what Chriſt ſought as his laſt end, in that great work which he came into the world upon, *viz.* to procure redemption for his people. It is manifeſt, that Chriſt profeſſes in John vii. 18. that he did not ſeek his own glory in what he did, but the glory of him that ſent him. He means, that he did not ſeek his own glory, but the glory of him that ſent him in the work of his miniſtry; the work he performed, and which he came into the world to perform, and which his Father ſent him to work out, which is the work of redemption. And with reſpect to that text, John xii. 27, 28.; it has been already obſerved, that Chriſt comforted himſelf in the view of the extreme difficulty of his work, which was the work of redemption, in the proſpect of that which he had reſpect to, and rejoiced in, as the higheſt, ultimate, and moſt valuable excellent end of that work, which he ſet his heart moſt upon, and delighted moſt in. And in the anſwer

anſwer that the Father made him from heaven at that time, in the latter part of the ſame verſe, "I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again." The meaning plainly is, that God had glorified his name in what Chriſt had done, in the work he ſent him upon; and would glorify it again, and to a greater degree, in what he ſhould further do, and in the ſucceſs thereof. Chriſt ſhews that he underſtood it thus, in what he ſays upon it, when the people took notice of it, wondering at the voice; ſome ſaying, that it thundered, others, that an angel ſpake to him. Chriſt ſays, "This voice came not becauſe of me, but for your ſakes." And then he ſays, (exulting in the proſpect of this glorious end and ſucceſs), "Now is the judgment of this world; now is the prince of this world caſt out; and I, if I be lift up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." In the ſucceſs of the ſame work of redemption, he places his own glory, as was obſerved before, in theſe words in the 23d and 24th verſes of the ſame chapter. "The hour is come, that the Son of man ſhould be glorified. Verily, verily, I ſay unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit."

So it is manifeſt, that when he ſeeks his own and his Father's glory, in that prayer, John xvii. (which, it has been obſerved, he then ſeeks as his laſt end), he ſeeks it as the end of that great work he came into the world upon, which he is now about to finiſh in his death. What follows through the whole prayer, plainly ſhews this: and particularly the 4th and 5th verſes. "I have glorified thee on earth: I have finiſhed the work which thou gaveſt me to do. And now, O Father, glorify thou me with thine own ſelf." Here it is pretty plain, that declaring to his Father that he had glorified him on earth, and finiſhed the work God gave him to do, meant that he had finiſhed the work which God gave him to do for this end, *viz.* that he might be glorified. He had now finiſhed that foundation that he came into the world to lay for his glory. He had laid a foundation for his Father's obtaining his

will, and the utmoſt that he deſigned. By which it is manifeſt, that God's glory was the utmoſt of his deſign, or his ultimate end in this great work.

And it is manifeſt, by John xiii. 31, 32. that the glory of the Father, and his own glory, are what Chriſt exulted in, in the proſpect of his approaching ſufferings, when Judas was gone out to betray him, as the end his heart was mainly ſet upon, and ſupremely delighted in. "Therefore, when he was gone out, Jeſus ſaid, Now is the Son of man glorified, and God is glorified in him. If God be glorified in him, God ſhall alſo glorify him in himſelf, and ſhall ſtraightway glorify him."

That the glory of God is the higheſt and laſt end of the work of redemption, is confirmed by the ſong of the angels at Chriſt's birth. Luke ii. 14. "Glory to God in the higheſt, and on earth peace, and good-will towards men." It muſt be ſuppoſed that they knew what was God's laſt end in ſending Chriſt into the world: and that in their rejoicing on the occaſion of his incarnation, their minds would be moſt taken up with, and would moſt rejoice in that which was moſt valuable and glorious in it; which muſt conſiſt in its relation to that which was its chief and ultimate end. And we may further ſuppoſe, that the thing which chiefly engaged their minds, as what was moſt glorious and joyful in the affair, is what would be firſt expreſſed in that ſong which was to expreſs the ſentiments of their minds, and exultation of their hearts.

The glory of the Father and the Son is ſpoken of as the end of the work of redemption, in Phil. ii. 6,——11. very much in the ſame manner as in John xii. 23, 28. and xiii. 31, 32. and xvii. 1, 4, 5. "Who being in the form of God,——made himſelf of no reputation, and took upon him the form of a ſervant, and was made in the likeneſs of men: and being found in faſhion as a man, he humbled himſelf, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the croſs: wherefore God alſo hath highly exalted him, and given him a name, &c.——that at the name of Jeſus every knee

ſhould

ſhould bow,——and every tongue confeſs, that Jeſus is the Lord, TO THE GLORY OF GOD THE FATHER." So God's glory, or the praiſe of his glory, is ſpoken of as the end of the work of redemption, in Eph. i. 3, &c. "Bleſſed be the God and Father of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, who hath bleſſed us with all ſpiritual bleſſings in heavenly places in Chriſt: according as he hath choſen us in him.——Having predeſtinated us to the adoption of children,—TO THE PRAISE OF THE GLORY OF HIS GRACE." And in the continuance of the ſame diſcourſe concerning the redemption of Chriſt, in what follows in the ſame chapter, God's glory is once and again mentioned as the great end of all. Several things belonging to that great redemption are mentioned in the following verſes: Such as God's great wiſdom in it, ver. 8. The clearneſs of light granted thro' Chriſt, ver. 9. God's gathering together in one, all things in heaven and earth in Chriſt, ver. 10. God's giving the Chriſtians that were firſt converted to the Chriſtian faith from among the Jews, an intereſt in this great redemption, ver. 11. Then the great end is added, ver. 12. "That we ſhould be TO THE PRAISE OF HIS GLORY, who firſt truſted in Chriſt." And then is mentioned the beſtowing of the ſame great ſalvation on the Gentiles, in its beginning or firſt fruits in the world, and in the completing it in another world, in the two next verſes. And then the ſame great end is added again. "In whom ye alſo truſted, after that ye heard the word of truth, the goſpel of your ſalvation: In whom alſo, after that ye believed, ye were ſealed with the holy ſpirit of promiſe, which is the earneſt of our inheritance, until the redemption of the purchaſed poſſeſſion, UNTO THE PRAISE OF HIS GLORY." The ſame thing is expreſſed much in the ſame manner, in 2 Cor. iv. 14, 15.—"He which raiſed up the Lord Jeſus, ſhall raiſe up us alſo by Jeſus, and ſhall preſent us with you. For all things are for your ſakes, that the abundance of grace might, through the thankſgiving of many, rebound TO THE GLORY OF GOD."

The ſame is ſpoken of as the end of the work of re-

demption in the old-teſtament. Pſal. lxxix. 9. "Help us, O God of our ſalvation, for the glory of thy name: deliver us and purge away our ſins, for thy name's ſake." So in the prophecies of the redemption of Jeſus Chriſt. Iſa. xliv. 23. "Sing, O ye heavens; for the LORD hath done it: ſhout, ye lower parts of the earth: break forth into ſinging, ye mountains; O foreſt, and every tree therein: for the LORD hath redeemed Jacob, and GLORIFIED HIMSELF in Iſrael!" Thus the works of creation are called upon to rejoice at the attaining of the ſame end, by the redemption of God's people, that the angels rejoiced at when Chriſt was born. See alſo chap. xlviii. 10, 11. and xlix. 3.

Thus it is evident, that the glory of God is the ultimate end of the work of redemption.——Which is the chief work of providence towards the moral world, as is abundantly manifeſt from ſcripture: the whole univerſe being put in ſubjection to Jeſus Chriſt; all heaven and earth, angels and men, being ſubject to him, as executing this office: and put under him to that end, that all things may be ordered by him, in ſubſervience to the great deſigns of his redemption: all power, as he ſays, being given to him, in heaven and in earth, that he may give eternal life to as many as the Father has given him: and he being exalted far above all principality and power, and might and dominion, and made head over all things to the church. The angels being put in ſubjection to him, that he may employ them all as miniſtering ſpirits, for the good of them that ſhall be the heirs of his ſalvation: and all things being ſo governed by their Redeemer for them, that all things are theirs, whether things preſent or things to come: and all God's works of providence in the moral government of the world, which we have an account of in ſcripture hiſtory, or that are foretold in ſcripture prophecy, being evidently ſubordinate to the great purpoſes and ends of this great work. And beſides, the work of redemption is that work, by which good men are, as it were, created, or brought into being, as good men, or as reſtored to holineſs and happineſs.

The

The work of redemption is a new creation, according to ſcripture repreſentation, whereby men are brought into a new exiſtence, or are made new creatures.

From theſe things it follows, according to the 5th, 6th, and 7th poſitions, that the glory of God is the laſt end of the creation of the world.

8. The ſcripture leads us to ſuppoſe, that God's glory is his laſt end in his moral government of the world in general. This has been already ſhewn concerning ſeveral things that belong to God's moral government of the world. As particularly in the work of redemption, the chief of all his diſpenſations in his moral government of the world. And I have alſo obſerved it, with reſpect to the duty which God requires of the ſubjects of his moral government, in requiring them to ſeek his glory as their laſt end. And this is actually the laſt end of the moral goodneſs required of them; the end which gives their moral goodneſs its chief value. And alſo, that it is what that perſon which God has ſet at the head of the moral world, as its chief governor, even Jeſus Chriſt, ſeeks as his chief end. And it has been ſhewn, that it is the chief end for which that part of the moral world which are good are made, or have their exiſtence as good. I now further obſerve, that this is the end of the eſtabliſhment of the public worſhip and ordinances of God among mankind. Hag. i. 8. "Go up to the mountain, and bring wood, and build the houſe; and I will take pleaſure in it, and I will BE GLORIFIED, ſaith the LORD." This is ſpoken of as the end of God's promiſes of rewards, and of their fulfilment. 2 Cor. i. 20. "For all the promiſes of God in him are yea, and in him Amen, TO THE GLORY OF GOD by us." And this is ſpoken of as the end of the execution of God's threatenings, in the puniſhment of ſin. Numb. xiv. 20, 21, 22, 23. "And the LORD ſaid, I have pardoned according to thy word. But, as truly as I live, all the earth ſhall be filled with THE GLORY OF JEHOVAH. Becauſe all theſe men, &c.——Surely they ſhall not ſee the land." The glory of Jehovah is evidently here

ſpoken

ſpoken of, as that which he had regard to, as his higheſt and ultimate end, which therefore he could not fail of; but muſt take place every where, and in every caſe, through all parts of his dominion, whatever became of men. And whatever abatements might be made, as to judgments deſerved; and whatever changes might be made in the courſe of God's proceedings from compaſſion, to ſinners; yet the attaining of God's glory was an end, which, being ultimate and ſupreme, muſt in no caſe whatſoever give place. This is ſpoken of as the end of God's executing judgments on his enemies in this world. Exod. xiv. 17, 18. "And I will get me honour (*Ikhabhedha*, I will be glorified) upon Pharaoh, and upon all his hoſt," &c. Ezek. xxviii. 22. "Thus ſaith the Lord God, Behold I am againſt thee, O Zion, and I WILL BE GLORIFIED in the midſt of thee: And they ſhall know that I am the Lord, when I ſhall have executed judgments in her, and ſhall be *ſanctified* in her." So Ezek. xxxix. 13. "Yea, all the people of the land ſhall bury them; and it ſhall be to them a renown, the day *that I ſhall be glorified*, ſaith the Lord God." And this is ſpoken of as the end, both of the executions of wrath, and in the glorious exerciſes of mercy, in the miſery and happineſs of another world. Rom. ix. 22, 23. "What if God, willing to ſhew his wrath, and make his power known, endured with much long-ſuffering, the veſſels of wrath fitted to deſtruction: and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the veſſels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory." And this is ſpoken of as the end of the day of judgment, which is the time appointed for the higheſt exerciſes of God's authority as moral Governor of the world; and is as it were the day of the conſummation of God's moral government, with reſpect to all his ſubjects in heaven, earth and hell. 2 Theſ. i. 9, 10. "Who ſhall be puniſhed with everlaſting deſtruction from the preſence of the Lord, and from *the glory of his power*; when he ſhall come *to be glorified* in his ſaints, and *to be admired* in all them that believe."

believe." Then his glory ſhall be obtained, with reſpect both to ſaints and ſinners.

From theſe things it is manifeſt, by the fourth poſition, that God's glory is the ultimate end of the creation of the world.

9. It appears, from what has been already obſerved, that the glory of God is ſpoken of in ſcripture as the laſt end of many of God's works: and it is plain that this thing is in fact the iſſue and reſult of the works of God's common providence, and of the creation of the world. Let us take God's glory in what ſenſe ſo ever, conſiſtent with its being ſomething brought to paſs, or a good attained by any work of God, certainly it is the conſequence of theſe works: and beſides it is expreſsly ſo ſpoken of in ſcripture. This is implied in the firſt verſe of the eighth pſalm, wherein are celebrated the works of creation: the heavens being the work of God's fingers; the moon and the ſtars being ordained by God; and God's making man a little lower than the angels, &c. The firſt verſe is, "O Lord, our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth! who haſt ſet thy glory above the heavens," or upon the heavens. By *name* and *glory*, very much the ſame thing is intended here, as in many other places, as ſhall be particularly ſhewn afterwards. So the pſalm concludes as it began. "O Lord, our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth!" So, in the 148th pſalm, after a particular mention of moſt of the works of creation, enumerating them in order, the pſalmiſt ſays, ver. 13. "Let them praiſe the name of the Lord, for his name alone is excellent, his glory is above the earth and the heaven." And in the 104th pſalm, after a very particular, orderly, and magnificent repreſentation of God's works of creation and common providence, it is ſaid in the 31ſt verſe, "The glory of the Lord ſhall endure forever: the Lord ſhall rejoice in his works." Here God's glory is ſpoken of, as the grand reſult, and bleſſed conſequence of all theſe works which God values, and on account of which he rejoices in theſe works. And this is one thing doubtleſs implied

plied in the ſong of the ſeraphim, Iſa. vi. 3. "Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hoſts, the whole earth is full of his glory."

The glory of God, in being the reſult and conſequence of thoſe works of providence that have been mentioned, is in fact the conſequence of the creation. The good attained in the uſe of a thing, made for uſe, is the reſult of the making of that thing; as the ſignifying the time of day, when actually attained by the uſe of a watch, is the conſequence of the making of the watch. So that it is apparent, that the glory of God is a thing that is actually the reſult and conſequence of the creation of the world. And from what has been already obſerved, it appears, that it is what God ſeeks as good, valuable, and excellent in itſelf. And I preſume none will pretend, that there is any thing peculiar in the nature of the caſe, rendering it a thing valuable in ſome of the inſtances wherein it takes place, and not in others: or that the glory of God, though indeed an effect of all God's works, is an exceeding deſirable effect of ſome of them; but of others, a worthleſs and inſignificant effect. God's glory therefore, muſt be a deſirable, valuable conſequence of the work of creation. Yea, it is expreſsly ſpoken of, in Pſalm civ. 3. (as was obſerved) as an effect, on account of which God rejoices and takes pleaſure in the works of creation.

Therefore it is manifeſt, by poſition third, that the glory of God is an ultimate end in the creation of the world.

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## SECT. IV.

PLACES of ſcripture that lead us to ſuppoſe, that GOD created the world *for his* NAME, to MAKE HIS PERFECTIONS KNOWN; and that he made it FOR HIS PRAISE.

Here

Here I ſhall firſt take notice of ſome paſſages of ſcripture that ſpeak of God's *name* as being made God's end, or the object of his regard, and the regard of his virtuous and holy intelligent creatures, much in the ſame manner as has been obſerved of *God's glory*.

As particularly, God's name is in like manner ſpoken of, as the end of his acts of goodneſs towards the good part of the moral world, and of his works of mercy and ſalvation towards his people. As 1 Sam. xii. 22. "The Lord will not forſake his people, *for his great name's ſake*." Pſal. xxiii. 3. "He reſtoreth my ſoul, he leadeth me in the paths of righteouſneſs, *for his name's ſake*." Pſal. xxxi. 3. "*For thy name's ſake*, lead me, and guide me." Pſal. cix. 21. "But do thou for me,——*for thy name's ſake*." The forgiveneſs of ſin in particular, is often ſpoken of as being for God's *name's ſake*. 1 John ii. 12. "I write unto you, little children, becauſe your ſins are forgiven you *for his name's ſake*." Pſal. xxv. 11. "*For thy name's ſake*, O Lord, pardon mine iniquity, for it is great." Pſal. lxxix. 9. "Help us, O God of our ſalvation, *for the glory of thy name*; and deliver us, and purge away our ſins, *for thy name's ſake*." Jer. xiv. 7. "O Lord, though our iniquities teſtify againſt us, do thou it *for thy name's ſake*."

Theſe things ſeem to ſhew, that the ſalvation of Chriſt is for God's name's ſake. Leading and guiding in the way of ſafety and happineſs, reſtoring the ſoul, the forgiveneſs of ſin; and that help, deliverance and ſalvation, that is conſequent thereon, is *for God's name*. And here it is obſervable, that thoſe two great temporal ſalvations of God's people, the redemption from Egypt, and that from Babylon, that are often repreſented as figures and ſimilitudes of the redemption of Chriſt, are frequently ſpoken of as being wrought *for God's name's ſake*. So is that great work of God, in delivering his people from Egypt, carrying them through the wilderneſs to their reſt in Canaan. 2 Sam. vii. 23. "And what one nation in the earth is like thy people, even like Iſrael, whom God went to redeem for a people

ple to himſelf, and to *make him a name?*" Pſal. cvi. 8. "Nevertheleſs, he ſaved them *for his name's ſake.*" Iſa. lxiii. 12. "That led them by the right hand of Moſes, with his glorious arm, dividing the waters before them, *to make himſelf an everlaſting name.*" In the 20th chap. of Ezekiel, God, rehearſing the various parts of this wonderful work, adds, from time to time, "*I wrought for my name's ſake*, that it ſhould not be polluted before the Heathen," as in ver. 9, 14, 22. See alſo Joſh. vii. 8, 9. Dan. ix. 15. So is the redemption from the Babyloniſh captivity. Iſa. xlviii. 9, 10. "*For my name's ſake* will I defer mine anger.—— For mine own ſake, even for mine own ſake will I do it; for how ſhould *my name* be polluted?" In Ezek. xxxvi. 21, 22, 23. the reaſon is given for God's mercy in reſtoring Iſrael. "But I had pity for my holy name. Thus ſaith the Lord, I do not this for your ſakes, O houſe of Iſrael, but *for my holy name's ſake*;— And I will *ſanctify my great name*, which was profaned among the Heathen." And chap. xxxix. 25. "Therefore, thus ſaith the Lord God, now will I bring again the captivity of Jacob, and have mercy upon the whole houſe of Iſrael, *and will be jealous for my holy name.*" Daniel prays, that God would forgive his people, and ſhew them mercy *for his own ſake.* Dan. ix. 19.

When God, from time to time, ſpeaks of ſhewing mercy, and exerciſing goodneſs, and promoting his people's happineſs for his *name's ſake*, we cannot underſtand it as of a merely ſubordinate end. How abſurd would it be to ſay, that he promotes their happineſs for his name's ſake, in ſubordination to their good; and that his name may be exalted only for their ſakes, as a means of promoting their happineſs! eſpecially when ſuch expreſſions as theſe are uſed, "For mine own ſake, even for mine own ſake will I do it; for how ſhould my name be polluted?" and "Not for your ſakes do I this, but for my holy name's ſake."

Again, it is repreſented as though God's people had their

their exiſtence, at leaſt as God's people, for God's name's ſake. God's redeeming or purchaſing them, that they might be his people, *for his name*, implies this. As in that paſſage mentioned before, 2 Sam. vii. 23. ——" Thy people Iſrael, whom God went to redeem for a people to himſelf, and *to make him a name.*" So God's making them a people for his name, is implied in Jer. xiii. 11. " For as the girdle cleaveth to the loins of a man, ſo have I cauſed to cleave unto me the whole houſe of Iſrael, &c.—that they may be unto me for a people, *and for a name.*" Acts xv. 14. " Simeon hath declared how God at the firſt did viſit the Gentiles, to take out of them a people *for his name.*"

This alſo is ſpoken of as the end of the virtue and religion, and holy behaviour of the ſaints. Rom. i. 5. " By whom we have received grace and apoſtleſhip, for obedience to the faith among all nations *for his name.*" Matth. xix. 29. " Every one that forſaketh houſes, or brethren, &c.—*for my name's ſake*, ſhall receive an hundred fold, and ſhall inherit everlaſting life." 3 John 7. " Becauſe, that *for his name's ſake*, they went forth, taking nothing of the Gentiles." Rev. ii. 3. " And haſt borne, and haſt patience, and *for my name's ſake*, haſt laboured and haſt not fainted."

And we find that holy perſons expreſs their deſire of this, and their joy in it, in the ſame manner as in the glory of God. 2 Sam. vii. 26. " Let thy name be magnified for ever." Pſal. lxxvi. 1. " In Judah is God known, his name is great in Iſrael." Pſal. cxlviii. 13. " Let them praiſe the name of the Lord; for his name alone is excellent, his glory is above the earth and heaven." Pſal. cxxxv. 13. " Thy name, O Lord, endureth for ever, and thy memorial throughout all generations." Iſa. xii. 4. " Declare his doings among the people, make mention that his name is exalted."

The judgments God executes on the wicked, are ſpoken of as being *for the ſake of his name*, in like

manner as for his glory. Exod. ix. 16. "And in very deed, for this cauſe have I raiſed thee up, for to ſhew in thee my power; and that my name may be declared throughout all the earth." Neh. ix. 10. "And ſhewedſt ſigns and wonders upon Pharaoh, and on all his ſervants, and on all the people of his land; for thou knewedſt that they dealt proudly againſt them: ſo didſt thou *get thee a name*, as at this day."

And this is ſpoken of as a conſequence of the works of creation, in like manner as God's glory. Pſal. viii. 1. "O Lord, *how excellent is thy name*, in all the earth! who haſt ſet thy glory above the heavens." And then, at the concluſion of the obſervations on the works of creation, the pſalm ends thus, ver. 9. "O Lord, our Lord, *how excellent is thy name*, in all the earth!" So Pſal. cxlviii. 13. after a particular mention of the various works of creation, "Let them praiſe the name of the Lord, for his name alone is excellent in all the earth, his glory is above the earth and the heaven."

So we find manifeſtation, or making known God's *perfections*, his *greatneſs*, and *excellency*, is ſpoken of very much in the ſame manner as God's glory.

There are ſeveral ſcriptures which would lead us to ſuppoſe this to be the great thing that God ſought of the moral world, and the end aimed at in the moral agents, which he had created, wherein they are to be active in anſwering their end. This ſeems implied in that argument God's people ſometimes made uſe of, in deprecating a ſtate of death and deſtruction: that, in ſuch a ſtate, they cannot know, or make known the glorious excellency of God. Pſal. lxxxviii. 18, 19. "Shall thy loving-kindneſs be declared in the grave, or thy faithfulneſs in deſtruction? Shall thy wonders be known in the dark, and thy righteouſneſs in the land of forgetfulneſs?" So Pſal. xxx. 9. Iſa. xxxviii. 18, 19. The argument ſeems to be this: Why ſhould we periſh? and how ſhall thine end, for which thou haſt made us, be obtained in a ſtate of deſtruction, in which thy glory cannot be known or declared?

This is ſpoken of as the end of the good part of the moral

moral world, or the end of God's people in the ſame manner as the glory of God. Iſa. xliii. 21. "This people have I formed for myſelf, they ſhall ſhew forth my *praiſe.*" 1 Pet. ii. 9. "But ye are a choſen generation, a royal prieſthood, an holy nation, a peculiar people, *that ye ſhould ſhew forth the praiſes of him* who hath called you out of darkneſs into marvellous light."

And this ſeems to be repreſented as the thing wherein the value and proper fruit and end of their virtue appears. Iſa. lx. 6. Speaking of the converſion of the Gentile nations to true religion——"They ſhall come and *ſhew forth the praiſes* of the Lord. Iſa. lxvi. 19. "I will ſend——unto the nations——and to the iſles afar off, that have not *heard my fame*, neither have ſeen my glory; and they ſhall *declare* my *glory* among the Gentiles.

And this ſeems by ſcripture repreſentations to be the end, in the deſires of which, and delight in which, appears the proper tendency and reſt of true virtue, and holy diſpoſitions; much in the ſame manner as the glory of God. 1 Chron. xvi. 8. "Make known his deeds among the people. Verſe 23, 24. "Shew forth from day to day thy ſalvation. Declare his glory among the Heathen." See alſo, Pſal. ix. 1, 11, 14, and xix. 1. and xxvi. 7. and lxxi. 18. and lxxv. 9. and lxxvi. 1. and lxxix. 13. and xcvi. 2, 3. and ci. 1. and cvii. 22. and cxviii. 17. and cxlv. 6, 11, 12. Iſa. xlii. 12. and lxiv. 1, 2. Jer. l. 10.

This ſeems to be ſpoken of as a great end of the acts of God's moral government; particularly, the great judgments he executes for ſin. Exod. ix. 16. "And in very deed, for this cauſe have I raiſed thee up, to ſhew in thee my power; and that my name might be declared throughout all the earth." Dan. iv. 17. "This matter is by the decree of the watchers, &c.——To the intent that the living may know that the Moſt High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomſoever he will; and ſetteth up over it the baſeſt of men." But places to this purpoſe are too

numerous to be particularly recited. See them in the margin. *

This is alſo ſpoken of as a great end of God's works of favour and mercy to his people. 2 Kings xix. 19. "Now therefore, O Lord our God, I beſeech thee, ſave thou us out of his hand, that all the kingdoms of the earth *may know that thou art the Lord God*, even thou only." 1 Kings viii. 59, 60.—"That he maintain the cauſe of his ſervant, and the cauſe of his people Iſrael at all times as the matter ſhall require, that all the people of the earth may know that the Lord is God, and that there is none elſe." See other paſſages to the ſame purpoſe referred to in the margin. †

This is ſpoken of as the end of the eternal damnation of the wicked, and alſo the eternal happineſs of the righteous. Rom. ix. 22, 23. "What if God, willing to ſhew his wrath, and make his power known, endured with much long-ſuffering the veſſels of wrath fitted to deſtruction; and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the veſſels of mercy, which he hath afore prepared unto glory?"

This is ſpoken of from time to time, as a great end of the miracles which God wrought. See Exod. vii. 17. and viii. 10. and x. 2. Deut. xxix. 5, 6. Ezek. xxiv. 27.

This is ſpoken of as a great end of ordinances. Exod. xxix. 44, 45, 46. "And I will ſanctify the tabernacle of the congregation; I will ſanctify alſo both Aaron and his ſons to miniſter to me in the prieſt's office. And I will dwell among the children of Iſrael,

* Exod. xiv. 17, 18. 1 Sam. xvii. 46. Pſal. lxxxiii. 18. Iſa. xlv. 3. Ezek. vi. 7, 10, 13, 14 and vii. 4, 9, 27. and xi. 10, 11, 12. and xii. 15, 16, 20. and xiii. 9, 14, 21, 23. and xiv. 8. and xv. 7. and xxi. 5. and xxii. 16. and xxv. 7, 11, 17. and xxvi. 6. and xxviii. 22, 23, 24. and xxix. 9, 16. and xxx. 8, 19, 25, 26. and xxxii. 15. and xxxiii. 29 and xxxv. 4, 12, 15. and xxxviii. 23. and xxxix. 6, 7, 21, 22.

† Exod. vi. 7. and viii. 22. and xvi. 12. 1 Kings viii. 43. and xx. 28. Pſal. cii. 21. Ezek. xxiii. 49. and xxiv. 24. and xxv. 5. and xxxv. 9. and xxxix. 21, 22.

rael, and will be their God. And they ſhall know that I am the Lord their God," &c. Chap. xxxi. 13. "Verily, my ſabbaths ſhall ye keep; for it is a ſign between me and you, throughout your generations; that ye may know that I am the Lord that doth ſanctify you." We have again almoſt the ſame words, Ezek. xx. 12. and ver. 20.

This is ſpoken of as a great end of the redemption out of Egypt. Pſal. cvi. 8. "Nevertheleſs he ſaved them for his name's ſake, that *he might make his mighty power to be known.*" See alſo Exod. vii. 5. and Deut. iv. 34, 35. And alſo of the redemption from the Babyloniſh captivity. Ezek. xx. 34,—38. "And I will bring you out from the people, and will gather you out of the countries whither ye are ſcattered.—And I will bring you into the wilderneſs of the people; and there I will plead with you, as I pleaded with your fathers in the wilderneſs of the land of Egypt.—And I will bring you into the bond of the covenant. And I will purge out the rebels.—*And ye ſhall know that I am the Lord.*" Verſe 42. "*And ye ſhall know that I am the Lord,* when I ſhall bring you into the land of Iſrael." Verſe 44. "*And ye ſhall know that I am the Lord,* when I have wrought with you *for my name's ſake.*" See alſo, chap. xxviii. 25, 26. and xxxvi. 11. and xxxvii. 6, 13.

This is alſo ſpoken of as a great end of the work of redemption of Jeſus Chriſt: both of the purchaſe of redemption by Chriſt, and the application of redemption. Rom. iii. 25, 26. "Whom God hath ſet forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, *to declare his righteouſneſs.—To declare, I ſay, at this time, his righteouſneſs:* that he might be juſt, and the juſtifier of him that believeth in Jeſus." Eph. ii. 4,—7. "But God, who is rich in mercy, &c.—*That he might ſhew the exceeding riches of his grace,* in his kindneſs towards us through Jeſus Chriſt." Chap. iii. 8, 9, 10. "To preach among the Gentiles the unſearchable riches of Chriſt, and to make all men ſee, what is the fellowſhip of that myſtery which, from the be-

ginning of the world hath been hid in God, who created all things by Jeſus Chriſt: *To the intent that now unto the principalities and powers* in heavenly places, might *be known by the church the manifold wiſdom of God.*" Pſal. xxii. 21, 22. "Save me from the lion's mouth. *I will declare thy name unto my brethren:* in the midſt of the congregation will I praiſe thee." Compared with Heb. ii. 12. and John xvii. 26. Iſa. lxiv. 4. "O that thou wouldeſt rend the heavens—*to make thy name known to thine adverſaries.*"

And it is ſpoken of as the end of that great actual ſalvation, which ſhould follow Chriſt's purchaſe of ſalvation, both among Jews and Gentiles. Iſa. xlix. 22, 23. "I will lift up my hand to the Gentiles,—and they ſhall bring thy ſons in their arms—and kings ſhall be thy nurſing-fathers—*and thou ſhalt know that I am the Lord.*" *

This is ſpoken of as the end of God's common providence. Job xxxvii. 6, 7. "For he ſaith to the ſnow, Be thou on the earth. Likewiſe to the ſmall rain, and to the great rain of his ſtrength. He ſealeth up the hand of every man, that all men may know his work."

It is ſpoken of as the end of the day of judgment, that grand conſummation of God's moral government of the world, and the day for the bringing all things to their deſigned ultimate iſſue. It is called "The day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God." Rom. ii. 5.

And the declaration, or openly manifeſting God's excellency, is ſpoken of as the actual, happy conſequence and effect of the work of creation at the beginning. Pſal. xix. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament ſheweth his handy-work. Day unto day uttereth ſpeech, night unto night ſheweth forth knowledge.—In them hath he placed a tabernacle for the ſun, which is as a bridegroom coming out of

* See alſo, Ezek. xvi. 62. and xxix 21. and xxxiv. 27. and xxxvi. 38. and xxxix. 28, 29 Joel iii. 17

of his chamber, and rejoiceth as a ſtrong man to run his race," &c.

In like manner, there are many ſcriptures that ſpeak of God's PRAISE, in many of the forementioned reſpects, juſt in the ſame manner as of his name and glory.

This is ſpoken of as the end of the being of God's people, in the ſame manner. Jer. xiii. 11. "For as the girdle cleaveth to the loins of a man, ſo have I cauſed to cleave unto me the whole houſe of Iſrael, and the whole houſe of Judah, ſaith the Lord; that they might be unto me for a name, *and for a praiſe*, and for a glory."

It is ſpoken of as the end of the moral world. Mat. xxi. 16. "Out of the mouth of babes and ſucklings *haſt thou perfected praiſe*." That is, ſo haſt thou in thy ſovereignty and wiſdom ordered it, that thou ſhouldeſt obtain the great end for which intelligent creatures are made, more eſpecially from ſome of them that are in themſelves weak, or inferior and more inſufficient. Compare Pſal. viii. 1, 2.

And the ſame thing that was obſerved before concerning the making known God's excellency, may alſo be obſerved concerning *God's praiſe*. That it is made uſe of as an argument in deprecating a ſtate of deſtruction; that in ſuch a ſtate this end cannot be anſwered, in ſuch a manner as ſeems to imply its being an ultimate end, that God had made man for. Pſal. lxxxviii. 10. "Shall the dead ariſe and *praiſe thee?* Shall thy loving-kindneſs be declared in the grave?——Shall thy wonders be known in the dark?" Pſal. xxx. 9. "What profit is there in my blood? When I go down to the pit, *ſhall the duſt praiſe thee?* Shall it declare thy truth?" Pſal cxv. 17, 18. "The dead *praiſe not the Lord*, neither any that go down into ſilence: but we will *bleſs the Lord*, from this time forth and for evermore. *Praiſe ye the Lord.*" Iſa. xxxviii. 18, 19. "For the grave *cannot praiſe thee*, death cannot celebrate thee; they that go down into the pit cannot hope

hope for thy truth. The living, the living, *he ſhall praiſe thee.*".

It is ſpoken of as the end of the virtue of God's people, in like manner as is God's glory. Phil. i. 11. "Being filled with the fruits of righteouſneſs, which are by Jeſus Chriſt *to the praiſe and glory of God.*".

It is ſpoken of as the end of the work of redemption. In the firſt chap. of Eph. where that work in the various parts of it is particularly inſiſted on, and ſet forth in its exceeding glory, this is mentioned from time to time as the great end of all, that it ſhould be "*to the praiſe of his glory.*" (As in ver. 6, 12, 14.) By which we may doubtleſs underſtand much the ſame thing with that which in Phil. i. 11. is expreſſed, "*his praiſe and glory.*" Agreeable to this, Jacob's fourth ſon, from whom the Meſſiah, the great Redeemer was to proceed, by the ſpirit of prophecy, or the ſpecial direction of God's providence, was called PRAISE; with reference to this happy conſequence, and glorious end of that great redemption, this Meſſiah, one of his poſterity, was to work out.

This in the old teſtament is ſpoken of as the end of the forgiveneſs of the ſin of God's people, and their ſalvation, in the ſame manner as is God's name and glory. Iſa. xlviii. 9, 10, 11. "For my name's ſake will I defer mine anger, and for my *praiſe* will I refrain for thee, that I cut thee not off. Behold I have refined thee——for mine own ſake, even for mine own ſake will I do it; for how ſhould my name be polluted? and my glory will I not give to another." Jer. xxxiii. 8, 9. "And I will cleanſe them from all their iniquity,——and I will pardon all their iniquities —— And it ſhall be to me a name of joy, a *praiſe*, and an honour."

And that the holy part of the moral world do expreſs deſires of this, and delight in it, as the end which holy principles in them tend to, reach after, and reſt in, in their higheſt exerciſes, juſt in the ſame manner as the glory of God, is abundantly manifeſt. It would be endleſs to enumerate particular places wherein this appears;

appears; wherein the ſaints declare this, by expreſſing their earneſt deſires of God's praiſe; calling on all nations, and all beings in heaven and earth to praiſe him; in a rapturous manner calling on one another, crying Hallelujah; praiſe ye the Lord, praiſe him forever." Expreſſing their reſolutions to praiſe him as long as they live through all generations, and forever; declaring how good, how pleaſant and comely the *praiſe* of God is, &c.

And it is manifeſt, that God's *praiſe* is the deſirable and glorious conſequence and effect of all the works of creation, by ſuch places as theſe. Pſal. cxlv. 5,—10. and cxlviii. throughout, and ciii. 19,—22.

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## SECT. V.

PLACES of ſcripture from whence it may be argued, that *communication of good to the creature*, was one thing which God had in view, as an ultimate end of the creation of the world.

1. According to the ſcripture, communicating good to the creatures, is what is in itſelf pleaſing to God: and that this is not merely ſubordinately agreeable, and eſteemed valuable on account of its relation to a further end, as it is in executing juſtice in puniſhing the ſins of men; which God is inclined to as fit and neceſſary in certain caſes, and on the account of good ends attained by it: but what God is inclined to on its own account, and what he delights in ſimply and ultimately. For though God is ſometimes in ſcripture ſpoken of as taking pleaſure in puniſhing men's ſins, Deut. xxviii. 63. "The Lord will rejoice over you, to deſtroy you." Ezek. v. 13. "Then ſhall mine anger be accompliſhed, and I will cauſe my fury to reſt upon them, and I will be comforted." Yet God is often ſpoken of as exerciſing goodneſs and ſhewing mercy, with delight, in a manner quite different, and oppoſite

to

to that of his executing wrath. For the latter is ſpoken of as what God proceeds to with backwardneſs and reluctance; the miſery of the creature being not agreeable to him on its own account. Neh. ix. 17. "That thou art a God ready to pardon, gracious and merciful, ſlow to anger, and of great loving-kindneſs." Pſal. ciii. 8. "The Lord is merciful and gracious, ſlow to anger, and plenteous in mercy." Pſal. cxlv. 8. "The Lord is gracious and full of compaſſion, ſlow to anger, and of great mercy." We have again almoſt the ſame words, Jonah iv. 2. Mic. vii. 10. "Who is a God like thee, that pardoneth iniquity, &c.——He retaineth not his anger forever, becauſe he delighteth in mercy." Ezek. xviii. 32. "I have no pleaſure in the death of him that dieth, ſaith the Lord God; wherefore turn yourſelves, and live ye." Lam. iii. 33. "He doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men." Ezek. xxxiii. 11. "As I live, ſaith the Lord God, I have no pleaſure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live: turn ye, turn ye from your evil ways; for why will ye die, O houſe of Iſrael!" 2 Pet. iii. 9. "Not willing that any ſhould periſh, but that all ſhould come to repentance."

2. The work of redemption wrought out by Jeſus Chriſt, is ſpoken of in ſuch a manner as being from the grace and love of God to men, that does not well conſiſt with his ſeeking a communication of good to them, only ſubordinately, *i. e.* not at all from any inclination to their good directly, or delight in giving happineſs to them, ſimply and ultimately conſidered; but only indirectly, and wholly from a regard to ſomething entirely diverſe, which it is a means of. Such expreſſions as that in John iii. 16. carry another idea. "God ſo loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whoſoever believeth in him, ſhould not periſh, but have everlaſting life." And 1 John iv. 9, 10. "In this was manifeſted the love of God towards us, becauſe that God ſent his only begotten Son into the world, that we might live through him. Herein

in is love; not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and ſent his Son to be a propitiation for our ſins." So Eph. ii. 4. "But God, who is rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us," &c. But if indeed this was only from love to ſomething elſe, and a regard to a further end, entirely diverſe from our good; then all the love is truly terminated in that, its ultimate object! and God's love conſiſts in regard towards that: and therein is God's love, and therein is his love manifeſted, ſtrictly and properly ſpeaking, and not in that he loved us, or exerciſed ſuch high regard towards us. For if our good be not at all regarded ultimately, but only ſubordinately, then our good or intereſt is in itſelf conſidered, nothing in God's regard or love: God's reſpect is all terminated upon, and ſwallowed up in ſomething diverſe, which is the end, and not in the means.

So the ſcripture every where repreſents concerning Chriſt, as though the great things that he did and ſuffered, were in the moſt direct and proper ſenſe from exceeding love to us; and not as one may ſhew kindneſs to a perſon, to whoſe intereſt, ſimply and in itſelf conſidered, he is entirely indifferent, only as it may be a means of promoting the intereſt of another (that is indeed directly regarded) which is connected with it. Thus the apoſtle Paul repreſents the matter, Gal. ii. 20. "Who loved me, and gave himſelf for me." Eph. v. 25. "Huſbands love your wives, even as Chriſt loved the church, and gave himſelf for it." And Chriſt himſelf, John xvii. 19. "For their ſakes I ſanctify myſelf." And the ſcripture repreſents Chriſt as reſting in the ſalvation and glory of his people, when obtained, as in what he ultimately ſought, as having therein reached the goal at the end of his race; obtained the prize he aimed at; enjoying the travail of his ſoul, in which he is ſatisfied, as the recompence of his labours and extreme agonies. Iſa. liii. 10, 11. "When thou ſhalt make his ſoul an offering for ſin, he ſhall ſee his ſeed, he ſhall prolong his days, and the pleaſure of the Lord ſhall proſper in his hand. He ſhall ſee of the travail

travail of his ſoul, and ſhall be ſatisfied: by his knowledge ſhall my righteous ſervant juſtify many, for he ſhall bear their iniquities." He ſees the travail of his ſoul, in ſeeing his ſeed, the children brought forth in the iſſue of his travail. This implies, that Chriſt has his delight, moſt truly and properly, in obtaining the ſalvation of his church, not merely as a means conducing to the thing which terminates his delight and joy; but as what he rejoices and is ſatisfied in, moſt directly and properly: as do thoſe ſcriptures which repreſent him as rejoicing in his obtaining this fruit of his labour and purchaſe, as the bridegroom, when he obtains his bride. Iſa. lxii. 5. "As the bridegroom rejoices over the bride, ſo ſhall thy God rejoice over thee." And how emphatical and ſtrong to the purpoſe, are the expreſſions in Zeph. iii. 17. "The Lord thy God in the midſt of thee is mighty; he will ſave, he will rejoice over thee with joy: he will reſt in his love, he will rejoice over thee with ſinging." The ſame thing may be argued from Prov. viii. 30, 31. "Then was I by him, as one brought up with him: and I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him: rejoicing in the habitable part of his earth, and my delights were with the ſons of men." And from thoſe places that ſpeak of the ſaints as God's portion, his jewels and peculiar treaſure; theſe things are abundantly confirmed by what is related, John xii. 23, —32. But the particular conſideration of what may be obſerved to the preſent purpoſe, in that paſſage of ſcripture, may be referred to the next ſection.

3. The communications of divine goodneſs, particularly forgiveneſs of ſin, and ſalvation, are ſpoken of, from time to time, as being for God's goodneſs ſake, and for his mercies ſake, juſt in the ſame manner as they are ſpoken of as being for God's name's ſake, in places obſerved before. Pſal. xxv. 7. "Remember not the ſins of my youth, nor my tranſgreſſions: according to thy mercy remember thou me, *for thy goodneſs ſake*, O Lord." In the 11th verſe, the pſalmiſt ſays, "For thy name's ſake, O Lord pardon mine iniquity."

iniquity." Neh. ix. 31. "Nevertheleſs, *for thy great mercies ſake*, thou haſt not utterly conſumed them, nor forſaken them; for thou art a gracious and a merciful God." Pſal. vi. 4. "Return, O Lord, deliver my ſoul: O ſave me for thy mercies ſake." Pſal. xxxi. 16. "Make thy face to ſhine upon thy ſervant: ſave me *for thy mercies ſake*." Pſal. xliv. 26. "Ariſe for our help; redeem us *for thy mercies ſake*." And here it may be obſerved, after what a remarkable manner God ſpeaks of his love to the children of Iſrael in the wilderneſs, as though his love were for love's ſake, and his goodneſs were its own end and motive. Deut. vii. 7, 8. "The Lord did not ſet his love upon you, nor chooſe you, becauſe ye were more in number than any people, for ye were the feweſt of all people: *but becauſe the Lord loved you.*"

4. That the government of the world in all parts of it, is for the good of ſuch as are to be the eternal ſubjects of God's goodneſs, is implied in what the ſcripture teaches us of Chriſt's being ſet at God's right hand, made king of angels and men; ſet at the head of the univerſe, having all power given him in heaven and earth, to that end that he may promote their happineſs; being made head over all things to the church, and having the government of the whole creation for their good. * Chriſt mentions it, Mark xxviii. 29. as the reaſon why the Son of man is made Lord of the Sabbath, that "the Sabbath was made for man." And if ſo, we may in like manner argue, that *all things* were made for man, that the Son of man is made Lord of all things.

5. That God uſes the whole creation, in his whole government of it, for the good of his people, is moſt elegantly repreſented in Deut. xxxiii. 26. "There is none like the God of Jeſhurun, who rideth on the heavens in thine help, and in his excellency on the

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* Eph. i. 20, 21, 22, 23. John xvii. 2. Matth. xi. 27. and xxviii. 18, 19. John iii. 35.

ſky." The whole univerſe is a machine, which God hath made for his own uſe, to be his chariot for him to ride in; as is repreſented in Ezekiel's viſion. In this chariot, God's ſeat or throne is heaven, where he ſits, who uſes and governs, and rides in this chariot, Ezek. i. 22, 26, 27, 28. The inferior part of the creation, this viſible univerſe, ſubject to ſuch continual changes and revolutions, are the wheels of the chariot, under the place of the ſeat of him who rides in this chariot. God's providence in the conſtant revolutions and alterations, and ſucceſſive events, is repreſented by the motion of the wheels of the chariot, by the ſpirit of him who ſits in his throne on the heavens, or above the firmament. Moſes tells us for whoſe ſake it is, that God moves the wheels of this chariot, or rides in it, ſitting in his heavenly ſeat; and to what end he is making his progreſs, or goes his appointed journey in it, *viz.* the ſalvation of his people.

6. God's judgments on the wicked in this world, and alſo their eternal damnation in the world to come, are ſpoken of, as being for the happineſs of God's people. So are his judgments on them in this world. Iſa. xliii. 3, 4, "For I am the Lord thy God, the holy one of Iſrael, thy Saviour. I gave Egypt for thy ranſom, Ethiopia and Seba for thee. Since thou haſt been precious in my ſight, thou haſt been honourable, and I have loved thee; therefore will I give men for thee, and people for thy life." So the works of God's vindictive juſtice and wrath, are ſpoken of as works of mercy to his people, Pſal. cxxxvi. 10, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20. And ſo is their eternal damnation in another world. Rom. ix. 22, 23. "What if God, willing to ſhew his wrath and make his power known, endured with much long-ſuffering the veſſels of wrath fitted to deſtruction: and that he might make known the riches of his glory on the veſſels of mercy, which he had afore prepared unto glory." Here it is evident the laſt verſe comes in, in connection with the foregoing, as giving another reaſon of the deſtruction of the wicked, *viz.* the ſhewing the riches of his glory on the veſſels of mercy; in higher degrees of their glory and happineſs, in an advancement

vancement of their reliſh of their own enjoyments, and greater ſenſe of their value, and of God's free grace in the beſtowment.

7. It ſeems to argue, that God's goodneſs to them who are to be the eternal ſubjects of his goodneſs, is the end of the creation, that the whole creation, in all parts of it, and all God's diſpoſals of it, is ſpoken of as THEIRS. 1 Cor. iii. 22, 23. "All things are yours, Whether Paul, or Apollos, or Cephas, or the world, or life, or death, or things preſent, or things to come, all are yours." The terms are very univerſal; and both works of creation and providence are mentioned; and it is manifeſtly the deſign of the apoſtle to be underſtood of every work of God whatſoever. Now, how can we underſtand this any otherwiſe, than that all things are for their benefit; and that God made and uſes all for their good?

8. All God's works, both his works of creation and providence, are repreſented as works of goodneſs or mercy to his people, in the 136th pſalm. His wonderful works in general, ver. 4. "To him who alone doth great wonders; for his mercy endureth for ever." The works of creation in all parts of it. Ver. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9. "To him that by wiſdom made the heavens; for his mercy endureth for ever. To him that ſtretched out the earth above the waters; for his mercy endureth for ever. To him that made great lights; for his mercy endureth for ever. The ſun to rule by day; for his mercy endureth for ever. The moon and ſtars to rule by night; for his mercy endureth for ever." And God's works of providence, in the following part of the pſalm.

9. That expreſſion in the bleſſed ſentence pronounced on the righteous at the day of judgment, "Inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world," ſeems to hold forth as much, as that the eternal expreſſions and fruits of God's goodneſs to them, was God's end in creating the world, and in his providential diſpoſals ever ſince the creation: that God in all his works, in laying the foundation of the world, and

ever ſince the foundation of it, had been preparing this kingdom and glory for them.

10. Agreeable to this, the good of men is ſpoken of as an ultimate end of the virtue of the moral world. Rom. xiii. 8, 9, 10. "He that loveth another hath fulfilled the law. For this, Thou ſhalt not commit adultery, Thou ſhalt not kill, &c.——And if there be any other commandment, it is briefly comprehended in this ſaying, Thou ſhalt love thy neighbour as thyſelf. *Love worketh no ill to his neighbour; therefore love is the fulfilling of the law.*" Gal. v. 14. "All the law is fulfilled in one word, even in this, Thou ſhalt love thy neighbour as thyſelf." Jam. ii. 8. "If ye fulfil the royal law, according to the ſcripture, Thou ſhalt love thy neighbour as thyſelf, thou ſhalt do well."

If the good of the creature be one end of God in all things he does; and ſo be one end of all things that he requires moral agents to do; and an end they ſhould have reſpect to in all that they do, and which they ſhould regulate all parts of their conduct by; theſe things may be eaſily explained: but otherwiſe it ſeems difficult to be accounted for, that the Holy Ghoſt ſhould thus expreſs himſelf from time to time. The ſcripture repreſents it to be the ſpirit of all true ſaints, to prefer the welfare of God's people to their chief joy. And this was the ſpirit of Moſes and the prophets of old: and the good of God's church was an end they regulated all their conduct by. And ſo it was with the apoſtles. 2 Cor. iv. 15. "For all things are for your ſakes." 2 Tim. ii. 10. "I endure all things for the elects ſake, that they may alſo obtain the ſalvation which is in Chriſt Jeſus, with eternal glory." And the ſcriptures repreſent as though every Chriſtian ſhould, in all things he does, be employed for the good of God's church, as each particular member of the body, is in all things employed for the good of the body. Rom. xii. 4, 5, &c. Eph. iv. 15, 16. 1 Cor. xii. 12, 25. to the end; together with the whole of the next chapter. To this end the ſcripture teaches us the angels are continually employed. Heb. i. 14.

SECT.

## SECT. VI.

WHEREIN is conſidered what is meant by the GLORY OF GOD, and the NAME OF GOD in ſcripture, when ſpoken of as GOD's end in his works.

Having thus conſidered what things are ſpoken of in the holy ſcriptures, as the ends of God's works; and in ſuch a manner as juſtly to lead us to ſuppoſe they were the ends which God had ultimately in view in the creation of the world, I now proceed particularly to enquire concerning ſome of theſe things, what they are, and how the terms are to be underſtood?

I BEGIN firſt, with the GLORY OF GOD.

And here I might obſerve, that the phraſe, *the glory of God*, is ſometimes manifeſtly uſed to ſignify the ſecond perſon in the Trinity. But it is not neceſſary at this time to conſider that matter, or ſtand to prove it from particular paſſages of ſcripture. Omitting this, therefore, I proceed to obſerve concerning the Hebrew word *Cabhòdh*, which is the word moſt commonly uſed in the Old Teſtament where we have the word *glory* in the Engliſh Bible. The root which it comes from is either the verb *Cabhadh*, which ſignifies to be heavy, or make heavy, or from the adjective *Càbhèdh*, which ſignifies heavy or weighty. Theſe, as ſeems pretty manifeſt, are the primary ſignifications of theſe words, though they have alſo other meanings, which ſeem to be derivative. The noun *Cobhèdh* ſignifies gravity, heavineſs, greatneſs and abundance. Of very many places it will be ſufficient to name a few. Prov. xxvii. 3. 2 Sam. xiv. 26. 1 Kings xii. 11. Pſal. xxxviii. 4. Iſa. xxx. 27. And as the weight of bodies ariſes from two things, *viz.* ſolidity or denſity, or ſpecific gravity, as it is called, and their magnitude; ſo we find the word *Cabhedh* uſed to ſignify denſe, as in Exod. xix. 16. *Gnanatz Cobhedh* a denſe cloud. And it is very often uſed for great. Iſa. xxxii. 2. Gen. v. 9.

1 Kings x. 2. 2 Kings vi. 14. and xviii. 17. Iſa. xxxvi. 2. and other places.

The word *Cabhodh*, which is commonly tranſlated glory, is uſed in ſuch a manner as might be expected from this ſignification of the words from whence it comes. Sometimes it is uſed to ſignify what is internal, what is within the being or perſon inherent, in the ſubject, or what is in the poſſeſſion of the perſon: and ſometimes for emanation, exhibition, or communication of this internal glory: and ſometimes for the knowledge or ſenſe, or effect of theſe, in thoſe who behold it, to whom the exhibition or communication is made; or an expreſſion of this knowledge, or ſenſe or effect. And here I would note, that agreeable to the uſe of the word *Cabhodh* in the Old Teſtament, is that of the word *Doxa* in the New. For as the word *Cabhodh* is generally tranſlated by *Doxa* in the ſeptuagint; ſo it is apparent, that this word is deſigned to be uſed to ſignify the ſame thing in the New Teſtament with *Cabhodh* in the Old. This might be abundantly proved, by comparing particular places of the Old Teſtament; but probably it will not be denied.

I therefore proceed particularly to conſider theſe words, with regard to their uſe in ſcripture, in each of the forementioned ways.

1. As to internal glory. When the word is uſed to ſignify what is within, inherent, or in the poſſeſſion of the ſubject, it very commonly ſignifies excellency, or great valuableneſs, dignity, or worthineſs or regard. This, according to the Hebrew *idiom*, is, as it were, the *weight* of a thing, as that by which it is heavy; as to be *light*, is to be worthleſs, without value, contemptible. Numb. xxi. 5. "This *light* bread." 1 Sam. xviii. 23. "Seemeth it a *light* thing." Judg. ix. 4. "*Light* perſons," *i. e.* worthleſs, vain, vile perſons. So Zeph. iii. 4. To ſet *light* is to deſpiſe, 2 Sam. xix. 43. Belſhazzar's vileneſs in the ſight of God, is repreſented by his being *Tekel*, weighed in the balances and found light, Dan. v. 27. And as the weight of a thing ariſes from theſe two things, its magnitude, and

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its ſpecific gravity conjunctly, ſo the word *glory* is very commonly uſed to ſignify the excellency of a perſon or thing, as conſiſting either in greatneſs, or in beauty, or as it were preciouſneſs, or in both conjunctly; as will abundantly appear by conſidering the places referred to in the margin *.

Sometimes that internal great and excellent good, which is called glory, is rather in poſſeſſion than inherent. Any one may be called *heavy*, that poſſeſſes an abundance; and he that is empty and deſtitute, may be called *light*. Thus we find riches is ſometimes called *glory*. Gen. xxxi. 1. "And of that which was our fathers hath he gotten all this glory." Eſth. v. 11. "Haman told them of the glory of his riches." Pſal. xlix. 16, 17. "Be not afraid when one is made rich, when the glory of his houſe is increaſed. For when he dieth, he ſhall carry nothing away, his glory ſhall not deſcend after him." Nah. ii. 9. "Take ye the ſpoil of ſilver, take the ſpoil of gold; for there is none end of the ſtore and glory out of the pleaſant furniture.

And it is often put for a great height of happineſs and proſperity, and fulneſs of good in general. Gen. xlv. 13. "You ſhall tell my father of all my glory in Egypt." Job xix. 9. "He hath ſtripped me of my glory." Iſa. x. 3. "Where will you leave your glory." Ver. 10. "Therefore ſhall the Lord of hoſts ſend among his fat ones leanneſs, and under his glory ſhall he kindle.

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* Exod. xvi. 7. and xxviii. 2, 40. and iii 8. Numb. xvi. 19. Deut. v. 24 and xxviii. 58. 2 Sam. vi. 20. 1 Chron. xvi. 24. Eſth. i 4. Job xxix 20. Pſal. xix. 1. and xlv. 13. and lxiii. 3. and lxvi 3 and lxvii. 6. and lxxxvii. 3. and cii. 16. and cxlv. 5, 12, 13. Iſa. iv. 2 and x. 18. and xvi. 40. and xxxv 21. and xl. 5. and lx. 13 and lxii. 2. Ezek. xxxi. 18. Hab. ii 14. Hag. ii 3, 9. Matth. vi. 29. and xvi. 27. and xxiv. 30. Luke ix. 31, 32. John i 14. and ii. 11. and xi. 40. Rom. vi. 4 1 Cor. ii. 8. and xv. 40. 2 Cor. iii. 10. Eph. iii. 21. Col. i. 11. 2 Theſſ. i. 9 Tit ii. 13 1 Pet. i. 24. 2 Pet. i. 17.

kindle a burning, like the burning of a fire." Iſa. xvii. 3, 4. "The kingdom ſhall ceaſe from Damaſcus, and the remnant of Syria; they ſhall be as the glory of the children of Iſrael. And in that day, it ſhall come to paſs, that the glory of Jacob ſhall be made thin, and the fatneſs of his fleſh ſhall be made lean." Iſa. xxi. 16. "And all the glory of Kedar ſhall fail." Iſa. lxi. 6. "Ye ſhall eat the riches of the Gentiles, and in their glory ſhall ye boaſt yourſelves." Chap. lxvi. 11, 12. "That ye may milk out, and be delighted with the abundance of her glory.——I will extend peace to her, like a river, and the glory of the Gentiles like a flowing ſtream." Hoſ. ix. 11. "As for Ephraim, their glory ſhall fly away as a bird." Matth. iv. 8.——Sheweth him all the kingdoms of the world, and the glory of them." Luke xxiv. 26. "Ought not Chriſt to have ſuffered theſe things, and to enter into his glory?" John xvii. 27. "And the glory which thou gaveſt me, have I given them." Rom. v. 2. "And rejoice in hope of the glory of God." Chap. viii. 18. "The ſufferings of this preſent time, are not worthy to be compared with the glory which ſhall be revealed in us." See alſo chap. ii. 7, 10. and iii. 23. and ix. 23. 1 Cor. ii. 7. "The hidden wiſdom which God ordained before the world, unto our glory." 2 Cor. iv. 17.——"Worketh out for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory. Eph. i. 18. "And what the riches of the glory of his inheritance in the ſaints." 1 Pet. iv. 13. "But rejoice, inaſmuch as ye are made partakers of Chriſt's ſufferings; that when his glory ſhall be revealed, ye may be glad alſo with exceeding joy." Chap. i. 8. "Ye rejoice, with joy unſpeakable and full of glory." †

2. The word glory, is uſed in ſcripture often to expreſs

† See alſo, Coloſ. i. 27. and iii. 4. 1 Theſſ. ii. 12. 2 Theſſ. ii. 14. 1 Tim. iii. 16. 2 Tim. ii. 10. Heb. ii. 10. 1 Pet. i. 11, 21. and v. 1, 10. 2 Pet. i. 3. Rev. xxi. 24, 26. Pſal. lxxiii. 24. and cxlix. 5. Iſa. xi. 10.

preſs the exhibition, emanation or communication of the internal glory. Hence it often ſignifies a viſible exhibition of glory; as in an effulgence or ſhining brightneſs, by an emanation of beams of light. Thus the brightneſs of the ſun, and moon, and ſtars, is called their glory, in 1 Cor. xv. 41. But in particular, the word is very often thus uſed, when applied to God and Chriſt. As in Ezek. i. 28. "As the appearance of the bow that is in the cloud in the day of rain, ſo was the appearance of the brightneſs round about. This was the appearance of the likeneſs of the glory of the Lord." And chap. x. 4. "Then the glory of the Lord went up from the cherub, and ſtood over the threſhold of the houſe, and the houſe was filled with the cloud, and the court was full of the brightneſs of the Lord's glory." Iſa. vi. 1, 2, 3. "I ſaw the Lord ſitting upon a throne, high and lifted up, and his train filled the temple. Above it ſtood the ſeraphim.——And one cried to another, and ſaid, Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hoſts, the whole earth is full of his glory." Compared with John xii. 4. "Theſe things ſaid Eſaias, when he ſaw his glory and ſpake of him." Ezek. xliii. 2. "And behold the glory of the God of Iſrael came from the way of the eaſt.——And the earth *ſhined* with his glory." Iſa. xxiv. 23. "Then the moon ſhall be confounded, and the ſun aſhamed, when the Lord of hoſts ſhall reign in mount Zion, and in Jeruſalem, and before his ancients *gloriouſly*." Iſa. lx. 1, 2. "Ariſe, ſhine, for thy light is come, and the glory of the Lord is riſen upon thee. For behold the darkneſs ſhall cover the earth, and groſs darkneſs the people; but the Lord ſhall ariſe upon thee, and his glory ſhall be ſeen upon thee." Together with verſe 19. "The ſun ſhall be no more thy light by day, neither for brightneſs ſhall the moon give light unto thee: but the Lord ſhall be unto thee an everlaſting light, and thy God thy glory." Luke ii. 9. "The glory of the Lord ſhone round about them." Acts xxii. 11. "And when I could not ſee for the glory of that light." In 2 Cor. iii. 7. The ſhining of Moſes' face is called *the*

*glory*

*glory of his countenance.* And to this Chriſt's glory is compared, verſe 18. "But we all with open face, beholding as in a glaſs the glory of the Lord, are changed into the ſame image, from glory to glory." And ſo chap. iv. 4. "Leſt the light of the glorious goſpel of Chriſt, who is the image of God, ſhould ſhine unto them." Ver. 6. "For God, who commanded the light to ſhine out of darkneſs, hath ſhined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jeſus Chriſt." Heb. i. 3. "Who is the *brightneſs* of his glory." The apoſtle Peter, ſpeaking of that emanation of exceeding brightneſs, from the bright cloud that overſhadowed the diſciples in the mount of transfiguration, and of the ſhining of Chriſt's face at that time, ſays, 2 Pet. i. 17. "For he received from God the Father honour and glory, when there came ſuch a voice to him from the excellent glory, This is my beloved Son, in whom I am well pleaſed." Rev. xviii. 1. "Another angel came down from heaven, having great power, *and the earth was lightened with his glory.*" Rev. xxi. 11. Having the glory of God, and her light was like unto a ſtone moſt precious, like a jaſper ſtone, clear as cryſtal." Ver. 23. "And the city had no need of the ſun, nor of the moon to ſhine in it; for the glory of God did lighten it." See the word for a viſible effulgence or emanation of light in the places to be ſeen in the margin. *

The word *glory*, as applied to God or Chriſt, ſometimes evidently ſignifies the communications of God's fulneſs, and means much the ſame thing, with God's abundant and exceeding goodneſs and grace. So Eph. ii. 16. "That he would grant you, according to the riches of his glory, to be ſtrengthened with might, by

* Exod. xvi. 12. and xxiv. 16, 17, 23. and xl. 34, 35. Lev. ix. 6, 23. Numb. xiv. 10. and xvi. 19. 1 Kings viii. 11. 2 Chron. v. 14. and vii. 1, 2, 3. Iſa. lviii. 8. Ezek. iii. 23. and viii. 4. and ix. 3. and x. 18, 19. and xi. 22, 23. and xliii. 4, 5. and xliv. 4. Acts vii. 55. Rev. xv. 8.

by his Spirit in the inner man." The expreſſion, "According to the riches of his glory," is apparently equivalent to that in the ſame epiſtle, chap. i. 7. "According to the riches of his grace." And chap. ii. 7. "The exceeding riches of his grace in his kindneſs towards us, through Chriſt Jeſus." In like manner is the word *glory* uſed in Phil. iv. 19. "But my God ſhall ſupply all your need, according to his riches in glory, by Chriſt Jeſus." And Rom. ix. 23. "And that he might make known the riches of his glory, on the veſſels of mercy." In this, and the foregoing verſe, the apoſtle ſpeaks of God's making known two things, his great wrath, and his rich grace. The former on the veſſels of wrath, ver. 22. The latter, which he calls *the riches of his glory*, on the veſſels of mercy, ver. 23. So when Moſes ſays, "I beſeech thee ſhew me thy *glory*;" God granting his requeſt, makes anſwer, "I will make all my *goodneſs* to paſs before thee." Exod. xxxiii. 18, 19. †

What we find in John xii. 23,—32, is worthy of particular notice in this place. The words and behaviour of Chriſt, which we have an account of here, argue two things.

1. That the happineſs and ſalvation of men, was an end that Chriſt ultimately aimed at in the labours and ſuf-

†Dr Goodwin obſerves, (Vol. I. of his works, part 2d, page 166) that riches of grace are called *riches of glory* in ſcripture. "The ſcripture," ſays he, "ſpeaks of riches of glory "in Eph. iii. 16 *That he would grant you according to the "riches of his glory*; yet eminently mercy is there intend-"ed: for it is that which God beſtows, and which the a-"poſtle there prayeth for. And he calls his mercy there "his glory, as elſewhere he doth, as being the moſt eminent "excellency in God.——That in Rom. ix. 22, 23. compared, "is obſervable. In the 22d verſe, where the apoſtle ſpeaks "of God's making known the power of his wrath, ſaith he, "*God willing to ſhew his wrath, and make his power known.* "But in verſe 23d, when he comes to ſpeak of mercy, he "ſaith, *That he might make known the riches of his glory on "the veſſels of mercy.*"

ſufferings he went through, for our redemption (and conſequently, by what has been before obſerved, an ultimate end of the work of creation.) The very ſame things which were obſerved before in this paſſage (chapter ſecond, ſection third) concerning God's glory, are equally, and in the ſame manner obſervable, concerning the ſalvation of men. As it was there obſerved, that Chriſt in the great conflict of his ſoul, in the view of the near approach of the moſt extreme difficulties which attended his undertaking, comforts himſelf in a certain proſpect of obtaining the end he had chiefly in view. It was obſerved, that the glory of God is therefore mentioned and dwelt upon by him, as what his ſoul ſupported itſelf and reſted in, as this great end. And at the ſame time, and exactly in the ſame manner, is the ſalvation of men mentioned and inſiſted on, as the end of theſe great labours and ſufferings, which ſatisfied his ſoul, in the proſpect of undergoing them. Compare the 23d and 24th verſes; and alſo the 28th and 29th verſes; ver. 31. and 32. And,

2. The glory of God, and the emanations and fruits of his grace in man's ſalvation, are ſo ſpoken of by Chriſt on this occaſion in juſt the ſame manner, that it would be quite unnatural to underſtand him as ſpeaking of two diſtinct things. Such is the connection, that what he ſays of the latter, muſt moſt naturally be underſtood as exegetical of the former. He firſt ſpeaks of his own glory and the glory of his Father, as the great end that ſhould be obtained by what he is about to ſuffer; and then explains and amplifies what he ſays on this, in what he expreſſes of the ſalvation of men that ſhall be obtained by it. Thus, in the 23d verſe, he ſays, "The hour is come that the Son of man ſhould be glorified." And in what next follows, he evidently ſhews how he was to be glorified, or wherein his glory conſiſted: "Verily, verily, I ſay unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground, and die, it abideth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit." As much fruit is the glory of the ſeed, ſo is the

the multitude of redeemed ones, which ſhould ſpring from his death, his glory *. So concerning the glory of his Father, in the 27th and following verſes. "Now is my ſoul troubled, and what ſhall I ſay? Father, ſave me from this hour! But for this cauſe came I unto this hour. Father, glorify thy name. Then came there a voice from heaven, ſaying, I have both glorified it, and will glorify it again." In an aſſurance of this, which this voice declared, Chriſt was greatly comforted, and his ſoul even exulted under the view of his approaching ſufferings. And what this glory was, in which Chriſt's ſoul was ſo comforted on this occaſion, his own words, which he then ſpake, plainly ſhew. When the people ſaid, it thundered; and others ſaid, an angel ſpake to him; then Chriſt explains the matter to them, and tells them what this voice meant. Ver. 30, 31, 32. "Jeſus anſwered and ſaid, This voice came not becauſe of me, but for your ſakes. Now is the judgment of this world; now ſhall the prince of this world be caſt out. And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me." By this behaviour, and theſe ſpeeches of our Redeemer, it appears that the expreſſions of divine grace, in the ſanctification and happineſs of the redeemed, are eſpecially that glory of his, and his Father, which was the joy that was ſet before him, for which he endured the croſs, and deſpiſed the ſhame: and that this glory eſpecially, was the end of the travail of his ſoul, in obtaining which end he was ſatisfied, agreeable to Iſa. liii. 10, 11.

This is agreeable to what has been juſt obſerved, of God's glory being ſo often repreſented by an effulgence, or emanation, or communication of light, from a luminary or fountain of light. What can be thought of, that ſo naturally and aptly repreſents the emanation of the internal glory of God; or the flowing forth,

* Here may be remembered what was before obſerved of the church's being ſo often ſpoken of as the glory and fulneſs of Chriſt.

and abundant communication of that infinite fulneſs of good that is in God? Light is very often in ſcripture put for comfort, joy, happineſs, and for good in general *.

Again, the word *glory*, as applied to God in ſcripture, implies the view or knowledge of God's excellency. The exhibition of glory is to the view of beholders. The manifeſtation of glory, the emanation or effulgence of brightneſs, has relation to the eye. Light or brightneſs is a quality that has relation to the ſenſe of ſeeing: we ſee the luminary by its light. And knowledge is often expreſſed in ſcripture by light. The word *glory* very often in ſcripture ſignifies or implies *honour*, as any one may ſoon ſee by caſting his eye on a concordance †. But honour implies the knowledge of the dignity and excellency of him who hath the honour; and this is often more eſpecially ſignified by the word *glory*, when applied to God. Numb. xiv. 21. "But as truly as I live, all the earth ſhall be filled with the glory of the Lord." *i. e.* All the earth ſhall ſee the manifeſtations I will make of my perfect holineſs and hatred of ſin, and ſo of my infinite excellence. This appears by the context. So Ezek. xxxix. 21, 22, 23. "And I will ſet my glory among the Heathen, and all the Heathen *ſhall ſee* my judgment that I have executed, and my hand that I have laid upon them. So the houſe of Iſrael *ſhall know* that I am

* Iſa. vi. 3—"Holy, holy, holy is the Lord of hoſts, the whole earth is full of his glory." In the original, *His glory is the fulneſs of the whole earth:* which ſignifies much more than the words of the tranſlation. God's glory, conſiſting eſpecially in his holineſs, is that, in the ſight or communications of which man's fulneſs, *i. e.* his holineſs and happineſs, conſiſts. By God's glory here, there ſeems to be reſpect to that train, or thoſe effulgent beams that filled the temple: theſe beams ſignifying God's glory ſhining forth and communicated. This effulgence, or communication, is the fulneſs of all intelligent creatures, who have no fulneſs of their own.

† See particularly, Heb. iii. 3.

am the Lord their God. And the Heathen *ſhall know* that the houſe of Iſrael went into captivity for their iniquity." And it is manifeſt in many places, where we read of God's glorifying himſelf, or of his being glorified, that one thing directly intended, is a manifeſting or making known his divine greatneſs and excellency.

Again, glory, as the word is uſed in ſcripture, often ſignifies or implies *praiſe*. This appears from what was obſerved before, that glory very often ſignifies honour, which is much the ſame thing with praiſe, *viz.* high eſteem and reſpect of heart, and the expreſſion and teſtimony of it in words and actions. And it is manifeſt that the words *glory* and *praiſe*, are often uſed as equivalent expreſſions in ſcripture. Pſal. l. 23. "Whoſo offereth praiſe, glorifieth me." Pſal. xxii. 23. "Ye that fear the Lord, praiſe him; all ye ſeed of Iſrael, glorify him." Iſa. xlii. 8. "My glory I will not give unto another, nor my praiſe to graven images." Ver. 12. "Let them give glory unto the Lord, and declare his praiſe in the iſlands." Iſa. xlviii. 9, 10, 11. "For my name's ſake will I defer mine anger; for my praiſe will I refrain for thee.——For mine own ſake will I do it; for——I will not give my glory unto another." Jer. xiii. 11. "That they might be unto me for a people, and for a name, and for a praiſe, and for a glory." Eph. i. 6. "To the praiſe of the glory of his grace." Ver. 12. "To the praiſe of his glory." So ver. 14. The phraſe is apparently equivalent to that, Phil. i. 11. "Which are by Jeſus Chriſt unto the praiſe and glory of God." 2 Cor. iv. 15. "That the abundant grace might, thro' the thankſgiving of many, redound to the glory of God."

It is manifeſt the *praiſe of God*, as the phraſe is uſed in ſcripture, implies the high eſteem and love of the heart, exalting thoughts of God, and complacence in his excellence and perfection. This is ſo manifeſt to every one acquainted with the ſcripture, that there ſeems to be but little or no need to refer to particu-

lar places. However, if any need ſatisfaction, they may, among innumerable other places which might be mentioned, turn to thoſe in the margin *.

It alſo implies joy in God, or rejoicing in his perfections, as is manifeſt by Pſal. xxxiii. 2. "*Rejoice* in the Lord, O ye righteous, for *praiſe* is comely for the upright." Other paſſages to the ſame purpoſe, ſee in the margin †. How often do we read of *ſinging praiſe?* But ſinging is commonly an expreſſion of joy. It is called, making a joyful noiſe ‖. And as it is often uſed, it implies gratitude or love to God for his benefits to us §.

Having thus conſidered what is implied in the phraſe, THE GLORY OF GOD, as we find it uſed in ſcripture; I proceed to enquire what is meant by the *name* of God.

And I obſerve, that it is manifeſt that God's name and his glory, at leaſt very often, ſignify the ſame thing in ſcripture. As it has been obſerved concerning the glory of God, that it ſometimes ſignifies the ſecond perſon in the Trinity; the ſame might be ſhewn of the name of God, if it were needful in this place. But that the name and glory of God are often equipollent expreſſions, is manifeſt by Exod. xxxiii. 18, 19. When Moſes ſays, "I beſeech thee, ſhew me thy glory:" and God grants his requeſt, he ſays, "I will proclaim the *name* of the Lord before thee." Pſal. viii. 1. "O Lord, how excellent is thy name in all

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* Pſal. cxlv. 1.——12. and xxxiv. 1, 2, 3 and xliv. 8. and lxxi 14, 15. and xcix. 2, 3. and cvii. 31, 32. and cviii. 3, 4, 5 and cxix 164 and cxlviii. 13 and cl 2. Rev xix 1, 2, 3 ——

† Pſal. ix. 1, 2, 14. and xxviii. 7. and xxxv. 27, 28. and xlii. 4. and lxiii. 5. and lxvii. 3, 4, 5 and lxxi. 22, 23. and civ. 33, 34. and cvi. 47 and cxxxv. 3. and cxlvii. 1. and cxlix. 1, 2, 5, 6. Acts ii 46, 47 and iii 8. Rev. xix. 6. 7.

‖ Pſal lxvi. 1, 2. and xcvi. 4, 5.

§ Pſal. xxx. 12. and xxxv. 18. and lxiii. 3, 4. and lxvi. 8, 9. and lxxi. 6. 7. 8. and lxxix. 13. and xcviii. 4, 5. and c. 4. and cvii. 21. 22. and cxxxviii. 2. And many other places.

all the earth! Who haſt ſet thy glory above the heavens," Pſal. lxxix. 9. "Help us! O God of our ſalvation, for the glory of thy name; and deliver us, and purge away our ſins for thy name's ſake." Pſal. cii. 15. "So the Heathen ſhall fear the *name* of the Lord; and all the kings of the earth thy *glory*." Pſal. cxlviii. 13. "His *name* alone is excellent, and his *glory* is above the earth and heaven." Iſa. xlviii. 9. "For my *name's* ſake will I defer mine anger, and for my *praiſe* will I refrain for thee." Ver. 11. "For mine own ſake, even for mine own ſake will I do it: for how ſhould my *name* be polluted? And I will not give my *glory* unto another." Iſa. xlix. 19. "They ſhall fear the *name* of the Lord from the weſt, and his *glory* from the riſing of the ſun." Jer. xiii. 11. "That they might be unto me for a *name*, and for a *praiſe*, and for a *glory*. As glory often implies the manifeſtation, publication, and knowledge of excellency, and the honour that any one has in the world; ſo it is evident does *name*. Gen. xi. 4. "Let us make us a *name*." Deut. xxvi. 19. "And to make thee high above all nations, in praiſe, in name, and in honour." *

So it is evident, that by *name* is ſometimes meant much the ſame thing as praiſe, by ſeveral places which have been juſt mentioned, as Iſa. xlviii. 9. Jer. xiii. 11. Deut. xxvi. 19. And alſo by Jer. xxxiii. 9. "And it ſhall be unto me for a *name*, a *praiſe*, and an *honour*, before all the nations of the earth, which ſhall hear of all the good I do unto them." Zeph. iii. 20. "I will make you a *name* and a *praiſe* among all people of the earth.

And it ſeems that the expreſſion or exhibition of God's goodneſs is eſpecially called his *name*, in Exod. xxxiii. 19. "I will make all my goodneſs paſs before thee, and I will proclaim the *name* of the Lord before



* See alſo, 2 Sam. vii 9. and viii' 13. and xxiii 18. Neh. ix 10. Job xxx. 8. Prov. xxii. 1. Many other places import the ſame thing.

thee." And chap. xxxiv. 5, 6, 7. "And the Lord deſcended in the cloud, and ſtood with him there, and proclaimed the *name* of the Lord. And the Lord paſſed by before him, and proclaimed, the Lord, the Lord God, gracious and merciful, long-ſuffering and abundant in goodneſs and truth; keeping mercy for thouſands," &c.

And the ſame illuſtrious brightneſs and effulgence in the pillar of cloud that appeared in the wilderneſs, and dwelt above the mercy-ſeat in the tabernacle and temple, (or rather the ſpiritual divine brightneſs and effulgence repreſented by it), which is ſo often called *the glory of the Lord*, is alſo often called *the name of the Lord*. Becauſe God's glory was to dwell in the tabernacle, therefore he promiſes, Exod. xxix. 43. "There will I meet with the children of Iſrael, and the tabernacle ſhall be ſanctified by my glory." And the temple was called *the houſe of God's glory*, Iſa. lx. 7. In like manner, the *name* of God is ſaid to dwell in the ſanctuary. Thus we often read of the place that God choſe, *to put his name there*: or, as it is in the Hebrew, to cauſe his name to inhabit there. So it is ſometimes rendered by our tranſlators. As Deut. xii. 11. "Then there ſhall be a place which the Lord your God ſhall chuſe *to cauſe his name to dwell there*." And the temple is often ſpoken of as built *for God's name*. And in Pſal. lxxiv. 7. the temple is called *the dwelling-place of God's name*. The mercy-ſeat in the temple was called the throne of God's name or glory, Jer. xiv. 21. "Do not abhor us, for thy name's ſake, do not diſgrace the throne of thy glory." Here God's *name* and his *glory*, ſeem to be ſpoken of as the ſame.

SECT.

## SECT. VII.

SHEWING, that the ultimate end of the creation of the world is BUT ONE, and what THAT ONE END is.

From what has been obſerved in the laſt ſection, it appears, that however the laſt end of the creation is ſpoken of in ſcripture under various denominations; yet, if the whole of what is ſaid relating to this affair be duly weighed, and one part compared with another, we ſhall have reaſon to think, that the deſign of the Spirit of God does not ſeem to be to repreſent God's ultimate end as manifold, but as one. For though it be ſignified by various names, yet they appear not to be names of different things, but various names involving each other in their meaning; either different names of the ſame thing, or names of ſeveral parts of one whole, or of the ſame whole viewed in various lights, or in its different reſpects and relations. For it appears, that all that is ever ſpoken of in the ſcripture as an ultimate end of God's works, is included in that one phraſe, *the glory of God*; which is the name by which the laſt end of God's works is moſt commonly called in ſcripture; and ſeems to be the name which moſt aptly ſignifies the thing.

The thing ſignified by that name, *the glory of God*, when ſpoken of as the ſupreme and ultimate end of the work of creation, and of all God's works, is the emanation and true external expreſſion of God's internal glory and fulneſs; meaning by his fulneſs, what has already been explained; or in other words, God's internal glory extant, in a true and juſt exhibition, or external exiſtence of it. It is confeſſed, that there is a degree of obſcurity in theſe definitions: but perhaps an obſcurity which is unavoidable, through the imperfection of language, and words being leſs fitted to expreſs things of ſo ſublime a nature. And therefore the thing

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may poſſibly be better underſtood, by uſing many words and a variety of expreſſions, by a particular conſideration of it, as it were by parts, than by any ſhort definition.

There is included in this, the exerciſe of God's perfections to produce a proper effect, in oppoſition to their lying eternally dormant and ineffectual: as his power being eternally without any act or fruit of that power; his wiſdom eternally ineffectual in any wiſe production, or prudent diſpoſal of any thing, &c. The manifeſtation of his internal glory to created underſtandings. The communication of the infinite fulneſs of God to the creature. The creature's high eſteem of God, love to God, and complacence and joy in God; and the proper exerciſes and expreſſions of theſe.

Theſe at firſt view may appear to be entirely diſtinct things: but if we more cloſely conſider the matter, they will all appear to be one thing, in a variety of views and relations. They are all but the emanation of God's glory; or the excellent brightneſs and fulneſs of the divinity diffuſed, overflowing, and as it were enlarged; or in one word, *exiſting ad extra*. God's exerciſing his perfection to produce a proper effect, is not diſtinct from the emanation or communication of his fulneſs: for this is the effect, *viz.* his fulneſs communicated, and the producing this effect is the communication of his fulneſs; and there is nothing in this effectual exerting of God's perfection, but the emanation of God's internal glory. The emanation or communication, is of the internal glory or fulneſs of God, as it is. Now God's internal glory, as it is in God, is either in his underſtanding or will. The glory or fulneſs of his underſtanding, is his knowledge. The internal glory and fulneſs of God, which we muſt conceive of as having its ſpecial ſeat in his will, is his holineſs and happineſs. The whole of God's internal good or glory, is in theſe three things, *viz.* his infinite knowledge; his infinite virtue or holineſs, and his infinite joy and happineſs. Indeed there are a great many attributes in God, according to our way of conceiving

ceiving or talking of them: but all may be reduced to theſe; or to the degree, circumſtances and relations of theſe. We have no conception of God's power, different from the degree of theſe things, with a certain relation of them to effects. God's infinity is not ſo properly a diſtinct kind of good in God, but only expreſſes the *degree* of the good there is in him. So God's eternity is not a diſtinct good; but is the duration of good. His immutability is ſtill the ſame good, with a negation of change. So that, as I ſaid, the fulneſs of the Godhead is the fulneſs of his underſtanding, conſiſting in his knowledge; and the fulneſs of his will, conſiſting in his virtue and happineſs. And therefore, the external glory of God conſiſts in the communication of theſe. The communication of his knowledge is chiefly in giving the knowledge of himſelf: for this is the knowledge in which the fulneſs of God's underſtanding chiefly conſiſts. And thus we ſee how the manifeſtation of God's glory to created underſtandings, and their ſeeing and knowing it, is not diſtinct from an emanation or communication of God's fulneſs, but clearly implied in it. Again, the communication of God's virtue or holineſs, is principally in communicating the love of himſelf (which appears by what has before been obſerved. And thus we ſee how, not only the creature's ſeeing and knowing God's excellence, but alſo ſupremely eſteeming and loving him, belongs to the communication of God's fulneſs. And the communication of God's joy and happineſs conſiſts chiefly in communicating to the creature that happineſs and joy which conſiſts in rejoicing in God, and in his glorious excellency; for in ſuch joy God's own happineſs does principally conſiſt. And in theſe things, *viz.* in knowing God's excellency, loving God for it, and rejoicing in it; and in the exerciſe and expreſſion of theſe conſiſts God's honour and praiſe; ſo that theſe are clearly implied in that glory of God, which conſiſts in the emanation of his internal glory. And though we ſuppoſe all theſe things, which ſeem to be ſo various, are ſignified by that *glory*, which the ſcrip-

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ture ſpeaks of as the laſt end of all God's works; yet it is manifeſt there is no greater, and no other variety in it, than in the internal and eſſential glory of God itſelf. God's internal glory is partly in his underſtanding, and partly in his will. And this internal glory, as ſeated in the will of God, implies both his holineſs and his happineſs: both are evidently God's glory, according to the uſe of the phraſe. So that as God's external glory is only the emanation of his internal glory, this variety neceſſarily follows. And again, it hence appears that here is no other variety or diſtinction, but what neceſſarily ariſes from the diſtinct faculties of the creature, to which the communication is made, as created in the image of God; even as having theſe two faculties of underſtanding and will. God communicates himſelf to the underſtanding of the creature, in giving him the knowledge of his glory; and to the will of the creature, in giving him holineſs, conſiſting primarily in the love of God: and in giving the creature happineſs chiefly conſiſting in joy in God. Theſe are the ſum of that emanation of divine fulneſs called in ſcripture, *the glory of God.* The firſt part of this glory, is called *truth*, the latter, *grace.* John i. 14. "We beheld his *glory*, the glory of the only begotten of the Father, full of *grace* and *truth.*"

Thus we ſee that the great and laſt end of God's works, which is ſo variouſly expreſſed in ſcripture, is indeed but *one*; and this *one* end is moſt properly and comprehenſively called, THE GLORY OF GOD; by which name it is moſt commonly called in ſcripture; and is fitly compared to an effulgence or emanation of light from a luminary, by which this glory of God is abundantly repreſented in ſcripture. Light is the external expreſſion, exhibition, and manifeſtation of the excellency of the luminary, of the ſun for inſtance: It is the abundant, extenſive emanation and communication of the fulneſs of the ſun to innumerable beings that partake of it. It is by this that the ſun itſelf is ſeen, and his glory beheld, and all other things are diſcovered: it is by a participation of this communication from

from the ſun, that ſurrounding objects receive all their luſtre, beauty, and brightneſs. It is by this that all nature is quickened, and receives life, comfort, and joy. Light is abundantly uſed in ſcripture to repreſent and ſignify theſe three things, knowledge, holineſs, and happineſs *.

What has been ſaid may be ſufficient to ſhew how thoſe things, which are ſpoken of in ſcripture as ultimate ends of God's works, though they may ſeem at firſt view to be diſtinct, are all plainly to be reduced to this one thing, *viz.* God's internal glory or fulneſs extant externally, or exiſting in its emanation. And though God in ſeeking this end, ſeeks the creature's good; yet therein appears his ſupreme regard to himſelf.

The emanation or communication of the divine fulneſs, conſiſting in the knowledge of God, love to God, and joy in God, has relation indeed both to God and the creature: but it has relation to God as its fountain, as it is an emanation from God; and as the communication itſelf, or thing communicated, is ſomething divine, ſomething of God, ſomething of his internal fulneſs; as the water in the ſtream is ſomething of the fountain; and as the beams of the ſun are ſomething of

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* It is uſed to ſignify knowledge, or that manifeſtation and evidence by which knowledge is received. Pſal. xix. 8. and cxix. 105, 130. Prov. vi 23. Iſa. viii. 20. and ix. 2. and xxix. 18. Dan. v. 11. Eph. v. 13. "But all things that are reproved, are made manifeſt by the light: for whatſoever doth make manifeſt, is light." And in other places of the New Teſtament innumerable.——

It is uſed to ſignify virtue, or moral good Job xxv. 5. Eccl. viii. 1. Iſa. v. 20. and xxiv. 23. and lxii. 1. Ezek. xxviii. 7, 17. Dan. ii 31. 1 John i. 5. And many other places ——

And it is abundantly uſed to ſignify comfort, joy, and happineſs. Eſth. viii. 16. Job xviii. 18. and xxii 28. and xxix. 3. and xxx. 26 Pſal. xxvii. 1 and xcvii 11. and cxviii. 27. and cxii 4. Iſa xlii. 16 and l. 10. and lix. 9. Jer xiii 16. Lam iii. 2. Ezek. xxxii. 8. Amos v. 18. Mic. 7, 8, 9. And other places.——

of the ſun. And again, they have relation to God, as they have reſpect to him as their object: for the knowledge communicated is the knowledge of God; and ſo God is the object of the knowledge: and the love communicated, is the love of God; ſo God is the object of that love: and the happineſs communicated, is joy in God; and ſo he is the object of the joy communicated. In the creature's knowing, eſteeming, loving, rejoicing in, and praiſing God, the glory of God is both exhibited and acknowledged; his fulneſs is received and returned. Here is both an *emanation*, and *remanation*. The refulgence ſhines upon and into the creature, and is reflected back to the luminary. The beams of glory come from God, and are ſomething of God, and are refunded back again to their original. So that the whole is *of* God, and *in* God, and *to* God; and God is the beginning, middle, and end in this affair.

And though it be true that God has reſpect to the creature in theſe things; yet his reſpect to himſelf, and to the creature in this matter, are not properly to be looked upon, as a double and divided reſpect of God's heart. What has been ſaid in chap. I. ſect. 3, 4, may be ſufficient to ſhew this. Nevertheleſs, it may not be amiſs here briefly to ſay a few things; though they are moſtly implied in what has been ſaid already.

When God was about to create the world, he had reſpect to that emanation of his glory, which is actually the conſequence of the creation, juſt as it is with regard to all that belongs to it, both with regard to its relation to himſelf and the creature. He had regard to it as an emanation from himſelf, and a communication of himſelf, and as the thing communicated, in its nature returned to himſelf, as its final term. And he had regard to it alſo as the emanation was to the creature, and as the thing communicated was in the creature, as its ſubject. And God had regard to it in this manner, as he had a ſupreme regard to himſelf, and value for his own infinite internal glory. It was this value for himſelf that cauſed him to value and ſeek that his internal glory ſhould flow forth from himſelf.

ſelf. It was from his value for his glorious perfections of wiſdom and righteouſneſs, &c.——that he valued the proper exerciſe and effect of theſe perfections, in wiſe and righteous acts and effects. It was from his infinite value for his internal glory and fulneſs, that he valued the thing itſelf, which is communicated, which is ſomething of the ſame, extant in the creature. Thus, becauſe he infinitely values his own glory, conſiſting in the knowledge of himſelf, love to himſelf, and complacence and joy in himſelf; he therefore valued the image, communication, or participation of theſe in the creature. And it is becauſe he values himſelf, that he delights in the knowledge, and love, and joy of the creature; as being himſelf the object of this knowledge, love, and complacence. For it is the neceſſary conſequence of the true eſteem and love of any perſon or being, (ſuppoſe a ſon or friend) that we ſhould approve and value others eſteem of the ſame object, and diſapprove and diſlike the contrary. For the ſame reaſon is it the conſequence of a being's eſteem and love of himſelf, that he ſhould approve of others eſteem and love of himſelf.

Thus it is eaſy to conceive, how God ſhould ſeek the good of the creature, conſiſting in the creature's knowledge and holineſs, and even his happineſs, from a ſupreme regard to himſelf; as his happineſs ariſes from that which is an image and participation of God's own beauty; and conſiſts in the creature's exerciſing a ſupreme regard to God, and complacence in him; in beholding God's glory, in eſteeming and loving it, and rejoicing in it, and in his exerciſing and teſtifying love and ſupreme reſpect to God: which is the ſame thing with the creature's exalting God as his chief good, and making him his ſupreme end.

And though the emanation of God's fulneſs, which God intended in the creation, and which actually is the conſequence of it, is to the creature as its object, and the creature is the ſubject of the fulneſs communicated, and is the creature's good; and was alſo regarded as ſuch, when God ſought it as the end of his works; yet

it does not neceſſarily follow, that even in ſo doing, he did not make himſelf his end. It comes to the ſame thing. God's reſpect to the creature's good, and his reſpect to himſelf, is not a divided reſpect; but both are united in one, as the happineſs of the creature aimed at is happineſs in union with himſelf. The creature is no further happy with this happineſs which God makes his ultimate end, than he becomes one with God. The more happineſs the greater union: when the happineſs is perfect, the union is perfect. And as the happineſs will be increaſing to eternity, the union will become more and more ſtrict and perfect; nearer and more like to that between God the Father, and the Son; who are ſo united, that their intereſt is perfectly one. If the happineſs of the creature be conſidered as it will be, in the whole of the creature's eternal duration, with all the infinity of its progreſs, and infinite increaſe of nearneſs and union to God; in this view, the creature muſt be looked upon as united to God in an infinite ſtrictneſs.

If God has reſpect to ſomething in the creature, which he views as of everlaſting duration, and as riſing higher and higher through that infinite duration, and that not with conſtantly diminiſhing (but perhaps an increaſing) celerity; then he has reſpect to it, as, in the whole, of infinite height; though there never will be any particular time when it can be ſaid already to have come to ſuch an height.

Let the moſt perfect union with God be repreſented by ſomething at an infinite height above us; and the eternally increaſing union of the ſaints with God, by ſomething that is aſcending conſtantly towards that infinite height, moving upwards with a given velocity; and that is to continue thus to move to all eternity. God who views the whole of this eternally increaſing height, views it as an infinite height. And if he has reſpect to it, and makes it his end, as in the whole of it, he has reſpect to it as an infinite height, though the time will never come when it can be ſaid it has already arrived at this infinite height.

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God aims at that which the motion or progreſſion which he cauſes, aims at, or tends to. If there be many things ſuppoſed to be ſo made and appointed, that, by a conſtant and eternal motion, they all tend to a certain centre; then it appears that he who made them, and is the cauſe of their motion, aimed at that centre; that term of their motion, to which they eternally tend, and are eternally, as it were, ſtriving after. And if God be this centre; then God aimed at himſelf. And herein it appears, that as he is the firſt author of their being and motion, ſo he is the laſt end, the final term, to which is their ultimate tendency and aim.

We may judge of the end that the Creator aimed at, in the being, nature, and tendency he gives the creature, by the mark or term which they conſtantly aim at in their tendency and eternal progreſs; though the time will never come, when it can be ſaid it is attained to, in the moſt abſolutely perfect manner.

But if ſtrictneſs of union to God be viewed as thus infinitely exalted; then the creature muſt be regarded as infinitely, nearly, and cloſely united to God. And viewed thus, their intereſt muſt be viewed as one with God's intereſt; and ſo is not regarded properly with a disjunct and ſeparate, but an undivided reſpect. And as to any difficulty of reconciling God's not making the creature his ultimate end, with a reſpect properly diſtinct from a reſpect to himſelf; with his benevolence and free grace, and the creature's obligation to gratitude, the reader muſt be referred to chap. I. ſect. 4. obj. 4. where this objection has been conſidered and anſwered at large.

If by reaſon of the ſtrictneſs of the union of a man and his family, their intereſt may be looked upon as one, how much more one is the intereſt of Chriſt and his church, (whoſe firſt union in heaven is unſpeakably more perfect and exalted, than that of an earthly father and his family) if they be conſidered with regard to their eternal and increaſing union? Doubtleſs it may juſtly be eſteemed as ſo much one, that it may be

ſuppoſed to be aimed at and ſought, not with a diſtinct and ſeparate, but an undivided reſpect.

It is certain that what God aimed at in the creation of the world, was the good that would be the conſequence of the creation, in the whole continuance of the thing created.

It is no ſolid objection againſt God's aiming at an infinitely perfect union of the creature with himſelf, that the particular time will never come when it can be ſaid, the union is now infinitely perfect. God aims at ſatisfying juſtice in the eternal damnation of ſinners; which will be ſatisfied by their damnation, conſidered no otherwiſe than with regard to its eternal duration. But yet there never will come that particular moment, when it can be ſaid, that now juſtice is ſatisfied. But if this does not ſatisfy our modern free-thinkers, who do not like the talk about ſatisfying juſtice with an infinite puniſhment; I ſuppoſe it will not be denied by any, that God, in glorifying the ſaints in heaven with eternal felicity, aims to ſatisfy his infinite grace or benevolence, by the beſtowment of a good infinitely valuable, becauſe eternal: and yet there never will come the moment, when it can be ſaid, that now this infinitely valuable good has been actually beſtowed.

# The Nature of true Virtue.

## CHAPTER I.

### Shewing wherein the Eſſence of true Virtue conſiſts.

WHATEVER controverſies and variety of opinions there are about the nature of virtue, yet all (excepting ſome ſceptics, who deny any real difference between virtue and vice) mean by it ſomething *beautiful*, or rather ſome kind of *beauty*, or excellency. ——It is not *all* beauty that is called virtue; for inſtance, not the beauty of a building, of a flower, or of the rainbow: but ſome beauty belonging to beings that have *perception* and *will*.—It is not all beauty of *mankind* that is called virtue; for inſtance, not the external beauty of the countenance, or ſhape, gracefulneſs of motion, or harmony of voice: but it is a beauty that has its original ſeat in the mind.——But yet perhaps not *every* thing that may be called a beauty of mind, is properly called virtue. There is a beauty of underſtanding and ſpeculation. There is ſomething in the ideas and conceptions of great philoſophers and ſtateſmen, that may be called beautiful; which is a different thing from what is moſt common-

ly meant by virtue. But virtue is the beauty of those qualities and acts of the mind, that are of a *moral* nature, *i. e.* such as are attended with desert or worthiness of *praise* or *blame*. Things of this sort, it is generally agreed, so far as I know, are not any thing belonging merely to speculation; but to the *disposition* and *will*, (or to use a general word, I suppose commonly well understood) to the *heart*. Therefore, I suppose, I shall not depart from the common opinion, when I say, that virtue is the beauty of the qualities and exercises of the heart, or those actions which proceed from them. So that when it is enquired, what is the nature of true *virtue?* This is the same as to enquire, what that is, which renders any habit, disposition, or exercise of the heart truly *beautiful?*——I use the phrase *true* virtue, and speak of things *truly* beautiful, because I suppose it will generally be allowed, that there is a distinction to be made between some things which are truly virtuous, and others which only seem to be virtuous, through a partial and imperfect view of things: that some actions and dispositions appear beautiful, if considered partially and superficially, or with regard to some things belonging to them, and in some of their circumstances and tendencies, which would appear otherwise in a more extensive and comprehensive view, wherein they are seen clearly in their whole nature, and the extent of their connections in the universality of things.——There is a general and particular beauty. By a *particular* beauty, I mean that by which a thing appears beautiful when considered only with regard to its connection with, and tendency to, some particular things within a limited, and as it were a private sphere. And a *general* beauty is that by which a thing appears beautiful when viewed most perfectly, comprehensively and universally, with regard to all its tendencies, and its connections with every thing it stands related to.——The former may be without and against the latter. As a few notes in a tune, taken only by themselves, and in their relation to one another, may be harmoni-

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ous; which, when conſidered with reſpect to all the notes in the tune, or the entire ſeries of ſounds they are connected with, may be very diſcordant and diſagreeable. (Of which more afterwards)——*That only*, therefore, is what I mean by true virtue, which is *that* belonging to the *heart* of an intelligent being, that is beautiful by a *general* beauty, or beautiful in a comprehenſive view, as it is in itſelf, and as related to every thing that it ſtands in connection with. And therefore, when we are enquiring concerning the nature of true virtue, *viz.* wherein this true and general beauty of the heart does moſt eſſentially conſiſt,—this is my anſwer to the enquiry.——

True virtue moſt eſſentially conſiſts in benevolence to being in general. Or perhaps to ſpeak more accurately, it is that conſent, propenſity and union of heart to being in general, that is immediately exerciſed in a general good-will.

The things which were before obſerved of the nature of true virtue, naturally lead us to ſuch a notion of it. If it has its ſeat in the heart, and is the general goodneſs and beauty of the diſpoſition and exerciſe of that, in the moſt comprehenſive view, conſidered with regard to its univerſal tendency, and as related to every thing that it ſtands in connection with; what can it conſiſt in, but a conſent and good-will to being in general?——Beauty does not conſiſt in diſcord and diſſent, but in conſent and agreement. And if every intelligent being is ſome way related to being in general, and is a part of the univerſal ſyſtem of exiſtence; and ſo ſtands in connection with the whole; what can its general and true beauty be, but its union and conſent with the great whole.

If any ſuch thing can be ſuppoſed as an union of heart to ſome particular being, or number of beings, diſpoſing it to benevolence to a private circle or ſyſtem of beings, which are but a ſmall part of the whole; not implying a tendency to an union with the great ſyſtem, and not at all inconſiſtent with enmity towards being in general; this I ſuppoſe not to be of the nature

ture of true virtue: although it may in ſome reſpects be good, and may appear beautiful in a confined and contracted view of things.—But of this more afterwards.

It is abundantly plain by the holy ſcriptures, and generally allowed, not only by Chriſtian divines, but by the more conſiderable Deiſts, that virtue moſt eſſentially conſiſts in love. And I ſuppoſe, it is owned by the moſt conſiderable writers, to conſiſt in general love of benevolence, or kind affection: though it ſeems to me the meaning of ſome in this affair is not ſufficiently explained; which perhaps occaſions ſome error or confuſion in diſcourſes on this ſubject.

When I ſay, true virtue conſiſts in love to being in general, I ſhall not be likely to be underſtood, that no one act of the mind or exerciſe of love is of the nature of true virtue, but what has being in general, or the great ſyſtem of univerſal exiſtence, for its direct and immediate object: ſo that no exerciſe of love, or kind affection to any one particular being, that is but a ſmall part of this whole, has any thing of the nature of true virtue.—But, that the nature of true virtue conſiſts in a diſpoſition to benevolence towards being in general. Though from ſuch a diſpoſition may ariſe exerciſes of love to particular beings, as objects are preſented and occaſions ariſe. No wonder, that he who is of a generally benevolent diſpoſition, ſhould be more diſpoſed than another to have his heart moved with benevolent affection to particular perſons, whom he is acquainted and converſant with, and from whom ariſe the greateſt and moſt frequent occaſions for exciting his benevolent temper.——But my meaning is, that no affections towards particular perſons or beings are of the nature of true virtue, but ſuch as ariſe from a generally benevolent temper, or from that habit or frame of mind, wherein conſiſts a diſpoſition to love being in general.

And perhaps it is needleſs for me to give notice to my readers, that when I ſpeak of an intelligent being's having a heart united and benevolently diſpoſed

to

to being in general, I thereby mean *intelligent* being in general. Not inanimate things, or beings that have no perception or will; which are not properly capable objects of benevolence.

Love is commonly diſtinguiſhed into love of benevolence, and love of complacence.——Love of *benevolence* is that affection or propenſity of the heart to any being, which cauſes it to incline to its well-being, or diſpoſes it to deſire and take pleaſure in its happineſs. And if I miſtake not, it is agreeable to the common opinion, that beauty in the object is not always the ground of this propenſity: but that there may be ſuch a thing as benevolence, or a diſpoſition to the welfare of thoſe that are not conſidered as beautiful, unleſs mere exiſtence be accounted a beauty. And benevolence or goodneſs in the divine Being is generally ſuppoſed, not only to be prior to the beauty of many of its objects, but to their exiſtence: ſo as to be the ground both of their exiſtence and their beauty, rather than the foundation of God's benevolence; as it is ſuppoſed that it is God's goodneſs which moved him to give them both being and beauty. So that if all virtue primarily conſiſts in that affection of heart to being, which is exerciſed in benevolence, or an inclination to its good, then God's virtue is ſo extended as to include a propenſity not only to being actually exiſting, and actually beautiful, but to poſſible being, ſo as to incline him to give a being beauty and happineſs.——But not now to inſiſt particularly on this——What I would have obſerved, at preſent, is, that it muſt be allowed benevolence doth not neceſſarily preſuppoſe beauty in its object.

What is commonly called love of *complacence*, preſuppoſes beauty.——For it is no other than delight in beauty; or complacence in the perſon or being beloved for his beauty.

If virtue be the beauty of an intelligent being, and virtue conſiſts in love, then it is a plain inconſiſtence, to ſuppoſe that virtue primarily conſiſts in any love to its object for its beauty; either in a love of complacence,

cence, which is delight in a being for his beauty, or in a love of benevolence, that has the beauty of its object for its foundation. For that would be to ſuppoſe, that the beauty of intelligent beings primarily conſiſts in love to beauty; or that their virtue firſt of all conſiſts in their love to virtue. Which is an inconſiſtence, and going in a circle. Becauſe it makes virtue, or beauty of mind, the foundation or firſt motive of that love wherein virtue originally conſiſts, or wherein the very firſt virtue conſiſts; or, it ſuppoſes the firſt virtue to be the conſequence and effect of virtue. So that virtue is originally the foundation and exciting cauſe of the very beginning or firſt being of virtue. Which makes the firſt virtue, both the ground and the conſequence, both cauſe and effect of itſelf. Doubtleſs virtue primarily conſiſts in ſomething elſe beſides any effect or conſequence of virtue. If virtue conſiſts primarily in love to virtue, then virtue, the thing loved, is the love of virtue: ſo that virtue muſt conſiſt in the love of the love of virtue. And if it be enquired, what that virtue is, which virtue conſiſts in the love of the love of, it muſt be anſwered, it is the love of virtue. So that there muſt be the love of the love of the love of virtue, and ſo on *in infinitum*. For there is no end of going back in a circle. We never come to any beginning or foundation. For it is without beginning, and hangs on nothing.

Therefore, if the eſſence of virtue or beauty of mind lies in love, or a diſpoſition to love, it muſt primarily conſiſt in ſomething *different* both from complacence, which is a delight in beauty, and alſo from any benevolence that has the beauty of its object for its foundation. Becauſe it is abſurd to ſay, that virtue is primarily and firſt of all the conſequence of itſelf. For this makes virtue primarily prior to itſelf.

Nor can virtue primarily conſiſt in *gratitude*; or one being's benevolence to another for his benevolence to him. Becauſe this implies the ſame inconſiſtence. For it ſuppoſes a benevolence prior to gratitude, that is the cauſe of gratitude. Therefore the firſt benevolence,

or

or that benevolence which has none prior to it, cannot be gratitude.

Therefore there is room left for no other concluſion than that the primary object of virtuous love is being, ſimply conſidered; or that true virtue primarily conſiſts, not in love to any particular beings, becauſe of their virtue or beauty, nor in gratitude, becauſe they love us; but in a propenſity and union of heart to being ſimply conſidered; exciting *abſolute* benevolence (if I may ſo call it) to being in general.——I ſay, true virtue *primarily* conſiſts in this. For I am far from aſſerting, that there is no true virtue in any other love than this abſolute benevolence. But I would expreſs what appears to me to be the truth, on this ſubject, in the following particulars.

The *firſt* object of a virtuous benevolence is *being*, ſimply conſidered: and if being, *ſimply* conſidered, be its object, then being *in general* is its object; and the thing it has an ultimate propenſity to, is the *higheſt good* of being in general. And it will ſeek the good of every *individual* being unleſs it be conceived as not conſiſtent with the higheſt good of being in general. In which caſe the good of a particular being, or ſome beings, may be given up for the ſake of the higheſt good of being in general. And particularly, if there be any being that is looked upon as ſtatedly and irreclaimably oppoſite and an enemy to being in general, then conſent and adherence to being in general will induce the truly virtuous heart to forſake that being, and to oppoſe it.

And further, if being, ſimply conſidered, be the firſt object of a truly virtuous benevolence, then that being who has *moſt* of being, or has the greateſt ſhare of exiſtence, other things being equal, ſo far as ſuch a being is exhibited to our faculties, or ſet in our view, will have the *greateſt* ſhare of the propenſity and benevolent affection of the heart.——I ſay, *other things being equal*, eſpecially becauſe there is a *ſecondary* object of virtuous benevolence, that I ſhall take notice of preſently, which is one thing that muſt be conſidered as the ground

ground or motive to a purely virtuous benevolence. Pure benevolence in its firſt exerciſe is nothing elſe but being's uniting conſent, or propenſity to being; appearing true and purely its extending to being in general, and inclining to the general higheſt good, and to each being, whoſe welfare is conſiſtent with the higheſt general good, in proportion to the degree of *exiſtence* *, underſtand other things being equal.

The *ſecond* object of a virtuous propenſity of heart is *benevolent* being.——A ſecondary ground of pure benevolence is virtuous benevolence itſelf in its object. When any one under the influence of general benevolence, ſees another being poſſeſſed of the like general benevolence, this attaches his heart to him, and draws forth greater love to him, than merely his having exiſtence: becauſe ſo far as the being beloved has love to being in general, ſo far his own being is, as it were, enlarged; extends to, and in ſome ſort comprehends being in general: and therefore, he that is governed by love to being in general, muſt of neceſſity have complacence in him, and the greater degree of benevolence to him, as it were out of gratitude to him for his love to general exiſtence, that his own heart is extended and united to, and ſo looks on its intereſt as its own. It is becauſe his heart is thus united to being in general, that he looks on a benevolent propenſity to being in general, wherever he ſees it, as the beauty of the being in whom it is; an excellency that renders

* I ſay,—in proportion to the degree of *exiſtence*,—becauſe one being may have more *exiſtence* than another, as he may be *greater* than another. That which is *great*, has more exiſtence, and is further from nothing, than that which is *little*. One being may have every thing poſitive belonging to it, or every thing which goes to its poſitive exiſtence (in oppoſition to defect) in an higher degree than another; or a greater capacity and power, greater underſtanding, every faculty and every poſitive quality in an higher degree. An *Arch-angel* muſt be ſuppoſed to have more exiſtence, and to be every way further removed from *non-entity*, than a *worm* or a *flea*.

renders him worthy of eſteem, complacence, and the greater good-will.

But ſeveral things may be noted more particularly concerning this ſecondary ground of a truly virtuous love.

1. That loving a being on *this ground* neceſſarily ariſes from pure benevolence to being *in general*, and comes to the ſame thing. For he that has a ſimple and pure good-will to general entity or exiſtence, muſt love that temper in others, that agrees and conſpires with itſelf. A ſpirit of conſent to being muſt agree with conſent to being. That which truly and ſincerely ſeeks the good of others, muſt approve of, and love that which joins with him in ſeeking the good of others.

2. This which has been now mentioned as a ſecondary ground of virtuous love, is the thing wherein true moral or ſpiritual *beauty* primarily conſiſts. Yea, ſpiritual beauty conſiſts wholly in this, and the various qualities and exerciſes of mind which proceed from it, and the external actions which proceed from theſe internal qualities and exerciſes. And in theſe things conſiſts all true *virtue*, *viz.* in this love of being, and the qualities and acts which ariſe from it.

3. As all ſpiritual beauty lies in theſe virtuous principles and acts, ſo it is primarily *on this account* they are beautiful, *viz.* that they imply *conſent* and *union* with being *in general*. This is the primary and moſt eſſential beauty of every thing that can juſtly be called by the name of virtue, or is any moral excellency in the eye of one that has a perfect view of things. I ſay,—the *primary* and *moſt eſſential* beauty,—becauſe there is a ſecondary and inferior ſort of beauty; which I ſhall take notice of afterwards.

4. This ſpiritual beauty, that is but a *ſecondary* ground of a virtuous benevolence, is the ground, not only of benevolence, but *complacence*, and is the *primary* ground of the latter; that is, when the complacence is truly virtuous. Love to us in particular, and

kindneſs received, may be a ſecondary ground: but this is the primary objective foundation of it.

5. It muſt be noted, that the *degree* of the *aimableneſs* or *valuableneſs* of true virtue, primarily conſiſting in conſent, and a benevolent propenſity of heart to being in general, in the eyes of one that is influenced by ſuch a ſpirit, is not in the *ſimple* proportion of the degree of benevolent affection ſeen, but in a proportion *compounded* of the greatneſs of the benevolent being, or the degree of *being* and the degree of *benevolence*. One that loves being in general, will neceſſarily value good-will to being in general, wherever he ſees it. But if he ſees the ſame benevolence in *two* beings, he will value it *more* in two, than in one only. Becauſe it is a greater thing, more favourable to being in general, to have two beings to favour it, than only one of them. For there is more being that favours being: both together having more being than one alone. So, if one being be as great as two, has as much exiſtence as both together, and has the ſame degree of general benevolence, it is more favourable to being in general, than if there were general benevolence in a being that had but half that ſhare of exiſtence. As a large quantity of gold, with the ſame degree of preciouſneſs, *i. e.* with the ſame excellent quality of matter, is more valuable than a ſmall quantity of the ſame metal.

6. It is impoſſible that any one ſhould truly *reliſh* this beauty, conſiſting in general benevolence, who has *not* that temper himſelf. I have obſerved, that if any being is poſſeſſed of ſuch a temper, he will unavoidably be pleaſed with the ſame temper in another. And it may in like manner be demonſtrated, that it is ſuch a ſpirit, and nothing elſe, which will reliſh ſuch a ſpirit. For if a being, deſtitute of benevolence, ſhould love benevolence to being in general, it would prize and ſeek that which it had no value for. Becauſe to love an inclination to the good of being in general, would imply a loving and prizing the good of being in general. For how ſhould one love and value

a *diſpoſition* to a thing, or a *tendency to promote* a thing, and for that very reaſon, becauſe it tends to promote it,——when the *thing* itſelf is what he is regardleſs of, and has no value for, nor deſires to have promoted.

## CHAPTER II.

### Shewing how that *love*, wherein true virtue conſiſts, reſpects the *divine* Being and *created* beings.

FROM what has been ſaid, it is evident, that true virtue muſt chiefly conſiſt in love to God; the Being of beings, infinitely the greateſt and beſt of beings. This appears, whether we conſider the primary or ſecondary ground of virtuous love. It was obſerved, that the *firſt* objective ground of that love, wherein true virtue conſiſts, is being ſimply conſidered: and as a neceſſary conſequence of this, that being who has the moſt of being, or the greateſt ſhare of univerſal exiſtence, has proportionably the greateſt ſhare of virtuous benevolence, ſo far as ſuch a being is exhibited to the faculties of our minds, other things being equal. But God has infinitely the greateſt ſhare of exiſtence, or is infinitely the greateſt being. So that all other being, even that of all created things whatſoever, throughout the whole univerſe, is as nothing in compariſon of the divine Being.

And if we conſider the *ſecondary* ground of love, *viz.* beauty, or moral excellency, the ſame thing will appear. For as God is infinitely the greateſt Being, ſo he is allowed to be infinitely the moſt beautiful and excellent: and all the beauty to be found throughout the whole creation, is but the reflection of the diffuſed beams of that Being who hath an infinite fulneſs of

brightneſs and glory. God's beauty is infinitely more valuable than that of all other beings upon both thoſe accounts mentioned, *viz.* the *degree* of his virtue, and the greatneſs of the being poſſeſſed of this virtue. And God has ſufficiently exhibited himſelf, in his being, his infinite greatneſs and excellency: and has given us faculties, whereby we are capable of plainly diſcovering immenſe ſuperiority to all other beings, in theſe reſpects. Therefore, he that has true virtue, conſiſting in benevolence to being in general, and in that complacence in virtue, or moral beauty, and benevolence to virtuous being, muſt neceſſarily have a ſupreme love to God, both of benevolence and complacence. And all true virtue muſt radically and eſſentially, and, as it were, ſummarily, conſiſt in this. Becauſe God is not only infinitely greater and more excellent than all other being, but he is the head of the univerſal ſyſtem of exiſtence; the foundation and fountain of all being and all beauty; from whom all is perfectly derived, and on whom all is moſt abſolutely and perfectly dependent; *of whom*, and *through whom*, and *to whom* is all being and all perfection; and whoſe being and beauty is, as it were, the ſum and comprehenſion of all exiſtence and excellence: much more than the ſun is the fountain and ſummary comprehenſion of all the light and brightneſs of the day.

If it ſhould be objected, that virtue conſiſts primarily in benevolence, but that our fellow-creatures, and not God, ſeem to be the moſt proper objects of our benevolence; inaſmuch as *our goodneſs extendeth not to God*, and *we cannot be profitable to him*.—To this I anſwer,

1. A benevolent propenſity of heart is exerciſed, not only in *ſeeking to promote* the happineſs of the being towards whom it is exerciſed, but alſo in *rejoicing in* his happineſs. Even as gratitude for benefits received will not only excite endeavours to requite the kindneſs we receive, by equally benefiting our benefactor, but alſo if he be above any need of us, or we have nothing to beſtow, and are unable to repay his kindneſs, it will diſpoſe us to rejoice in his proſperity.

2. Though

2. Though we are not able to give any thing to God, which we have of our own, independently; yet we may be the inſtruments of promoting *his glory*, in which he takes a true and proper *delight*. [As was ſhewn at large in the former treatiſe, on God's end in creating the world, Chap. I. ſect. 4. whether I muſt refer the reader for a more full anſwer to this objection.]

Whatever influence ſuch an objection may ſeem to have on the minds of ſome, yet is there any that owns the being of a God, who will deny that any love or benevolent affection is due to God, and proper to be exerciſed towards him? If no *benevolence* is to be exerciſed towards God, becauſe we cannot profit him, then, for the ſame reaſon, neither is *gratitude* to be exerciſed towards him for his benefits to us; becauſe we cannot requite him. But where is the man, who believes a God and a providence, that will ſay this?

There ſeems to be an inconſiſtence in ſome writers on morality, in this reſpect, that they do not wholly exclude a regard to the *Deity* out of their ſchemes of morality, but yet mention it ſo ſlightly, that they leave me room and reaſon to ſuſpect they eſteem it a leſs important and a ſubordinate part of true morality; and inſiſt on benevolence to the *created ſyſtem*, in ſuch a manner as would naturally lead one to ſuppoſe they look upon that as by far the moſt important and eſſential thing in their ſcheme. But why ſhould this be? If true virtue conſiſts partly in a reſpect to God, then doubtleſs it conſiſts *chiefly* in it. If true morality requires that we ſhould have ſome regard, ſome benevolent affection to our Creator, as well as to his creatures, then doubtleſs it requires the firſt regard to be paid to him; and that he be every way the ſupreme object of our benevolence. If his being above our reach, and beyond all capacity of being profited by us, does not hinder, but that nevertheleſs he is the proper object of our love, then it does not hinder that he ſhould be loved according to his *dignity*, or according to the degree in which he has thoſe things wherein

worthineſs of regard conſiſts, ſo far as we are capable of it. But this worthineſs, none will deny, conſiſts in theſe two things, *greatneſs* and moral *goodneſs*. And thoſe that own a God, do not deny that he infinitely exceeds all other beings in theſe. If the Deity is to be looked upon as within that ſyſtem of beings which properly terminates our benevolence, or belonging to that whole, certainly he is to be regarded as the *head* of the ſyſtem, and the *chief* part of it; if it be proper to call him a *part*, who is infinitely more than all the reſt, and in comparison of whom, and without whom all the reſt are nothing, either as to beauty or exiſtence. And therefore certainly, unleſs we will be Atheiſts, we muſt allow that true virtue does primarily and moſt eſſentially conſiſt in a ſupreme love to God; and that where this is wanting, there can be no true virtue.

But this being a matter of the higheſt importance, I ſhall ſay ſomething further to make it plain, that love to God is moſt eſſential to true virtue; and that no benevolence whatſoever to other beings can be of the nature of true virtue without it.

And therefore, let it be ſuppoſed, that ſome beings, by natural inſtinct, or by ſome other means, have a determination of mind to union and benevolence to a *particular perſon*, or *private ſyſtem* *, which is but a ſmall part of the univerſal ſyſtem of being: and that this diſpoſition or determination of mind is independent on, or not ſubordinate to benevolence, to *being in general*. Such a determination, diſpoſition, or affection of mind is not of the nature of true virtue.

This

* It may be here noted, that when hereafter I uſe ſuch a phraſe as *private ſyſtem* of beings, or others ſimilar, I thereby intend any ſyſtem or ſociety of beings that contains but a ſmall part of the great ſyſtem comprehending the univerſality of exiſtence. I think *that* may well be called a *private ſyſtem*, which is but an infinitely ſmall part of this great whole we ſtand related to. I therefore alſo call that affection, *private affection*, which is limited to ſo narrow a circle: and that *general* affection or benevolence, which has *being in general* for its object.

This is allowed by all with regard to *ſelf-love*; in which good-will is confined to one ſingle perſon only. And there are the ſame reaſons why any other private affection or good-will, though extending to a ſociety of perſons independent of, and unſubordinate to, benevolence to the univerſality, ſhould not be eſteemed truly virtuous. For, notwithſtanding it extends to a number of perſons, which taken together are more than a ſingle perſon, yet the whole falls infinitely ſhort of the univerſality of exiſtence; and if put in the ſcales with it, has no greater proportion to it than a ſingle perſon.

However, it may not be amiſs more particularly to conſider the reaſons why *private affections*, or good-will limited to a particular circle of beings, falling infinitely ſhort of the whole exiſtence, and not dependent upon it, nor ſubordinate to general benevolence, cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

1. Such a private affection, detached from general benevolence, and independent on it, as the caſe may be, will be *againſt* general benevolence, or of a contrary tendency; and will ſet a perſon *againſt* general exiſtence, and make him an enemy to it.——As it is with *ſelfiſhneſs*, or when a man is governed by a regard to his own private intereſt, independent of regard to the public good, ſuch a temper expoſes a man to act the part of an enemy to the public. As, in every caſe wherein his private intereſt ſeems to claſh with the public; or in all thoſe caſes wherein ſuch things are preſented to his view, that ſuit his perſonal appetites or private inclinations, but are inconſiſtent with the good of the public. On which account a ſelfiſh, contracted, narrow ſpirit is generally abhorred, and is eſteemed baſe and ſordid.——But if a man's affection takes in half a dozen more, and his regards extend ſo far beyond his own ſingle perſon as to take in his children and family; or if it reaches further ſtill to a larger circle, but falls infinitely ſhort of the univerſal ſyſtem, and is excluſive of being in general; his private affection expoſes him to the ſame thing, *viz.*

*viz.* to purſue the intereſt of its particular object in *oppoſition* to general exiſtence: which is certainly contrary to the tendency of true virtue; yea, directly contrary to the main and moſt eſſential thing in its nature, the thing on account of which chiefly its nature and tendency is good. For the chief and moſt eſſential good that is in virtue, is its favouring being in general. Now certainly, if private affection to a limited ſyſtem had in itſelf the eſſential nature of virtue, it would be impoſſible, that it ſhould in any circumſtance whatſoever have a tendency and inclination directly *contrary* to that wherein the eſſence of virtue chiefly conſiſts.

2. Private affections, if not ſubordinate to general affection, is not only liable, as the caſe *may* be, to iſſue in enmity to being in general, but has a *tendency* to it as the caſe certainly *is*, and muſt neceſſarily be. For he that is influenced by private affection, not ſubordinate to regard to being in general, ſets up its particular or limited object *above* being in general; and this moſt naturally tends to enmity againſt the latter, which is by right the great ſupreme, ruling, and abſolutely ſovereign object of our regard. Even as the ſetting up another prince as ſupreme in any kingdom, diſtinct from the lawful ſovereign, naturally tends to enmity againſt the lawful ſovereign. Wherever it is ſufficiently publiſhed, that the ſupreme, infinite, and all-comprehending Being requires a ſupreme regard to himſelf; and inſiſts upon it, that our reſpect to him ſhould univerſally rule in our hearts, and every other affection be ſubordinate to it, and this under the pain of his diſpleaſure, (as we muſt ſuppoſe it is in the world of intelligent creatures, if God maintains a moral kingdom in the world), then a conſciouſneſs of our having choſen and ſet up another prince to rule over us, and ſubjected our hearts to him, and continuing in ſuch an act, muſt unavoidably excite enmity, and fix us in a ſtated oppoſition to the ſupreme Being. This demonſtrates, that affection to a private ſociety or ſyſtem, independent on general benevolence, cannot be of the nature

nature of true virtue. For this would be abſurd, that it has the nature and eſſence of true virtue, and yet at the ſame time has a *tendency oppoſite* to true virtue.

3. Not only would affection to a private ſyſtem, unſubordinate to regard to being in general, have a tendency to oppoſition to the ſupreme object of virtuous affection, as its effect and conſequence, but would become *itſelf* an oppoſition to that object. Conſidered by itſelf in its nature, detached from its effects, it is an inſtance of great oppoſition to the rightful ſupreme object of our reſpect. For it exalts its private object above the other great and infinite object; and ſets that up as ſupreme, in oppoſition to this. It puts down being in general, which is infinitely ſuperior in itſelf, and infinitely more important in an inferior place; yea, ſubjects the ſupreme general object to this private infinitely inferior object: which is to treat it with great contempt, and truly to act in oppoſition to it, and to act in oppoſition to the true order of things, and in oppoſition to that which is infinitely the ſupreme intereſt; making this ſupreme and infinitely important intereſt, as far as in us lies, to be ſubject to, and dependent on, an intereſt infinitely inferior. This is to act againſt it, and to act the part of an enemy to it. He that takes a ſubject, and exalts him above his prince, ſets him as ſupreme inſtead of the prince, and treats his prince wholly as a ſubject, therein acts the part of an enemy to his prince.

From theſe things, I think, it is manifeſt, that no affection limited to any private ſyſtem, not dependent on, nor ſubordinate to being in general, can be of the nature of true virtue; and this, whatever the private ſyſtem be, let it be more or leſs extenſive, conſiſting of a greater or ſmaller number of individuals, ſo long as it contains an infinitely little part of univerſal exiſtence, and ſo bears no proportion to the great all-comprehending ſyſtem.——And conſequently, that no affection whatſoever to any creature, or any ſyſtem of created beings, which is not dependent on, nor ſubordinate to a propenſity or union of the heart to God,

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the ſupreme and infinite Being, can be of the nature of true virtue.

From hence alſo it is evident, that the *divine virtue*, or the virtue of the divine mind, muſt conſiſt primarily in *love to himſelf*, or in the mutual love and friendſhip which ſubſiſts eternally and neceſſarily between the ſeveral perſons in the Godhead, or that infinitely ſtrong propenſity there is in theſe divine perſons one to another. There is no need of multiplying words, to prove that it muſt be thus, on a ſuppoſition that virtue, in its moſt eſſential nature, conſiſts in benevolent affection or propenſity of heart towards being in general; and ſo flowing out to particular beings, in a greater or leſſer degree, according to the meaſure of exiſtence and beauty which they are poſſeſſed of.——It will alſo follow, from the foregoing things, that God's goodneſs and love to created beings, is derived from, and ſubordinate to his love to himſelf. (In what manner it is ſo, I have endeavoured in ſome meaſure to explain in the preceeding diſcourſe of *God's end in creating the world.*)

With reſpect to the manner in which a virtuous love in *created* beings, *one to another*, is dependent on, and derived from love to *God*, this will appear by a proper conſideration of what has been ſaid; that it is ſufficient to render love to any created being virtuous, if it ariſe from the temper of mind wherein conſiſts a diſpoſition to love God ſupremely. Becauſe it appears from what has been already obſerved, all that love to *particular beings*, which is the fruit of a benevolent propenſity of heart to *being in general*, is virtuous love. But, as has been remarked, a benevolent propenſity of heart to being in general, and a temper or diſpoſition to love God ſupremely, are in effect the ſame thing. Therefore, if love to a created being comes from that temper, or propenſity of the heart, it is virtuous.——However, every particular exerciſe of love to a creature may not *ſenſibly* ariſe from any exerciſe of love to God, or an explicit conſideration of any ſimilitude,

militude, conformity, union or relation to God, in the creature beloved.

The moſt proper *evidence* of love to a created being, its ariſing from that temper of mind wherein conſiſts a ſupreme propenſity of heart to God, ſeems to be the agreeableneſs of the kind and degree of our love to *God's end* in our creation, and in the creation of all things, and the coincidence of the exerciſes of our love, in their manner, order, and meaſure, with the *manner* in which *God* himſelf exerciſes love to the creature in the creation and government of the world; and the way in which God, as the firſt cauſe and ſupreme diſpoſer of all things, has reſpect to the creature's happineſs, in ſubordination to himſelf as his own ſupreme end. For the true virtue of created beings is doubtleſs their higheſt excellency, and their true goodneſs, and that by which they are eſpecially agreeable to the mind of their Creator.——But the true goodneſs of a thing (as was obſerved before) muſt be its agreeableneſs to its *end*, or its fitneſs to anſwer the deſign for which it was made. Or, at leaſt, this muſt be its goodneſs in the eyes of the workman.——Therefore, they are good moral agents, whoſe temper of mind, or propenſity of heart, is agreeable to the *end* for which God made moral agents. But, as has been ſhewn, the laſt end for which God has made moral agents, muſt be the laſt end for which God has made all things: it being evident, that the moral world is the end of the reſt of the world; the inanimate and unintelligent world being made for the rational and moral world, as much as a houſe is prepared for the inhabitants.

By theſe things, it appears, that a truly virtuous mind, being as it were under the ſovereign dominion of *love to God*, does above all things ſeek the *glory of God*, and makes *this* his ſupreme, governing, and ultimate end: conſiſting in the expreſſion of God's perfections in their proper effects, and in the manifeſtation of God's glory to created underſtandings, and the communications of the infinite fulneſs of God to the creature; in the creature's higheſt eſteem of God, love

to God, and joy in God, and in the proper exercises and expressions of these.——And so far as a virtuous mind exercises true virtue in benevolence to created beings, it chiefly seeks the good of the creature, consisting in its knowledge or view of God's glory and beauty, its union with God, and conformity to him, love to him, and joy in him.——And that temper or disposition of heart, that consent, union, or propensity of mind to being in general, which appears chiefly in such exercises, is virtue, truly so called; or in other words, true grace and real holiness. And no other disposition or affection but this is of the nature of true virtue.

Corollary. Hence it appears, that these *schemes* of religion or moral philosophy, which, however well in some respects they may treat of benevolence to *mankind*, and other virtues depending on it, yet have not a supreme regard to God, and love to him, laid in the *foundation*, and all other virtues handled in a *connection* with this, and in a *subordination* to this, are not true schemes of philosophy, but are fundamentally and essentially defective.—And whatever other benevolence or generosity towards mankind, and other virtues, or moral qualifications which go by that name, any are possessed of, that are not attended with a *love to God*, which is altogether above them, and to which they are subordinate, and on which they are dependent, there is nothing of the nature of true virtue or religion in them.——And it may be asserted in general, that nothing is of the nature of true virtue, in which God is not the *first* and the *last*; or which, with regard to their exercises in general, have not their first foundation and source in apprehensions of God's supreme dignity and glory, and in answerable esteem and love of him, and have not respect to God as the supreme end.

CHAP.

## CHAPTER III.

### Concerning the *ſecondary* and *inferior* kind of beauty.

THOUGH this which has been ſpoken of, alone, is juſtly eſteemed the true beauty of moral agents, or ſpiritual beings; this alone being what would appear beautiful in them upon a clear and comprehenſive view of things; and therefore alone is the moral amiableneſs of beings that have underſtanding and will, in the eyes of him that perfectly ſees all things as they are. Yet there are other qualities, other ſenſations, propenſities and affections of mind, and principles or action, that often obtain the epithet of *virtuous*, and by many are ſuppoſed to have the nature of true virtue: which are intirely of a diſtinct nature from this, and have nothing of that kind; and therefore are erroneouſly confounded with real virtue:——as may particularly and fully appear from things which will be obſerved in this and the following chapters.

That conſent, agreement, or union of being to being, which has been ſpoken of, *viz.* the union or propenſity of *minds* to mental or ſpiritual exiſtence, may be called the higheſt, and firſt, or primary beauty, that is to be found among things that exiſt: being the proper and peculiar beauty of ſpiritual and moral beings, which are the higheſt and firſt part of the univerſal ſyſtem, for whoſe ſake all the reſt has exiſtence. Yet there is another, inferior, ſecondary beauty, which is ſome image of this, and which is not peculiar to ſpiritual beings, but is found even in inanimate things; which conſiſts in a mutual conſent and agreement of different things, in form, manner,

quantity, and visible end or design; called by the various names of regularity, order, uniformity, symmetry, proportion, harmony, &c. Such is the mutual agreement of the various sides of a square, or equilateral triangle, or of a regular polygon. Such is, as it were, the mutual consent of the different parts of the periphery of a circle, or surface of a sphere, and of the corresponding parts of an ellipsis. Such is the agreement of the colours, figures, dimensions, and distances of the different spots on a chess board. Such is the beauty of the figures on a piece of chints, or brocade. Such is the beautiful proportion of the various parts of an human body, or countenance. And such is the sweet mutual consent and agreement of the various notes of a melodious tune. This is the same that Mr HUTCHISON, in his Treatise on Beauty, expresses by uniformity in the midst of variety. Which is no other than the consent or agreement of different things, in form, quantity, &c. He observes, that the greater the variety is in equal uniformity, the greater the beauty. Which is no more than to say, the more there are of different mutually agreeing things, the greater is the beauty. And the reason of that is, because it is more considerable to have many things consent one with another, than a few only.

The beauty which consists in the visible fitness of a thing to its use, and unity of design, is not a distinct sort of beauty from this. For it is to be observed, that one thing which contributes to the beauty of the agreement and proportion of various things, is their relation one to another; which connects them, and introduces them together into view and consideration, and whereby one suggests the other to the mind, and the mind is led to compare them, and so to expect and desire agreement. Thus the uniformity of two or more pillars, as they may happen to be found in different places, is not an equal degree of beauty, as that uniformity in so many pillars in the corresponding parts of the same building. So means and an intended effect are related one to another. The answerableness of a thing

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to its uſe is only the proportion, fitneſs, and agreeing of a cauſe or means to a viſibly deſigned effect, and ſo an effect ſuggeſted to the mind by the idea of the means. This kind of beauty is not entirely different from that beauty which there is in fitting a mortiſe to its tenon. Only when the beauty conſiſts in unity of deſign, or the adaptedneſs of a variety of things to promote one intended effect, in which all conſpire, as the various parts of an ingenious complicated machine, there is a double beauty, as there is a twofold agreement and conformity. Firſt, there is the agreement of the various parts to the deſigned end. Secondly, through this, *viz.* the deſigned end or effect, all the various particulars agree one with another as the general medium of their union, whereby they being united in this third, they thereby are all united one to another.

The reaſon, or at leaſt one reaſon, why God has made this kind of mutual conſent and agreement of things beautiful and grateful to thoſe intelligent beings that perceive it, probably is, that there is in it ſome image of the true ſpiritual original beauty, which has been ſpoken of: conſiſting in being's conſent to being, or the union of minds or ſpiritual beings in a mutual propenſity and affection of heart. The other is an image of this, becauſe by that uniformity diverſe things become as it were one, as it is in this cordial union. And it pleaſes God to obſerve analogy in his works, as is manifeſt in fact in innumerable inſtances; and eſpecially to eſtabliſh inferior things in an analogy to ſuperior. Thus, in how many inſtances has he formed brutes in analogy to the nature of mankind? and plants, in analogy to animals, with reſpect to the manner of their generation, nutrition, &c. And ſo he has conſtituted the external world in an analogy to things in the ſpiritual world, in numberleſs inſtances; as might be ſhewn, if it were neceſſary, and here were proper place and room for it.——Why ſuch analogy in God's works pleaſes him, it is not needful now to inquire. It is ſufficient that he makes an agreement or conſent

of different things, in their form, manner, meaſure, &c. to appear beautiful, becauſe here is ſome image of an higher kind of agreement and conſent of ſpiritual beings. It has pleaſed him to eſtabliſh a law of nature, by virtue of which the uniformity and mutual correſpondence of a beautiful plant, and the reſpect which the various parts of a regular building ſeem to have one to another, and their agreement and union, and the conſent or concord of the various notes of a melodious tune, ſhould appear beautiful; becauſe therein is ſome image of the conſent of mind, of the different members of a ſociety or ſyſtem of intelligent beings, ſweetly united in a benevolent agreement of heart. ——And here by the way, I would further obſerve, probably it is with regard to this image or reſemblance, which ſecondary beauty has of true ſpiritual beauty, that God has ſo conſtituted nature, that the preſenting of this inferior beauty, eſpecially in thoſe kinds of it which have the greateſt reſemblance of the primary beauty, as the harmony of ſounds, and the beauties of nature, have a tendency to aſſiſt thoſe whoſe hearts are under the influence of a truly virtuous temper, to diſpoſe them to the exerciſes of divine love, and enliven in them a ſenſe of ſpiritual beauty.

From what has been ſaid we may ſee, that there are two ſorts of agreement or conſent of one thing to another. (1.) There is a *cordial* agreement; that conſiſts in concord and union of mind and heart: which, if not attended (viewing things in general) with more diſcord than concord, is true virtue, and the original or primary beauty, which is the only true *moral* beauty. ——(2.) There is a *natural* union or agreement; which, though ſome image of the other, is entirely a diſtinct thing; the will, diſpoſition, or affection of the heart having no concern in it, but conſiſting only in uniformity and conſent of nature, form, quantity, &c. (as before deſcribed), wherein lies an inferior ſecondary ſort of beauty, which may, in diſtinction from the other, be called *natural* beauty.——This may be ſufficient to let the reader know how I ſhall hereafter uſe

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the phraſes of cordial and natural agreement; and moral, ſpiritual, divine, and primary original beauty, and ſecondary or natural beauty.

Concerning this latter, inferior kind of beauty, the following things may be obſerved.

1. The *cauſe* why ſecondary beauty is grateful to men, is only a *law of nature*, which God has fixed, or an *inſtinct* he has given to mankind; and not their perception of the ſame thing which *God* is pleaſed to have regard to, as the ground or rule by which he has eſtabliſhed ſuch a law of nature.——This appears in two things.

(1.) That which God has reſpect to, as the rule or ground of this law of nature he has given us, whereby things having a ſecondary beauty are made grateful to men, is their mutual agreement and proportion, in meaſure, form, &c. But in many inſtances perſons that are gratified, and have their minds affected in preſenting this beauty, do not reflect on that particular agreement and proportion, which, according to the law of nature, is the ground and rule of beauty in the caſe, yea, are ignorant of it. Thus, a man may be pleaſed with the harmony of the notes in a tune, and yet know nothing of that proportion or adjuſtment of the notes, which by the law of nature is the ground of the melody. He knows not, that the vibrations in one note regularly coincide with the vibrations in another; that the vibrations of a note coincide in time with two vibrations of its octave; and that two vibrations of a note coincide with three of its fifth, &c.—Yea, he may not know, that there are vibrations of the air in the caſe, or any correſponding motions in the organs of hearing, in the auditory nerve, or animal ſpirits.—So a man may be affected and pleaſed with a beautiful proportion of the features in a face, and yet not know what that proportion is, or what meaſures, quantities, and diſtances it conſiſts in.

In this a ſenſation of ſecondary beauty differs from a ſenſation of primary and ſpiritual beauty, conſiſting in a ſpiritual union and agreement. What makes the

latter grateful, is perceiving the union itſelf. It is the immediate view of that wherein the beauty fundamentally lies, that is pleaſing to the virtuous mind.

(2.) As was obſerved before, God, in eſtabliſhing ſuch a law, that mutual natural agreement of different things, in form, quantity, &c. ſhould appear beautiful or grateful to men, ſeems to have had regard to the image and reſemblance there is in ſuch a natural agreement, of that ſpiritual cordial agreement, wherein original beauty conſiſts, as one reaſon why he eſtabliſhed ſuch a law. But it is not any reflection upon, or perception of, ſuch a reſemblance of this to ſpiritual beauty, that is the reaſon why ſuch a form or ſtate of objects appear beautiful to men: but their ſenſation of pleaſure, on a view of this ſecondary beauty, is immediately owing to the law God has eſtabliſhed, or the inſtinct he has given.

2. Another thing obſervable concerning this kind of beauty, is, that it affects the mind more (other things being equal) when taken notice of in objects which are of conſiderable importance, than in little trivial matters. Thus, the ſymmetry of the parts of a human body, or countenance, affects the mind more than the beauty of a flower. So the beauty of the ſolar ſyſtem, more than as great and as manifold an order and uniformity in a tree. And the proportions of the parts of a church, or a palace, more than the ſame proportions in ſome little ſlight compoſitions, made to pleaſe children.

3. It may be obſerved (which was hinted before) that not only uniformity and proportion, &c. of different things is requiſite in order to this inferior beauty, but ſome relation or connection of the things thus agreeing one with another. As the uniformity or likeneſs of a number of pillars, ſcattered hither and thither, does not conſtitute beauty, or at leaſt by no means in an equal degree as uniformity in pillars connected in the ſame building, in parts that have relation one to another. So, if we ſee things unlike, and very diſproportioned, in diſtant places, which have no relation

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to each other, this excites no ſuch idea of deformity, as diſagreement and inequality or diſproportion in things related and connected: and the nearer the relation, and the ſtricter the connection, ſo much the greater and more diſguſtful is the deformity, conſiſting in their diſagreement.

4. This ſecondary kind of beauty, conſiſting in uniformity and proportion, not only takes place in material and external things, but alſo in things immaterial; and is, in very many things, plain and ſenſible in the latter, as well as the former: and when it is ſo, there is no reaſon why it ſhould not be grateful to them that behold it, in theſe as well as the other, by virtue of the ſame ſenſe, or the ſame determination of mind to be gratified with uniformity and proportion. If uniformity and proportion be the things that affect, and appear agreeable to this ſenſe of beauty, then why ſhould not uniformity and proportion affect the ſame ſenſe in immaterial things as well as material, if there be equal capacity of diſcerning it in both? and indeed *more* in ſpiritual things (*cæteris paribus*) as theſe are more important than things merely external and material?

This is not only reaſonable to be ſuppoſed, but is evident in fact, in numberleſs inſtances. There is a beauty of order in ſociety, beſides what conſiſts in benevolence, or can be referred to it, which is of the ſecondary kind. As, when the different members of ſociety have all their appointed office, place and ſtation, according to their ſeveral capacities and talents, and every one keeps his place, and continues in his proper buſineſs. In this there is a beauty, not of a different kind from the regularity of a beautiful building, or piece of ſkilful architecture, where the ſtrong pillars are ſet in their proper place, the pilaſters in a place fit for them, the ſquare pieces of marble in the pavement in a place ſuitable for them, the pannels in the walls and partitions in their proper places, the corniſhes in places proper for them, &c. As the agreement of a variety in one common deſign, of the

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parts of a building, or complicated machine, is one inſtance of that regularity which belongs to the ſecondary kind of beauty, ſo there is the ſame kind of beauty in immaterial things, in what is called *wiſdom*, conſiſting in the united tendency of thoughts, ideas, and particular volitions, to one general purpoſe: which is a diſtinct thing from the goodneſs of that general purpoſe, as being uſeful and benevolent.

So there is a beauty in the virtue called *juſtice*, which conſiſts in the agreement of different things, that have relation to one another, in nature, manner, and meaſure: and therefore is the very ſame ſort of beauty with that uniformity and proportion, which is obſervable in thoſe external and material things that are eſteemed beautiful. There is a natural agreement and adaptedneſs of things that have relation one to another, and an harmonious correſponding of one thing to another: that he which from his will *does* evil to others, ſhould *receive* evil from the will of others, or from the will of him or them whoſe buſineſs it is to take care of the injured, and to act in their behalf: and that he ſhould ſuffer evil in *proportion* to the evil of his doings. Things are in natural regularity and mutual agreement, not in a metaphorical but literal ſenſe, when he whoſe heart oppoſes the general ſyſtem ſhould have the hearts of that ſyſtem, or the heart of the head and ruler of the ſyſtem, againſt him: and that in conſequence, he ſhould receive evil, in proportion to the evil tendency of the oppoſition of his heart.——So, there is a like agreement in nature and meaſure, when he that loves has the proper returns of love: when he that from his heart promotes the good of another, has his good promoted by the other; as there is a kind of juſtice in a becoming gratitude.

Indeed moſt of the duties incumbent on us, if well conſidered, will be found to partake of the nature of juſtice. There is ſome natural agreement of one thing to another; ſome adaptedneſs of the agent to the object; ſome anſwerableneſs of the act to the occaſion; ſome equality

equality and proportion in things of a ſimilar nature, and of a direct relation one to another. So it is in relative duties; duties of children to parents, and of parents to children; duties of huſbands and wives; duties of rulers and ſubjects; duties of friendſhip and good neighbourhood: and all duties that we owe to God, our Creator, preſerver, and benefactor; and all duties whatſoever, conſidered as required by God, and as branches of our duty to him, and alſo conſidered as what are to be performed with a regard to Chriſt, as acts of obedience to his precepts, and as teſtimonies of reſpect to him, and of our regard to what he has done for us, the virtues and temper of mind he has exerciſed towards us, and the benefits we have or hope for therefrom.

It is this ſecondary kind of beauty which belongs to the virtues and duties required of us, that Mr *Wollaſton* ſeems to have had in his eye, when he reſolved all virtue into an agreement of inclinations, volitions and actions with *truth*. He evidently has reſpect to the *juſtice* there is in the virtues and duties that are proper to be in one being towards another; which conſiſts in one being's expreſſing ſuch affections and uſing ſuch a conduct towards another, as hath a natural agreement and proportion to what is in them, and what we receive from them: which is as much a natural conformity of affection and action with its ground, object and occaſion, as that which is between a true propoſition and the thing ſpoken of in it.

But there is another and higher beauty in true virtue, and in all truly virtuous diſpoſitions and exerciſes, than what conſiſts in any uniformity or ſimilarity of various things; *viz.* the *union of heart* to *being in general*, or to GOD, the being of beings, which appears in thoſe virtues; and which thoſe virtues, when true, are the various expreſſions or effects of. Benevolence to being in general, or to being ſimply conſidered, is entirely a diſtinct thing from uniformity in the midſt of variety, and is a ſuperior kind of beauty.

It is true, that benevolence to being in general, when

when a perſon hath it, will naturally incline him to juſtice, or proportion in the exerciſes of it. He that loves being, ſimply conſidered, will naturally (as was obſerved before) other things being equal, love particular beings, in a proportion compounded of the degree of being, and the degree of virtue or benevolence to being, which they have. And that is to love beings in proportion to their dignity. For the dignity of any being conſiſts in thoſe two things. Reſpect to being, in this proportion, is the firſt and moſt general kind of juſtice; which will produce all the ſubordinate kinds. So that, after benevolence to being in general exiſts, the proportion which is obſerved in objects may be the cauſe of the proportion of benevolence to thoſe objects: but no proportion is the cauſe or ground of the exiſtence of ſuch a thing as benevolence to being. The tendency of objects to excite that degree of benevolence, which is proportionable to the degree of being, &c. is the *conſequence* of the exiſtence of benevolence, and not the ground of it. Even as a tendency of bodies, one to another, by mutual attraction, in proportion to the quantity of matter, is the conſequence of the being of ſuch a thing as mutual attraction; and not attraction the effect of proportion.

By this it appears, that *juſt* affections and acts have a *beauty* in them, diſtinct from and ſuperior to the uniformity and equality there is in them: for which, he that has a truly virtuous temper, reliſhes and delights in them. And that is the expreſſion and manifeſtation there is in them of benevolence to being in general. ——And beſides this, there is the agreement of *juſtice*, to the will and command of God: and alſo ſomething in the tendency and conſequences of juſtice, that is agreeable to general benevolence, *viz.* as in many reſpects it tends to the glory of God, and the general good. Which tendency alſo makes it beautiful to a truly virtuous mind. So that the tendency of general benevolence to produce juſtice, alſo the tendency of juſtice to produce effects agreeable to general benevolence, both render juſtice pleaſing to a virtuous mind.

And

And it is on theſe accounts *chiefly*, that juſtice is grateful to a virtuous taſte, or a truly benevolent heart. But though it be true there is, that in the uniformity and proportion there is in juſtice, which is grateful to a benevolent heart, as this uniformity and proportion tends to the general good; yet that is no argument that there is no other beauty in it but its agreeing with benevolence. For ſo the external regularity and order of the natural world gratifies benevolence, as it is profitable, and tends to the general good; but that is no argument that there is no other ſort of beauty in external uniformity and proportion, but only its ſuiting benevolence, by tending to the general good.

5. From all that has been obſerved concerning this ſecondary kind of beauty, it appears that that diſpoſition, or ſenſe of the mind, which conſiſts in determination of mind to approve and be pleaſed with this beauty, conſidered ſimply and by itſelf, has nothing of the nature of true virtue, and is entirely a different thing from a truly virtuous taſte. For it has been ſhewn, that this kind of beauty is intirely diverſe from the beauty of true virtue, whether it takes place in material or immaterial things; and therefore it will follow, that a taſte of this kind of beauty is entirely a different thing from a taſte of true virtue. Who will affirm, that a diſpoſition to approve of the harmony of good muſic, or the beauty of a ſquare, or equilateral triangle, is the ſame with true holineſs, or a truly virtuous diſpoſition of mind! It is a reliſh of uniformity and proportion that determines the mind to approve theſe things. And if this be all, there is no need of any thing higher, or of any thing in any reſpect diverſe, to determine the mind to approve and be pleaſed with equal uniformity and proportion among ſpiritual things which are equally diſcerned. It is virtuous to love true virtue, as that denotes an agreement of the heart with virtue. But it argues no virtue for the heart to be pleaſed with that which is entirely diſtinct from it.

Though

Though it be true there is ſome analogy in it to ſpiritual and virtuous beauty; as much as material things can have analogy to things ſpiritual (of which they can have no more than a ſhadow), yet, as has been obſerved, men do not approve it becauſe of any ſuch analogy perceived.

And not only reaſon, but experience plainly ſhews, that mens approbation of this ſort of beauty does not ſpring from any virtuous temper, and has no connection with virtue. For otherwiſe, mens delight in the beauty of ſquares, and cubes, and regular polygons in the regularity of buildings, and the beautiful figures in a piece of embroidery, would increaſe in proportion to mens virtue; and would be raiſed to a great height in ſome eminently virtuous or holy men; but would be almoſt wholly loſt in ſome others that are very vicious and lewd. It is evident in fact, that a reliſh of theſe things does not depend on general benevolence, or any benevolence at all to any being whatſoever, any more than a man's loving the taſte of honey, or his being pleaſed with the ſmell of a roſe. A taſte of this inferior beauty in things immaterial, is one thing which has been miſtaken by ſome moraliſts, for a true virtuous principle, implanted naturally in the hearts of all mankind.

CHAP.

## CHAPTER IV.

### Of *ſelf-love*, and its various influence, to cauſe love to *others*, or the contrary.

MANY aſſert, that all love ariſes from ſelf-love. In order to determine this point, it ſhould be clearly determined what is meant by ſelf-love.

Self-love, I think, is generally defined——a man's love of his own happineſs; which is ſhort, and may be thought very plain: but indeed is an ambiguous definition, as the pronoun, *his own*, is equivocal, and liable to be taken in two very different ſenſes. For a man's *own happineſs* may either be taken univerſally, for all the happineſs or pleaſure which the mind is in any regard the ſubject of, or whatever is grateful and pleaſing to men; or it may be taken for the pleaſure a man takes in his own proper, private, and ſeparate good. And ſo *ſelf-love* may be taken two ways.

1. Self-love may be taken for the ſame as his loving whatſoever is grateful or pleaſing to him. Which comes only to this, that ſelf-love is a man's liking, and being ſuited and pleaſed in that which he likes, and which pleaſes him; or, that it is a man's loving what he loves. For whatever a man loves, that thing is grateful and pleaſing to him, whether that be his own peculiar happineſs, or the happineſs of others. And if this be all that they mean by ſelf-love, no wonder they ſuppoſe that all love may be reſolved into ſelf-love.

For it is undoubtedly true, that whatever a man loves, his love may be reſolved into his loving what he loves,——if that be proper ſpeaking——If by ſelf-love is meant nothing elſe but a man's loving what is grateful or pleaſing to him, and being averſe to what is diſagreeable, this is calling *that* ſelf-love, which is only a general capacity of loving or hating; or a capaci-

ty of being either pleaſed or diſpleaſed; which is the ſame thing as a man's having a faculty of will. For if nothing could be either pleaſing or diſpleaſing, agreeable or diſagreeable, to a man, then he could incline to nothing, and will nothing. But if he is capable of having inclination, will and choice, then what he inclines to, and chuſes, is grateful to him, whatever that be; whether it be his own private good, the good of his neighbours, or the glory of God. And ſo far as it is grateful or pleaſing to him, ſo far it is a part of his pleaſure, good, or happineſs.

But if this be what is meant by ſelf-love, there is an impropriety and abſurdity even in the putting of the queſtion, Whether all our love, or our love to each particular object of our love, does not ariſe from ſelf-love? For that would be the ſame as to enquire, Whether the reaſon why our love is fixed on ſuch and ſuch particular objects, is not, that we have a capacity of loving ſome things? This may be a general reaſon why men love or hate any thing at all; and therein differ from ſtones and trees, which love nothing, and hate nothing. But it can never be a reaſon why men's love is placed on ſuch and ſuch objects. That a man in general loves, and is pleaſed with happineſs, or (which is the ſame thing) has a capacity of enjoying happineſs, cannot be the reaſon why ſuch and ſuch things become his happineſs: as for inſtance, why the good of his neighbour, or the happineſs and glory of God, is grateful and pleaſing to him, and ſo becomes a part of his happineſs.

Or if what they mean, who ſay that all love comes from ſelf-love, be not, that our loving ſuch and ſuch particular perſons and things, ariſes from our love to happineſs in general, but from a love to love our own happineſs, which conſiſts in theſe objects; ſo, the reaſon why we love benevolence to our friends, or neighbours, is, becauſe we love our happineſs, conſiſting in their happineſs, which we take pleaſure in:—— ſtill the notion is abſurd. For here the effect is made the cauſe of that of which it is the effect: our happineſs,

neſs, conſiſting in the happineſs of the perſon beloved, is made the cauſe of our love to that perſon. Whereas the truth plainly is, that our love to the perſon is the cauſe of our delighting, or being happy in his happineſs. How comes our happineſs to conſiſt in the happineſs of ſuch as we love, but by our hearts being firſt united to them in affection, ſo that we as it were look on them as ourſelves, and ſo on their happineſs as our own?

Men who have benevolence to others have pleaſure when they ſee others happineſs, becauſe ſeeing their happineſs gratifies ſome inclination that was in their hearts before. They before inclined to their happineſs; which was by benevolence or good-will; and therefore, when they ſee their happineſs, their inclination is ſuited, and they are pleaſed. But the being of inclinations and appetites is prior to any pleaſure in gratifying theſe appetites.

2. Self-love, as the phraſe is uſed in common ſpeech, moſt commonly ſignifies a man's regard to his confined *private ſelf*, or love to himſelf with reſpect to his *private intereſt*.

By *private* intereſt I mean that which moſt immediately conſiſts in thoſe pleaſures, or pains, that are *perſonal*. For there is a comfort, and a grief, that ſome have in others pleaſures, or pains; which are in others originally, but are derived to them, or in ſome meaſure become theirs, by virtue of a benevolent union of heart with others. And there are other pleaſures and pains that are originally our own, and not what we have by ſuch a participation with others. Which conſiſt in perceptions agreeable, or contrary, to certain perſonal inclinations implanted in our nature; ſuch as the ſenſitive appetites and averſions. Such alſo is the diſpoſition or the determination of the mind to be pleaſed with external beauty, and with all inferior ſecondary beauty, conſiſting in uniformity, proportion, &c. whether in things external or internal, and to diſlike the contrary deformity. Such alſo is the natural diſpoſition in men to be pleaſed in a per-

ception of their being the objects of the honour and love of others, and displeased with others hatred and contempt. For pleasures and uneasinesses of this kind are doubtless as much owing to an immediate determination of the mind by a fixed law of our nature, as any of the pleasures or pains of external sense. And these pleasures are properly of the private and personal kind; being not by any participation of the happiness or sorrow of others, through benevolence. It is evidently mere self-love that appears in this disposition. It is easy to see, that a man's love to himself will make him love love to himself, and hate hatred to himself. And as God has constituted our nature, self-love is exercised in no one disposition more than in this. Men, probably, are capable of much more pleasure and pain through this determination of the mind, than by any other personal inclination or aversion whatsoever. Though perhaps we do not so very often see instances of extreme suffering by this means, as by some others, yet we often see evidences of mens dreading the contempt of others more than death: and by such instances may conceive something what men would suffer, if universally hated and despised; and may reasonably infer something of the greatness of the misery, that would arise under a sense of universal abhorrence, in a great view of intelligent being in general, or in a clear view of the Deity, as incomprehensibly and immensely great, so that all other beings are as nothing and vanity,——together with a sense of his immediate continual presence, and an infinite concern with him and dependence upon him,——and living constantly in the midst of most clear and strong evidences and manifestations of his hatred, and contempt, and wrath.

But to return,——These things may be sufficient to explain what I mean by private interest; in regard to which, self-love, most properly so called, is immediately exercised.

And here I would observe, that if we take self-love in this sense, so love to some others may truly be the effect of self-love; *i. e.* according to the common method

thod and order which is maintained in the laws of nature. For no created thing has power to produce an effect any otherwiſe than by virtue of the laws of nature. Thus, that a man ſhould love thoſe that are of his party, when there are different parties contending one with another; and that are warmly engaged on his ſide, and promote his intereſt,——this is the natural conſequence of a private ſelf-love. Indeed there is no metaphyſical neceſſity, in the nature of things, that becauſe a man loves himſelf, and regards his own intereſt, he therefore ſhould love thoſe that love him, and promote his intereſt; *i. e.* to ſuppoſe it to be otherwiſe implies no contradiction. It will not follow from any abſolute metaphyſical neceſſity, that becauſe bodies have ſolidity, coheſion, and gravitation towards the centre of the earth, therefore a weight ſuſpended on the beam of a balance ſhould have greater power to counterbalance a weight on the other ſide, when at a diſtance from the fulcrum, than when it is near. It implies no contradiction that it ſhould be otherwiſe: but only as it contradicts that beautiful proportion and harmony, which the Author of Nature obſerves in the laws of nature he has eſtabliſhed. Neither is there any abſolute neceſſity, the contrary implying a contradiction, that becauſe there is an internal mutual attraction of the parts of the earth, or any other ſphere, whereby the whole becomes one ſolid coherent body, therefore other bodies that are around it, ſhould alſo be attracted by it, and thoſe that are neareſt, be attracted moſt. But according to the order and proportion generally obſerved in the laws of nature, one of theſe effects is connected with the other, ſo that it is juſtly looked upon as the ſame power of attraction in the globe of the earth, which draws bodies about the earth towards its centre, with that which attracts the parts of the earth themſelves one to another; only exerted under different circumſtances. By a like order of nature, a man's love to thoſe that love him, is no more than a certain expreſſion or effect of ſelf-love. No other principle is needful in order to the effect,

if nothing intervenes to countervail the natural tendency of ſelf-love. Therefore there is no more true virtue in a man's thus loving his friends merely from ſelf-love, than there is in ſelf-love itſelf, the principle from whence it proceeds. So, a man's being diſpoſed to hate thoſe that hate him, or to reſent injuries done him, ariſes from ſelf-love, in like manner as the loving thoſe that love us, and being thankful for kindneſs ſhewn us.

But it is ſaid by ſome, that it is apparent there is ſome other principle concerned in exciting the paſſions of gratitude and anger beſides ſelf-love, *viz.* a moral ſenſe, or ſenſe of moral beauty and deformity, determining the minds of all mankind to approve of, and be pleaſed with virtue, and to diſapprove of vice, and behold it with diſplicence; and that their ſeeing or ſuppoſing this moral beauty or deformity, in the kindneſs of a benefactor, or oppoſition of an adverſary, is the occaſion of theſe affections of gratitude or anger. Otherwiſe, why are not theſe affections excited in us towards inanimate things that do us good or hurt? Why do not we experience gratitude to a garden, or fruitful field? And why are we not angry with a tempeſt, or blaſting mildew, or an overflowing ſtream? We are very differently affected towards thoſe that do us good from the virtue of generoſity, or hurt us from the vice of envy and malice, than towards things that hurt or help us, which are deſtitute of reaſon and will. ——Now concerning this, I would make ſeveral remarks.

1. Thoſe who thus argue, that gratitude and anger cannot proceed from ſelf-love, might argue in the ſame way and with equal reaſon, that neither can theſe affections ariſe from love to others: which is contrary to their own ſcheme.

They ſay, that the reaſon why we are affected with gratitude and anger towards men, rather than things without life, is moral ſenſe: which they ſay is the effect of that principle of benevolence or love to others, or love to the public, which is naturally in the hearts

hearts of all mankind.—But now I might ſay, according to their own way of arguing, gratitude and anger cannot ariſe from love to others, or love to the public, or any ſenſe of mind that is the fruit of public affection. For how differently are we affected towards thoſe that do good or hurt to the public from underſtanding and will, and from a general public ſpirit, or public motive, ——I ſay, how differently affected are we towards theſe, from what we are towards ſuch inanimate things as the ſun and the clouds, that do good to the public, by enlightening and enlivening beams and refreſhing ſhowers; or mildew, and an overflowing ſtream, that does hurt to the public, by deſtroying the fruits of the earth? Yea, if ſuch a kind of argument be good, it will prove that gratitude and anger cannot ariſe from the united influence of ſelf-love, and public love, or moral ſenſe ariſing from public affection. For, if ſo, why are we not affected towards inanimate things, that are beneficial or injurious both to us and the public, in the ſame manner as to them that are profitable or hurtful to both on choice and deſign, and from benevolence or malice?

2. On the ſuppoſition of its being indeed ſo, that men love thoſe who love them, and are angry with thoſe who hate them, from the natural influence of ſelf-love; it is not at all ſtrange that the Author of Nature, who obſerves order, uniformity, and harmony in eſtabliſhing its laws, ſhould ſo order that it ſhould be natural for ſelf-love to cauſe the mind to be affected differently towards exceedingly different objects; and that it ſhould cauſe our heart to extend itſelf in one manner towards inanimate things, which gratify ſelf-love, without ſenſe or will, and in another manner towards beings which we look upon as having underſtanding and will, like ourſelves, and exerting theſe faculties in our favour, and promoting our intereſt from love to us. No wonder, ſeeing we love ourſelves, that it ſhould be natural to us to extend ſomething of that ſame kind of love which we have for ourſelves, to them who are the ſame kind of beings

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as ourſelves, and comply with the inclinations of our ſelf-love, by expreſſing the ſame ſort of love towards us.

3. If we ſhould allow that to be univerſal, that in gratitude and anger there is the exerciſe of ſome kind of moral ſenſe (as it is granted there is ſomething that may be ſo called.) All the moral ſenſe that is eſſential to thoſe affections, is a ſenſe of DESERT; which is to be referred to that ſenſe of *juſtice*, before ſpoken of, conſiſting in an apprehenſion of that ſecondary kind of beauty that lies in uniformity and proportion: which ſolves all the difficulty in the objection. —— This, or ſome appearance of it, to a narrow private view, indeed attends all anger and gratitude. Others love and kindneſs to us, or their ill-will and injuriouſneſs, appears to us to *deſerve* our love or our reſentment. Or, in other words, it ſeems to us no other than *juſt*, that as they love us and do us good, we alſo ſhould love them and do them good. And ſo it ſeems *juſt*, that when others hearts oppoſe us, and they from their hearts do us hurt, our hearts ſhould oppoſe them, and that we ſhould deſire they themſelves may ſuffer in like manner as we have ſuffered: *i. e.* there appears to us to be a natural agreement, proportion, and adjuſtment between theſe things; which is indeed a kind of moral ſenſe, or ſenſe of a beauty in moral things. But, as was before ſhewn, it is a moral ſenſe of a *ſecondary* kind, and is entirely different from a ſenſe or reliſh of the original eſſential beauty of true virtue; and may be without any principle of true virtue in the heart. Therefore, doubtleſs, it is a great *miſtake* in any to ſuppoſe, all that moral ſenſe which appears and is exerciſed in a ſenſe of *deſert*, is the ſame thing as a love of virtue, or a diſpoſition and determination of mind to be pleaſed with true virtuous beauty, conſiſting in public benevolence. Which may be further confirmed, if it be conſidered that even with reſpect to a ſenſe of *juſtice* or *deſert*, conſiſting in uniformity [and agreement between others actions towards us, and our actions towards them, in a way

of

of well-doing, or of ill-doing] it is not abſolutely neceſſary to the being of theſe paſſions of gratitude and anger, that there ſhould be any notion of juſtice in them, in any public or general view of things;—— as will appear by what ſhall be next obſerved.

4. Thoſe authors who hold, that that moral ſenſe which is natural to all mankind, conſiſts in a natural reliſh of the beauty of virtue, and ſo ariſes from a principle of true virtue implanted by nature in the hearts of all,——they hold that true virtue conſiſts in *public benevolence*. Therefore, if the affections of gratitude and anger neceſſarily imply ſuch a moral ſenſe as they ſuppoſe, then theſe affections imply ſome delight in the public good, and an averſion of the mind to public evil. And if this were ſo, then every time any man feels anger for oppoſition he meets with, or gratitude for any favour, there muſt be at leaſt a ſuppoſition of a tendency to public injury in that oppoſition, and a tendency to public benefit in the favour that excites his gratitude. But how far is this from being true? As in ſuch inſtances as theſe, which, I preſume, none will deny to be poſſible, or unlike to any thing that ever happens among mankind. A ſhip's crew enter into a conſpiracy againſt the maſter, to murder him, and run away with the ſhip, and turn pirates: but before they bring their matters to a ripeneſs for execution, one of them repents, and opens the whole deſign; whereupon the reſt are apprehended and brought to juſtice. The crew are enraged with him that has betrayed them, and earneſtly ſeek opportunity to revenge themſelves upon him.——And for an inſtance of gratitude; A gang of robbers that have long infeſted the neighbouring country, have a particular houſe whither they reſort, and where they meet from time to time, to divide their booty or prey, and hold their conſultations for carrying on their pernicious deſigns. The magiſtrates and officers of the country, after many fruitleſs endeavours to diſcover their ſecret haunt and place of reſort, at length by ſome means are well informed where it is, and are prepared with ſufficient

ficient force to ſurpriſe them, and ſeize them all, at the place of rendezvous, at an hour appointed, when they underſtand they will all be there. A little before the arrival of the appointed hour, while the officers with their bands are approaching, ſome perſon is ſo kind to theſe robbers, as to give them notice of their danger, ſo as juſt to give them opportunity to eſcape. They are thankful to him, and give him a handful of money for his kindneſs.——Now, in ſuch inſtances, I think it is plain, that there is no ſuppoſition of a public injury in that which is the occaſion of their *anger*; yea, they know the contrary. Nor is there any ſuppoſition of public good in that which excites their *gratitude*; neither has public benevolence, or moral ſenſe, conſiſting in a determination to approve of what is for the public good, any influence at all in the affair. And though there be ſome affection, beſides a ſenſe of uniformity and proportion, that has influence in ſuch anger and gratitude, it is not public affection or benevolence, but private affection; yea, that affection which is to the higheſt degree private, conſiſting in a man's love of his own perſon.

5. The paſſion of *anger*, in particular, ſeems to have been unluckily choſen as a medium to prove a ſenſe and determination to delight in virtue, conſiſting in benevolence natural to all mankind.

For if that moral ſenſe which is exerciſed in anger, were that which aroſe from a benevolent temper of heart, being no other than a ſenſe or reliſh of the beauty of benevolence, one would think, a diſpoſition to anger ſhould increaſe, at leaſt in ſome proportion, as a man had more of a ſweet, benign, and benevolent temper: which ſeems ſomething diſagreeable to reaſon, as well as contrary to experience, which ſhews that the leſs men have of benevolence, and the more they have of a contrary temper, the more are they diſpoſed to anger and deep reſentment of injuries.

And though *gratitude* be that which many ſpeak of as a certain noble principle of virtue, which God has implanted in the hearts of all mankind; and though it be

be true there is a gratitude that is truly virtuous, and the want of gratitude, or an ungrateful temper, is truly vicious, and argues an abominable depravity of heart (as I may have particular occaſion to ſhew afterwards) yet I think, what has been obſerved, may ſerve to convince ſuch as impartially conſider it, not only that not all anger, or hating thoſe which hate us, but alſo that not all gratitude, or loving thoſe which love us, ariſes from a truly virtuous benevolence of heart.

Another ſort of affections, which may be properly refered to ſelf-love, as its ſource, and which might be expected to be the fruit of it, according to the general analogy of nature's laws, is affections to ſuch as are near to us by the ties of nature; that we look upon as thoſe whoſe beings we have been the occaſions of, and that we have a very peculiar propriety in, and whoſe circumſtances, even from the firſt beginning of their exiſtence, do many ways lead them, as it were neceſſarily, to an high eſteem of us, and to treat us with great dependence, ſubmiſſion and compliance; and whom the conſtitution of the world makes to be united in intereſt, and accordingly to act as one in innumerable affairs, with a communion in each other's affections, deſires, cares, friendſhips, enmities, and purſuits; which is the caſe of mens affection to their children.——And in like manner, ſelf-love will alſo beget in a man ſome degree of affections towards others, with whom he has connection in any degree parallel.——As to the opinion of thoſe that aſcribe the natural affection there is between parents and children to a particular *inſtinct* of nature, I ſhall take notice of it afterwards.

And as men may love perſons and things from ſelf-love, ſo may love to qualities and characters ariſe from the ſame ſource. Some repreſent as though there were need of a great degree of metaphyſical refining to make it out, that men approve of others from ſelf-love, whom they hear of at a diſtance, or read of in hiſtory, or ſee repreſented on the ſtage, from whom they expect no profit or advantage. But perhaps it is not

not conſidered, that what we approve of in the firſt place is the character; and from the character we approve the perſon. And is it a ſtrange thing, that men ſhould from ſelf-love like a temper or character, which in its nature and tendency falls in with the nature and tendency of ſelf-love; and which we know by experience and ſelf-evidence, without metaphyſical refining, in the general tends to mens pleaſure and benefit?——And on the contrary, ſhould diſlike what they ſee tends to mens pain and miſery?——Is there need of a great degree of ſubtilty and abſtraction, to make it out, that a child, which has heard and ſeen much, ſtrongly to fix an idea of the pernicious deadly nature of the rattle-ſnake, ſhould have averſion to that ſpecies or form from ſelf-love; ſo as to have a degree of this averſion and diſguſt excited by ſeeing even the picture of that animal? And that from the ſame ſelf-love it ſhould be pleaſed and entertained with a lively figure and repreſentation of ſome pleaſant fruit, which it has often taſted the ſweetneſs of? Or, with the image of ſome bird, which it has always been told is innocent, and whoſe pleaſant ſinging it has often been entertained with?——Though the child neither fears being bitten by the picture of the ſnake, nor expects to eat of the painted fruit, or to hear the figure of the bird ſing. I ſuppoſe none will think it difficult to allow, that ſuch an approbation or diſguſt of a child may be accounted for from its natural delight in the pleaſures of taſte and hearing, and its averſion to pain and death, through ſelf-love, together with the habitual connection of theſe agreeable or terrible ideas with the form and qualities of theſe objects, the ideas of which are impreſſed on the mind of the child by their images.

And where is the difficulty of allowing, that a child or man may hate the general character of a ſpiteful and malicious man, for the like reaſon as he hates the general nature of a ſerpent; knowing, from reaſon, inſtruction and experience, that malice in men is pernicious to mankind, as well as ſpite or poiſon in a ſerpent?

pent? And if a man may from ſelf-love diſapprove the vices of malice, envy, and others of that ſort, which naturally tend to the hurt of mankind, why may he not from the ſame principle approve the contrary virtues of meekneſs, peaceableneſs, benevolence, charity, generoſity, juſtice, and the ſocial virtues in general; which, he as eaſily and clearly knows, naturally tend to the good of mankind?

It is undoubtedly true, that ſome have a love to theſe virtues from a higher principle. But yet I think it as certainly true, that there is generally in mankind a ſort of approbation of them, which ariſes from ſelf-love.

Beſides what has been already ſaid, the ſame thing further appears from this; that men commonly are moſt affected towards, and do moſt highly approve, thoſe virtues which agree with their intereſt moſt, according to their various conditions in life. We ſee that perſons of low condition are eſpecially enamoured with a condeſcending, acceſſible, affable temper in the great; not only in thoſe whoſe condeſcenſion has been exerciſed towards themſelves; but they will be peculiarly taken with ſuch a character when they have accounts of it from others, or when they meet with it in hiſtory, or even in romance.——The poor will moſt highly approve and commend liberality.——The weaker ſex, who eſpecially need aſſiſtance and protection, will peculiarly eſteem and applaud fortitude and generoſity in thoſe of the other ſex they read or hear of, or have repreſented to them on a ſtage.

As I think it plain from what has been obſerved, that men may approve, and be diſpoſed to commend a benevolent temper from ſelf-love, ſo the higher the degree of benevolence is, the more may they approve of it; which will account for ſome kind of approbation, from this principle, even of love to enemies; *viz.* as a man's loving his enemies is an evidence of a high degree of benevolence of temper;——the degree of it appearing from the obſtacles it overcomes.

And it may be here obſerved, that the conſidera-

tion of the tendency and influence of ſelf-love may ſhew, how men in general may approve of *juſtice* from another ground, beſides that approbation of the ſecondary beauty there is in uniformity and proportion, which is natural to all. Men, from their infancy, ſee the neceſſity of it, not only that it is neceſſary for others, or for human ſociety; but they find the neceſſity of it for themſelves, in inſtances that continually occur: which tends to prejudice them in its favour, and to fix an habitual approbation of it from ſelf-love.

And again, that forementioned approbation of juſtice and deſert, ariſing from a ſenſe of the beauty of natural agreement and proportion, will have a kind of reflex, and indirect influence to cauſe men to approve benevolence, and diſapprove malice; as men ſee that he who hates and injures others deſerves to be hated and puniſhed, and that he who is benevolent, and loves others, and does them good, deſerves himſelf alſo to be loved and rewarded by others, as they ſee the natural congruity or agreement, and mutual adaptedneſs of theſe things. And having always ſeen this, malevolence becomes habitually connected in the mind with the idea of being hated and puniſhed, which is diſagreeable to ſelf-love; and the idea of benevolence is habitually connected and aſſociated with the idea of being loved and rewarded by others, which is grateful to ſelf-love. And by virtue of this aſſociation of ideas, benevolence itſelf becomes grateful, and the contrary diſpleaſing.

Some vices may become in a degree odious by the influence of ſelf-love, through an habitual connection of ideas of contempt with it; contempt being what ſelf-love abhors. So it may often be with drunkenneſs, gluttony, ſottiſhneſs, cowardice, ſloth, niggardlineſs.—The idea of contempt becomes aſſociated with the idea of ſuch vices, both becauſe we are uſed to obſerve that theſe things are commonly objects of contempt, and alſo find that they excite contempt in ourſelves.—Some of them appear marks of littleneſs, *i. e.* of ſmall abilities,

abilities, and weakneſs of mind, and inſufficiency for any conſiderable effects among mankind.—By others, mens influence is contracted into a narrow ſphere, and by ſuch means perſons become of leſs importance, and more inſignificant among mankind. And things of little importance are naturally little accounted of.—— And ſome of theſe ill qualities are ſuch as mankind find it their intereſt to treat with contempt, as they are very hurtful to human ſociety.

There are no particular moral virtues whatſoever, but what in ſome or other of theſe ways, and moſt of them in ſeveral of theſe ways, come to have ſome kind of approbation from ſelf-love, without the influence of a truly virtuous principle; nor any particular vices, but what by the ſame means meet with ſome diſapprobation.

This kind of approbation and diſlike, through the joint-influence of ſelf-love and aſſociation of ideas, is in very many vaſtly heightened by education; as this is the means of a ſtrong, cloſe, and almoſt irrefragable aſſociation, in innumerable inſtances of ideas, which have no connection any other way than by education; and of greatly ſtrengthening that aſſociation, or connection, which perſons are led into by other means: as any one would be convinced, perhaps more effectually than in moſt other ways, if they had opportunity of any conſiderable acquaintance with *American* ſavages and their children.

## CHAPTER V.

### Of *natural conſcience*, and the *moral ſenſe*.

THERE is yet another diſpoſition or principle, of great importance, natural to mankind; which, if we conſider the conſiſtence and harmony of nature's laws, may alſo be looked upon as in ſome ſort ariſing from ſelf-love, or ſelf-union; and that is a diſpoſition in man to be uneaſy in a conſciouſneſs of being inconſiſtent with himſelf, and as it were againſt himſelf, in his own actions. This appears particularly in the inclination of the mind to be uneaſy in the conſciouſneſs of doing that to others, which he ſhould be angry with them for doing to him, if they were in his caſe, and he in theirs; or of forbearing to do that to them, which he would be diſpleaſed with them for neglecting to do to him.

I have obſerved, from time to time, that in pure love to others (*i. e.* love not ariſing from ſelf-love), there is an union of the heart with others; a kind of enlargement of the mind, whereby it ſo extends itſelf as to take others into a man's ſelf: and therefore it implies a diſpoſition to feel, to deſire, and to act as tho' others were one with ourſelves. So ſelf-love implies an inclination to feel and act as one with ourſelves; which naturally renders a ſenſible inconſiſtence with ourſelves, and ſelf-oppoſition in what we ourſelves chuſe and do, to be uneaſy to the mind: which will cauſe uneaſineſs of mind to be the conſequence of a malevolent and unjuſt behaviour towards others, and a kind of diſapprobation of acts of this nature, and an approbation of the contrary. To do that to another, which we ſhould be angry with him for doing to us, and to hate a perſon for doing that to us, which we ſhould incline to and inſiſt on doing to him, if we were exactly in the ſame caſe, is to diſagree with ourſelves, and contradict ourſelves.

It

It would be for ourſelves both to chuſe and adhere to, and yet to refuſe and utterly reject as it were the very ſame thing. No wonder, this is contrary to nature. No wonder, that ſuch a ſelf-oppoſition, and inward war with a man's ſelf, naturally begets unquietneſs, and raiſes diſturbance in his mind.

A thus approving of actions, becauſe we therein act as in agreement with ourſelves, or as one with ourſelves,—and a thus diſapproving and being uneaſy in the conſciouſneſs of diſagreeing and being inconſiſtent with ourſelves in what we do,——is quite a different thing from approving or diſapproving actions becauſe in them we agree and are united with being in general: which is loving or hating actions from a ſenſe of the primary beauty of true virtue, and odiouſneſs of ſin.——The former of theſe principles is private: the latter is public, and truly benevolent in the higheſt ſenſe. The former (*i. e.* an inclination to agree with ourſelves) is a natural principle: but the latter (*i. e.* an agreement or union of heart to the great ſyſtem, and to God the head of it, who is all and all in it) is a divine principle.

In that uneaſineſs now mentioned, conſiſts very much of that inward trouble men have from reflections of conſcience: and when they are free from this uneaſineſs, and are conſcious to themſelves, that in what they have acted towards others, they have done the ſame which they ſhould have expected from them in the ſame caſe, then they have what is called peace of conſcience, with reſpect to theſe actions. And there is alſo an approbation of conſcience, of the conduct of others towards ourſelves. As when we are blamed, condemned, or puniſhed by them, and are conſcious to ourſelves that if we were in their caſe, and they in ours, we ſhould in like manner, blame, condemn, and puniſh them. And thus men's conſciences may juſtify God's anger and condemnation. When they have the ideas of God's greatneſs, their relation to him, the benefits they have received from him, the manifeſtations he has made of his will to them, &c. ſtrongly impreſſed

on their minds, a conſciouſneſs is excited within them of thoſe reſentments, which would be occaſioned in themſelves by an injurious treatment in any wiſe parallel.

There is ſuch a conſciouſneſs as this oftentimes within men, implied in the thoughts and views of the mind, which, perhaps on reflection, they could hardly give an account of. Unleſs mens conſciences are greatly ſtupified, it is naturally and neceſſarily ſuggeſted; and does habitually, ſpontaneouſly, inſtantaneouſly, and, as it were, inſenſibly ariſe in the mind. And the more ſo for this reaſon, *viz.* that we have not, nor ever had from our infancy, any other way to conceive of any thing which other perſons act or ſuffer, or of any thing about intelligent, moral agents, but by recalling and exciting the ideas of what we ourſelves are conſcious of in the acts, paſſions, ſenſations, volitions, &c. which we have found in our own minds; and by putting the ideas which we obtain by this means in the place of another; or, as it were, ſubſtituting ourſelves in their place. Thus we have no conception, in any degree, what underſtanding, perception, love, pleaſure, pain, or deſire are in others; but by putting ourſelves as it were in their ſtead, or tranſferring the ideas we obtain of ſuch things in our own minds by conſciouſneſs into their place; making ſuch an alteration, as to degree and circumſtances, as what we obſerve of them requires. It is thus in all moral things that we conceive of in others, which are all mental, and not corporeal things; and every thing that we conceive of, belonging to others, more than ſhape, ſize, complexion, ſituation, and motion of their bodies. And this is the only way that we come to be capable of having ideas of any perception or act even of the Godhead. We never could have any notion what underſtanding or volition, love or hatred are, either in created ſpirits or in God, if we had never experienced what underſtanding and volition, love and hatred are in our own minds. Knowing what they are by conſciouſneſs, we can add degrees, and deny limits,

limits, and remove changeableneſs and other imperfections, and aſcribe them to God; which is the only way we come to be capable of conceiving of any thing in the Deity.

But though it be ſo, that men in thinking of others do as it were put themſelves in their place, they do it ſo naturally, or rather habitually, inſtantaneouſly, and without ſet purpoſe, that they do it inſenſibly, and can ſcarce give any account of it, and many would think ſtrange if they were told of it. So it may be in mens ſubſtituting themſelves in others place in ſuch exerciſes of conſcience as have been ſpoken of: and the former ſubſtitution leads to the latter, in one whoſe conſcience is not greatly ſtupified. For in all his thoughts of the other perſon, in whatever he apprehends or conceives of his moral conduct to others or to himſelf, if it be in loving or hating him, approving or condemning him, rewarding or puniſhing him, he neceſſarily as it were puts himſelf in his ſtead, for the forementioned reaſon; and therefore the more naturally, eaſily, and quietly, ſees whether he, being in his place, ſhould approve or condemn, be angry or pleaſed as he is.

Natural conſcience conſiſts in theſe two things.

1. In that which has now been ſpoken of: that diſpoſition to approve or diſapprove the moral treatment which paſſes between us and others, from a determination of the mind to be eaſy or uneaſy, in a conſciouſneſs of our being conſiſtent or inconſiſtent with ourſelves. Hereby we have a diſpoſition to approve our own treatment of another, when we are conſcious to ourſelves that we treat him ſo as we ſhould expect to be treated by him, were he in our caſe and we in his; and to diſapprove of our own treatment of another, when we are conſcious that we ſhould be diſpleaſed with the like treatment from him, if we were in his caſe. So we in our conſciences approve of another's treatment of us, if we are conſcious to ourſelves, that if we were in his caſe, and he in ours, we ſhould think it juſt to treat him as he treats us; and diſapprove his treatment

treatment of us, when we are conſcious that we ſhould think it unjuſt, if we were in his caſe. Thus mens conſciences approve or diſapprove the ſentence of their judge, by which they are acquitted or condemned. ——But this is not all that is in natural conſcience. Beſides this approving or diſapproving from uneaſineſs as being inconſiſtent with ourſelves, there is another thing that muſt precede it, and be the foundation of it. As for inſtance, when my conſcience diſapproves my own treatment of another, being conſcious to myſelf, that were I in his caſe, I ſhould be diſpleaſed and angry with him for ſo treating me; the queſtion might be aſked, but what would be the ground of that ſuppoſed diſapprobation, diſpleaſure, and anger, which I am conſcious would be in me in that caſe?——That diſapprobation muſt be on ſome other grounds.—— Therefore,

2. The other thing which belongs to the approbation or diſapprobation of natural conſcience, is the ſenſe of deſert which was ſpoken of before; conſiſting, as was obſerved, in a natural agreement, proportion and harmony, between malevolence or injury, and reſentment and puniſhment; or between loving and being loved, between ſhewing kindneſs and being rewarded, &c. Both theſe kinds of approving or diſapproving, concur in the approbation or diſapprobation of conſcience: the one founded on the other. Thus, when a man's conſcience diſapproves of his treatment of his neighbour, in the firſt place, he is conſcious, that if he were in his neighbour's ſtead, he ſhould reſent ſuch treatment from a ſenſe of juſtice, or from a ſenſe of uniformity and equality between ſuch treatment, and reſentment, and puniſhment; as before explained. And then, in the next place, he perceives, that therefore he is not conſiſtent with himſelf, in doing what he himſelf ſhould reſent in that caſe; and hence diſapproves it, as being naturally averſe to oppoſition to himſelf.

Approbation and diſapprobation of conſcience, in the ſenſe now explained, will extend to all virtue and vice;

vice; to every thing whatſoever that is morally good or evil, in a mind which does not confine its view to a private ſphere, but will take things in general into its conſideration, and is free from ſpeculative error. For, as all virtue or moral good may be reſolved into love to others, either God or creatures, ſo men eaſily ſee the uniformity and natural agreement there is between loving others, and being accepted and favoured by others. And all vice, ſin, or moral evil ſummarily conſiſting in the want of this love to others, or in the contrary, *viz.* hatred or malevolence, ſo men eaſily ſee the natural agreement there is between hating and doing ill to others, and being hated by them, and ſuffering ill from them, or from him that acts for all and has the care of the whole ſyſtem. And as this ſenſe of equality and natural agreement extends to all moral good and evil, ſo this lays a foundation of an equal extent with the other kind of approbation and diſapprobation, which is grounded upon it, ariſing from an averſion to ſelf-inconſiſtence and oppoſition. For in all caſes of benevolence, or the contrary towards others, we are capable of putting ourſelves in the place of others, and are naturally led to do it; and ſo of reflecting or being conſcious to ourſelves, how we ſhould like or diſlike ſuch treatment from others. Thus natural conſcience, if the underſtanding be properly enlightened, and errors and blinding ſtupifying prejudices are removed, concurs with the law of God, and is of equal extent with it, and joins its voice with it in every article.

And thus in particular, we may ſee in what reſpect this natural conſcience that has been deſcribed extends to true virtue, conſiſting in union of heart to being in general, and ſupreme love to God. For, although it ſees not, or rather does not taſte its primary and eſſential beauty, *i. e.* it taſtes no ſweetneſs in benevolence to being in general, ſimply conſidered, or loves it not for being in general's ſake (for nothing but general benevolence itſelf can do that), yet this natural conſcience, common to mankind, may approve of it from that

that uniformity, equality and juſtice, which there is in it, and the demerit which is ſeen in the contrary, conſiſting in the natural agreement between the contrary, and being hated of being in general. Men, by natural conſcience, may ſee the juſtice (or natural agreement) there is in yielding all to God, as we receive all from God; and the juſtice there is in being his that has made us, and being willingly ſo, which is the ſame as being dependent on his will, and conformed to his will in the manner of our being; as we are for our being itſelf, and in the conformity of our will to his will, on whoſe will we are univerſally and moſt perfectly dependent; and alſo the juſtice there is in our ſupreme love to God from his goodneſs,——the natural agreement there is between our having ſupreme reſpect to him who exerciſes infinite goodneſs to us, and from whom we receive all well-being.——Beſides that diſagreement and diſcord appears worſe to natural ſenſe (as was obſerved before) in things nearly related, and of great importance: and therefore it muſt appear very ill, as it reſpects the infinite Being, and in that infinitely great relation which there is between the Creator and his creatures. And it is eaſy to conceive how that ſenſe which is in natural conſcience, ſhould ſee the deſert of puniſhment, which there is in the contrary of true virtue, *viz.* oppoſition and enmity to being in general. For, this is only to ſee the natural agreement there is between oppoſing being in general, and being oppoſed by being in general; with a conſciouſneſs how, that if we were infinitely great, we ſhould expect to be regarded according to our greatneſs, and ſhould proportionably reſent contempt. This natural conſcience, if well informed, will approve of true virtue, and will diſapprove and condemn the want of it, and oppoſition to it; and yet without ſeeing the true beauty of it. Yea, if mens conſciences were fully enlightened, if they were delivered from being confined to a private ſphere, and brought to view, and conſider things in general, and delivered from being ſtupified by ſenſual objects and appetites, as they will

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be at the day of judgment, they would approve nothing but true virtue, nothing but general benevolence, and those affections and actions that are consistent with it, and subordinate to it. For they must see, that consent to being in general, and supreme respect to the Being of beings, is most just; and that every thing which is inconsistent with it, and interferes with it, or flows from the want of it, is unjust, and deserves the opposition of universal existence.

Thus has God established and ordered that this principle of natural conscience, which, though it implies no such thing as actual benevolence to being in general, nor any delight in such a principle, simply considered, and so implies no truly spiritual sense or virtuous taste, yet should approve and condemn the same things that are approved and condemned by a spiritual sense or virtuous taste.

That moral sense which is natural to mankind, so far as it is disinterested, and not founded in association of ideas, is the same with this natural conscience that has been described. The sense of moral good and evil, and that disposition to approve virtue, and disapprove vice, which men have by natural conscience, is that moral sense so much insisted on in the writings of many of late: a misunderstanding of which seems to have been the thing that has misled those moralists who have insisted on a disinterested moral sense, universal in the world of mankind, as an evidence of a disposition to true virtue, consisting in a benevolent temper, naturally implanted in the minds of all men. Some of the arguments made use of by these writers, do indeed prove that there is a moral sense or taste, universal among men, distinct from what arises from self-love. Though I humbly conceive, there is some confusion in their discourses on the subject, and not a proper distinction observed in the instances of mens approbation of virtue, which they produce. Some of which are not to their purpose, being instances of that approbation of virtue that was described, which arises from self-love. But other instances prove, that there is a moral

moral taſte, or ſenſe of moral good and evil, natural to all, which do not properly ariſe from ſelf-love. Yet I conceive there are no inſtances of this kind which may not be referred to natural conſcience, and particularly to that which I have obſerved to be primary in the approbation of natural conſcience, *viz.* a ſenſe of deſert and approbation of that natural agreement there is, in manner and meaſure, in juſtice. But I think it is plain from what has been ſaid, that neither this, nor any thing elſe wherein conſiſts the ſenſe of moral good and evil, which there is in natural conſcience, is of the nature of a truly virtuous taſte, or determination of mind to reliſh and delight in the eſſential beauty of true virtue, ariſing from a virtuous benevolence of heart.

But it further appears from this——If the approbation of conſcience were the ſame with the approbation of the inclination of the heart, or the natural diſpoſition and determination of the mind, to love and be pleaſed with virtue, then approbation and condemnation of conſcience would always be in proportion to the virtuous temper of the mind; or rather, the degree would be juſt the ſame. In that perſon who had a high degree of a virtuous temper, therefore, the teſtimony of conſcience in favour of virtue would be equally full: But he that had but little, would have as little a degree of the teſtimony of conſcience for virtue, and againſt vice. But, I think, the caſe is evidently otherwiſe. Some men, through the ſtrength of vice in their hearts, will go on in ſin againſt clearer light and ſtronger convictions of conſcience than others. If conſcience, its approving duty and diſapproving ſin, were the ſame thing as the exerciſe of a virtuous principle of the heart, in loving duty and hating ſin, then remorſe of conſcience will be the ſame thing as repentance: and juſt in the ſame degree as the ſinner feels remorſe of conſcience for ſin, in the ſame degree is his heart turned from the love of ſin to the hatred of it, inaſmuch as they are the very ſame thing.

Chriſtians have the greateſt reaſon to believe, from the

the ſcriptures, that in the future day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God, when ſinners ſhall be called to anſwer before their judge, and all their wickedneſs, in all its aggravations, brought forth, and clearly manifeſted in the perfect light of that day; and God will reprove them, and ſet their ſins in order before them, their conſciences will be greatly awakened and convinced, their mouths will be ſtopped, all ſtupidity of conſcience will be at an end, and conſcience will have its full exerciſe; and therefore their conſciences will approve the dreadful ſentence of the judge againſt them; and ſeeing that they have deſerved ſo great a puniſhment, will join with the judge in condemning them. And this, according to the notion I am oppoſing, would be the ſame thing as their being brought to the fulleſt repentance; their hearts being perfectly changed to hate ſin and love holineſs; and virtue or holineſs of heart in them will be brought to the moſt full and perfect exerciſe. But how much otherwiſe, have we reaſon to ſuppoſe it will then be? *viz.* that the ſin and wickedneſs of their heart will come to its higheſt dominion and completeſt exerciſe; that they ſhall be wholly left of God, and given up to their wickedneſs, even as the devils are! When God has done waiting on ſinners, and his Spirit done ſtriving with them, he will not reſtrain their wickedneſs, as he does now. But ſin ſhall then rage in their hearts, as a fire no longer reſtrained or kept under. It is proper for a judge when he condemns a criminal, to endeavour ſo to ſet his guilt before him as to convince his conſcience of the juſtice of the ſentence. This the Almighty will do effectually, and do to perfection, ſo as moſt thoroughly to awaken and convince the conſcience. But if natural conſcience, and the diſpoſition of the heart to be pleaſed with virtue, were the ſame, then at the ſame time that the conſcience was brought to its perfect exerciſe, the heart would be made perfectly holy; or, would have the exerciſe of true virtue and holineſs in perfect benevolence of temper. But inſtead of this, their wickedneſs will then be

brought to perfection, and wicked men will become very devils, and accordingly will be ſent away as curſed into everlaſting fire prepared for the devil and his angels.

But ſuppoſing natural conſcience to be what has been deſcribed, all theſe difficulties and abſurdities are wholly avoided. Sinners, when they ſee the greatneſs of the being whom they have lived in contempt of, and in rebellion and oppoſition to, and have clearly ſet before them their obligations to him, as their Creator, preſerver, benefactor, &c.; together with the degree in which they have acted as enemies to him, may have a clear ſenſe of the *deſert* of their ſin, conſiſting in the natural agreement there is between ſuch contempt and oppoſition of ſuch a being, and his deſpiſing and oppoſing them; between their being and acting as ſo great enemies to ſuch a God, and their ſuffering the dreadful conſequences of his being and acting as their great enemy: and their being conſcious within themſelves of the degree of anger, which would naturally ariſe in their own hearts in ſuch a caſe, if they were in the place and ſtate of their judge. In order to theſe things, there is no need of a virtuous benevolent temper, reliſhing and delighting in benevolence, and loathing the contrary. The conſcience may ſee the natural agreement between oppoſing and being oppoſed, between hating and being hated, without abhorring malevolence from a benevolent temper of mind, or without loving God from a view of the beauty of his holineſs. Theſe things have no neceſſary dependence one on the other.

## CHAPTER VI.

### *Of particular* inſtincts *of nature, which in ſome reſpects* reſemble *virtue.*

THERE are various diſpoſitions and inclinations natural to men, which depend on particular laws of nature, determining their minds to certain affections and actions towards particular objects; which laws ſeem to be eſtabliſhed chiefly for the preſervation of mankind, though not only for this, but alſo for their comfortably ſubſiſting in the world. Which diſpoſitions may be called *inſtincts*.

Some of theſe inſtincts reſpect only ourſelves perſonally: ſuch are many of our natural appetites and averſions. Some of them are not wholly perſonal, but more ſocial, and extend to others: ſuch are the mutual inclinations between the ſexes, &c.——Some of theſe diſpoſitions are more external and ſenſitive: ſuch are ſome of our natural inclinations that are perſonal; as thoſe that relate to meat and drink. And of this ſort alſo are ſome diſpoſitions that are more ſocial, and in ſome reſpects extend to others: as, the more ſenſitive inclinations of the ſexes towards each other. Beſides theſe inſtincts of the ſenſitive kind, there are others that are more internal and mental: conſiſting in affections of the mind, which mankind naturally exerciſe towards ſome of their fellow-creatures, or in ſome caſes towards men in general. Some of theſe inſtincts that are mental and ſocial, are what may be called kind affections; as having ſomething in them of benevolence, or a reſemblance of it. And others are of a different ſort, having ſomething in them that carries an angry appearance; ſuch as the paſſion of jealouſy between the ſexes, eſpecially in the male towards the female.

It is only the former of theſe two laſt mentioned

ſorts that it is to my purpoſe to conſider in this place, *viz.* thoſe natural inſtincts which appear in benevolent affections, or which have the appearance of benevolence, and ſo in ſome reſpects reſemble virtue. Theſe I ſhall therefore conſider; and ſhall endeavour to ſhew that none of them can be of the nature of true virtue.

That kind affection which is exerciſed towards thoſe who are near one to another in natural relation, particularly the love of parents to their children, called natural affection, is by many referred to inſtinct. I have already conſidered this ſort of love as an affection that ariſes from ſelf-love; and in that view, and in that ſuppoſition, have ſhewn it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. But if any think, that natural affection is more properly to be referred to a particular inſtinct of nature than to ſelf-love, as its cauſe, I ſhall not think it a point worthy of any controverſy or diſpute. In my opinion both are true; *viz.* that natural affection is owing to natural inſtinct, and alſo that it ariſes from ſelf-love. It may be ſaid to ariſe from inſtinct, as it depends on a law of nature. But yet it may be truly reckoned as an affection ariſing from ſelf-love; becauſe, though it ariſes from a law of nature, yet that is ſuch a law as according to the order and harmony every where obſerved among the laws of nature, is connected with, and follows from ſelf-love; as was ſhewn before. However, it is not neceſſary to my preſent purpoſe to inſiſt on this. For if it be ſo, that natural affection to a man's children or family, or near relations, is not properly to be aſcribed to ſelf-love, as its cauſe in any reſpect, but is to be eſteemed an affection ariſing from a particular independent inſtinct of nature, which the Creator in his wiſdom has implanted in men for the preſervation and well-being of the world of mankind, yet it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For it has been obſerved, and I humbly conceive, proved before (Chap. II.) that if any being or beings have by natural inſtinct, or any other means, a determination of mind to benevolence, extending only to ſome particular perſons or private ſyſtem,

ſtem, however large that ſyſtem may be, or however great a number of individuals it may contain, ſo long as it contains but an infinitely ſmall part of univerſal exiſtence, and ſo bears no proportion to this great and univerſal ſyſtem,——ſuch limited private benevolence, not ariſing from, nor being ſubordinate to benevolence to being in general, cannot have the nature of true virtue.

However, it may not be amiſs briefly to obſerve now, that it is evident to a demonſtration, thoſe affections cannot be of the nature of true virtue, from theſe two things.

*Firſt*, That they do not ariſe from a principle of virtue.——A principle of virtue, I think, is owned by the moſt conſiderable of late writers on morality to be general benevolence or public affection: and I think it has been proved to be union of heart to being ſimply conſidered: which implies a diſpoſition to benevolence to being in general. Now, by the ſuppoſition, the affections we are ſpeaking of do not ariſe from this principle; and that, whether we ſuppoſe they ariſe from ſelf-love, or from particular inſtincts: becauſe either of thoſe ſources is diverſe from a principle of general benevolence. And,

*Secondly*, Theſe private affections, if they do not ariſe from general benevolence, and they are not connected with it in their firſt exiſtence, have no tendency to produce it. This appears from what has been obſerved: for being not dependent on it, their detached and unſubordinate operation rather tends to, and implies oppoſition to being in general, than general benevolence; as every one ſees and owns with reſpect to ſelf-love. And there are the very ſame reaſons why any other private affection, confined to limits infinitely ſhort of univerſal exiſtence, ſhould have that influence, as well as love that is confined to a ſingle perſon.——Now upon the whole, nothing can be plainer than that affections which do not ariſe from a virtuous principle, and have no tendency to true vir-

tue, as their effect cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

For the reaſons which have been given, it is undeniably true, that if perſons by any means come to have a benevolent affection limited to a party that is very large, or to the country or nation in general, of which they are a part, or the public community they belong to, though it be as large as the Roman empire was of old, yea, if there could be an inſtinct or other cauſe determining a perſon to benevolence towards the whole world of mankind, or even all created ſenſible natures throughout the univerſe, excluſive of union of heart to general exiſtence and of love to God, nor derived from that temper of mind which diſpoſes to a ſupreme regard to him, nor ſubordinate to ſuch divine love, it cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

If what is called natural affection, ariſes from a particular natural inſtinct, ſo much more indiſputably does that mutual affection which naturally ariſes between the ſexes. I agree with *Hutchiſon* and *Hume* in this, that there is a foundation laid in nature for kind affections between the ſexes, that are truly diverſe from all inclinations to ſenſitive pleaſure, and do not properly ariſe from any ſuch inclination. There is doubtleſs a diſpoſition both to a mutual benevolence and mutual complacence, that are not naturally and neceſſarily connected with any ſenſitive deſires. But yet it is manifeſt ſuch affections as are limited to oppoſite ſexes, are from a particular inſtinct thus directing and limiting them; and not ariſing from a principle of general benevolence; for this has no tendency to any ſuch limitation. And though theſe affections do not properly ariſe from the ſenſitive deſires which are between the ſexes, yet they are implanted by the Author of Nature chiefly for the ſame purpoſe, *viz.* the preſervation or continuation of the world of mankind, to make perſons willing to forſake father and mother, and all their natural relations in the families where they were born and brought up, for the ſake of a ſtated union with a companion of the other ſex, and

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to diſpoſe to that union in bearing and going through with that ſeries of labours, anxieties, and pains, requiſite to the being, ſupport, and education of a family of children. Though not only for theſe ends, but partly alſo for the comfort of mankind as united in a marriage-relation.——But I ſuppoſe few, (if any) will deny, that the peculiar natural diſpoſitions there are to mutual affection between the ſexes, ariſe from an inſtinct or particular law of nature. And therefore it is manifeſt, from what has been ſaid already, that thoſe natural diſpoſitions cannot be of the nature of true virtue.

Another affection which is owing to a particular inſtinct, implanted in men for like purpoſes with other inſtincts, is that pity which is natural to mankind when they ſee others in great diſtreſs.—It is acknowledged, that ſuch an affection is natural to mankind. But I think it evident, that the pity which is general and natural, is owing to a particular inſtinct, and is not of the nature of true virtue. I am far from ſaying, that there is no ſuch thing as a truly virtuous pity among mankind. For I am far from thinking, that all the pity or mercy which is any where to be found among them, ariſes merely from natural inſtinct, or, that none is to be found, which ariſes from that truly virtuous divine principle of general benevolence to ſenſitive beings. Yet at the ſame time I think, this is not the caſe with all pity, or with that diſpoſition to pity which is natural to mankind in common. I think I may be bold to ſay, this does not ariſe from general benevolence, nor is truly of the nature of benevolence, or properly called by that name.

If all that uneaſineſs on the ſight of others extreme diſtreſs, which we call pity, were properly of the nature of benevolence, then they who are the ſubjects of this paſſion, muſt needs be in a degree of uneaſineſs in being ſenſible of the total want of happineſs, of all ſuch as they would be diſpoſed to pity in extreme diſtreſs. For that certainly is the moſt direct tendency and operation of benevolence or good will, to deſire the happineſs of its object. But now this is not the caſe

caſe univerſally, where men are diſpoſed to exerciſe pity. There are many men, with whom that is the caſe in reſpect to ſome others in the world, that it would not be the occaſion of their being ſenſibly affected with any uneaſineſs to know they were dead, (yea men, who are not influenced by the conſideration of a future ſtate, but view death as only a ceſſation of all ſenſibility, and conſequently an end of all happineſs) who yet would have been moved with pity towards the ſame perſons, if they had ſeen them under ſome very extreme anguiſh.——Some men would be moved with pity by ſeeing a brute-creature under extreme and long torments, who yet ſuffer no uneaſineſs in knowing that many thouſands of them every day ceaſe to live, and ſo have an end put to all their pleaſure, at butchers ſhambles in great cities.——It is the nature of true benevolence to deſire and rejoice in the proſperity and pleaſure of the object of it; and that, in ſome proportion to its degree of prevalence. But perſons may greatly pity thoſe that are in extreme pain, whoſe poſitive pleaſure they may ſtill be very indifferent about. In this caſe, a man may be much moved and affected with uneaſineſs, who yet would be affected with no ſenſible joy in ſeeing ſigns of the ſame perſon's or being's enjoyment of very high degrees of pleaſure.

Yea, pity may not only be without benevolence, but may conſiſt with true malevolence, or with ſuch ill-will as ſhall cauſe men not only not to deſire the poſitive happineſs of another, but even to deſire his calamity. They may pity ſuch an one when his calamity goes beyond their hatred. A man may have true malevolence towards another, deſiring no poſitive good for him, but evil: and yet his hatred not be infinite, but only to a certain degree. And when he ſees the perſon whom he thus hates in miſery far beyond his ill-will, he may then pity him: becauſe then the natural inſtinct begins to operate. For malevolence will not overcome the natural inſtinct, inclining to pity others in extreme calamity, any further than it goes, or

to the limits of the degree of misery it wishes to its object. Men may pity others under exquisite torment, when yet they would have been grieved if they had seen their prosperity. And some men have such a grudge against one or another, that they would be far from being uneasy at their very death, nay, would even be glad of it. And when this is the case with them, it is manifest that their heart is void of benevolence towards such persons, and under the power of malevolence. Yet at the same time they are capable of pitying even these very persons, if they should see them under a degree of misery very much disproportioned to their ill-will.

These things may convince us, that natural pity is of a nature very different from true virtue, and not arising from a disposition of heart to general benevolence: but is owing to a particular instinct, which the Creator has implanted in mankind, for the same purposes as most other instincts, *viz.* chiefly for the preservation of mankind, though not exclusive of their well-being. The giving of this instinct is the fruit of God's mercy, and an instance of his love of the world of mankind, and an evidence, that though the world be so sinful, it is not God's design to make it a world of punishment: and therefore has many ways made a merciful provision for mens relief in extreme calamities: and among others has given mankind in general a disposition to pity; the natural exercises whereof extend beyond those whom we are in a near connection with, especially in case of great calamity; because commonly in such cases men stand in need of the help of others beside their near friends, and because commonly those calamities which are extreme, without relief, tend to mens destruction. This may be given as the reason why men are so made by the Author of Nature, that they have no instinct inclining as much to rejoice at the sight of others great prosperity and pleasure, as to be grieved at their extreme calamity, *viz.* because they do not stand in equal necessity of such an instinct as that in order to their preservation. But if pure benevolence

volence were the ſource of natural pity, doubtleſs it would operate to as great a degree in congratulation, in caſes of others great proſperity, as in compaſſion towards them in great miſery.

The inſtincts God has given to mankind in this world, which in ſome reſpects reſemble a virtuous benevolence, are agreeable to the ſtate that God deſigned mankind for here, where he intends their preſervation and comfortable ſubſiſtence. But in the world of puniſhment, where the ſtate of the wicked inhabitants will be exceeding different, and God will have none of theſe merciful deſigns to anſwer, there, we have great reaſon to think, will be no ſuch thing as a diſpoſition to pity, in any caſe; as alſo there will be no natural affection toward near relations, and no mutual affection between oppoſite ſexes.

To conclude what I have to ſay on the natural inſtinct diſpoſing men to pity others in miſery, I would obſerve, that this is a ſource of a kind of abhorrence in men of ſome vices, as cruelty and oppreſſion; and ſo of a ſort of approbation of the contrary virtues, humanity, mercy, &c.; which averſion and approbation, however, ſo far as they ariſe from this cauſe only, are not from a principle of true virtue.

## CHAPTER VII.

### *The* reaſons *why thoſe things that have been mentioned, which have* not *the eſſence of virtue, have yet by many been miſtaken for* true virtue.

THE firſt reaſon that may be given of this is, that although they have not the ſpecific and diſtinguiſhing nature and eſſence of virtue, yet they have ſomething

ſomething that *belongs to the general nature* of virtue. ——The general nature of true virtue is love. It is expreſſed both in love of benevolence and complacence; but primarily in benevolence to perſons and beings, and conſequently and ſecondarily in complacence in virtue,——as has been ſhewn. There is ſomething of the general nature of virtue in thoſe natural affections and principles that have been mentioned, in both thoſe reſpects.

In many of theſe natural affections there is ſomething of the appearance of love to perſons. In ſome of them there appears the tendency and effect of benevolence, in part. Others have truly a ſort of benevolence in them, though it be a private benevolence, and in ſeveral reſpects fall ſhort of the extent of true virtuous benevolence, both in its nature and object.

The laſt mentioned paſſion, natural to mankind in their preſent ſtate, *viz.* that of pity to others in diſtreſs, though not properly of the nature of love, as has been demonſtrated, yet has partly the ſame influence and effect with benevolence. One effect of true benevolence is to cauſe perſons to be uneaſy, when the objects of it are in diſtreſs, and to deſire their relief. And natural pity has the ſame effect.

Natural gratitude, though in every inſtance wherein it appears it is not properly called love, becauſe perſons may be moved with a degree of gratitude towards perſons on certain occaſions, whom they have no real and proper friendſhip for; as in the inſtance of *Saul* towards *David*, once and again, after *David's* ſparing his life, when he had ſo fair opportunity to kill him: yet it has the ſame or like operation and effect with friendſhip, in part, for a ſeaſon, and with regard to ſo much of the welfare of its object, as appears a deſerved requital of kindneſs received. And in other inſtances, it may have a more general and abiding influence, ſo as more properly to be called by the name of love. So that many times men, from natural gratitude, do really with a ſort of benevolence love thoſe who love them. From this, together with ſome other natural

tural principles, men may love their near friends, love their own party, love their country, &c.

The natural diſpoſition there is to mutual affection between the ſexes, often operates by what may properly be called love. There is oftentimes truly a kind both of benevolence and complacence. As there alſo is between parents and children.

Thus theſe things have ſomething of the general nature of virtue, which is love: and eſpecially the thing laſt mentioned have ſomething of a love of benevolence. What they are eſſentially defective in, is, that they are private in their nature, they do not ariſe from any temper of benevolence to being in general, nor have they a tendency to any ſuch effect in their operation. But yet agreeing with virtue in its general nature, they are beautiful within their own private ſphere: *i. e.* they appear beautiful if we confine our views to that private ſyſtem, and while we ſhut all other things they ſtand in any relation to out of our conſideration. If that private ſyſtem contained the ſum of univerſal exiſtence, then their benevolence would have true beauty; or, in other words, would be beautiful, all things conſidered: but now it is not ſo. Theſe private ſyſtems are ſo far from containing the ſum of univerſal being, or comprehending all exiſtence which we ſtand related to that it contains but an infinitely ſmall part of it. The reaſon why men are ſo ready to take theſe private affections for true virtue, is the narrowneſs of their views; and above all, that they are ſo ready to leave the divine Being out of their view, and to neglect him in their conſideration, or to regard him in their thoughts, as though he were not properly belonging to the ſyſtem of real exiſtence, but as a kind of ſhadowy, imaginary being. And though moſt men allow that there is a God, yet, in their ordinary view of things, his being is not apt to come into the account, and to have the influence and effect of a real exiſtence, as it is with other beings which they ſee, and are converſant with by their external ſenſes. In their views of beauty and deformity, and in the inward ſenſations

of

of diſplicence and approbation which riſe in their minds, it is not a thing natural to them to be under the influence of a view of the Deity as part of the ſyſtem, and as the head of the ſyſtem, and he who is all in all, in compariſon of whom all the reſt is nothing, and with regard to whom all other things are to be viewed, and their minds to be accordingly impreſſed and affected.

Yea, we are apt through the narrowneſs of our views, in judging of the beauty of affections and actions, to limit our conſideration to only a ſmall part of the created ſyſtem. When private affections extend themſelves to a conſiderable number, we are very ready to look upon them as truly virtuous, and accordingly to applaud them highly. Thus it is with reſpect to love to a large party, or a man's love to his country. For though his private ſyſtem contains but a ſmall part even of the world of mankind, yet, being a conſiderable number, through the contracted limits of the mind and the narrowneſs of his views, they are ready to fill his mind and engroſs his ſight, and to ſeem as if they were all. Hence, among the *Romans*, love to their country was the higheſt virtue: though this affection of theirs, ſo much extolled among them, was employed as it were for the deſtruction of the reſt of the world of mankind.——The larger the number is that private affection extends to, the more apt men are, through the narrowneſs of their ſight, to miſtake it for true virtue; becauſe then the private ſyſtem appears to have more of the image of the univerſal ſyſtem. Whereas, when the circle it extends to is very ſmall, it is not ſo apt to be looked upon as virtuous or not ſo virtuous. As, a man's love to his own children.——

And this is the reaſon why ſelf-love is by nobody miſtaken for true virtue. For though there be ſomething of the general nature of virtue in this, here is love and good-will, yet the object is ſo private, the limits ſo narrow, that it by no means engroſſes the view; unleſs it be of the perſon himſelf, who through the greatneſs of his pride may imagine himſelf as it were *all*. The minds of men are large enough to

take in a vaſtly greater extent: and though ſelf-love is far from being uſeleſs in the world, yea, it is exceeding neceſſary to ſociety, beſides it is directly and greatly ſeeking the good of one, yet every body ſees that if it be not ſubordinate to, and regulated by, another more extenſive principle, it may make a man a common enemy to the ſyſtem he is related to. And though this is as true of any other private affection, notwithſtanding its extent may be to a ſyſtem that contains thouſands of individuals, and thoſe private ſyſtems bear no greater proportion to the whole of univerſal exiſtence than one alone, yet they bear a greater proportion to the extent to the view and comprehenſion of mens minds, and are more apt to be regarded as if they were *all*, or at leaſt as ſome reſemblance of the univerſal ſyſtem.

Thus I have obſerved how many of theſe natural principles, which have been ſpoken of, reſemble virtue in its primary operation, which is benevolence. Many of them alſo have a reſemblance of it in its ſecondary operation, which is its approbation of and complacence in virtue itſelf. Several kinds of approbation of virtue have been taken notice of, as common to mankind, which are not of the nature of a truly virtuous approbation, conſiſting in a ſenſe and reliſh of the eſſential beauty of virtue, conſiſting in a being's cordial union to being in general, from a ſpirit of love to being in general. As particularly, the approbation of conſcience, from a ſenſe of the inferior and ſecondary beauty which there is in virtue, conſiſting in uniformity, and from a ſenſe of deſert, conſiſting in a ſenſe of the natural agreement of loving and being beloved, ſhewing kindneſs and receiving kindneſs. So from the ſame principle, there is a diſapprobation of vice, from a natural oppoſition to deformity and diſproportion; and a ſenſe of evil deſert, or the natural agreement there is between hating and being hated, oppoſing and being oppoſed, &c. together with a painful ſenſation naturally ariſing in a ſenſe of ſelf-oppoſition and inconſiſtence.——Approbation of conſcience is the more readily

readily miſtaken for a truly virtuous approbation, becauſe by the wiſe conſtitution of the great Governor of the world (as was obſerved) when conſcience is well informed, and thoroughly awakened, it agrees with the latter fully and exactly, as to the object approved, though not as to the ground and reaſon of approving. It approves all virtue, and condemns all vice. It approves true virtue, and indeed approves nothing that is againſt it, or that falls ſhort of it; as was ſhewn before. And indeed natural conſcience is implanted in all mankind, there to be as it were in God's ſtead, and to be an internal judge or rule to all, whereby to diſtinguiſh right and wrong.

It has alſo been obſerved, how that virtue, conſiſting in benevolence, is approved, and vice, conſiſting in ill-will, is diſliked, from the influence of ſelf-love, together with aſſociation of ideas, in the ſame manner as men diſlike thoſe qualities in things without life or reaſon, with which they have always connected the ideas of hurtfulneſs, malignancy, perniciouſneſs; but like thoſe things with which they habitually connect the ideas of profit, pleaſantneſs, comfortableneſs, &c. This ſort of approbation or liking of virtue, and diſlike of vice, is eaſily miſtaken for true virtue, not only becauſe thoſe things are approved by it that have the nature of virtue, and the things diſliked have the nature of vice, but becauſe here is much of reſemblance of virtuous approbation, it being complacence from love; the difference only lying in this, that it is not from love to being in general, but from ſelf-love.

There is alſo, as has been ſhewn, a liking of ſome virtues, and diſlike of ſome vices, from the influence of the natural inſtinct of pity. This men are apt to miſtake for the exerciſe of true virtue on many accounts. Here is not only a kind of complacence, and the objects of complacence are what have the nature of virtue, and the virtues indeed very amiable, ſuch as humanity, mercy, tenderneſs of heart, &c. and the contrary very odious; but beſides, the approbation is not merely from ſelf-love, but from compaſſion; an af-

fection that reſpects others, and reſembles benevolence, as has been ſhewn.

Another reaſon why the things which have been mentioned are miſtaken for true virtue, is, that there is indeed a true *negative* moral goodneſs in them. By a negative moral goodneſs, I mean the negation or abſence of true moral evil. They have this negative moral goodneſs, becauſe a being without them would be an evidence of a much greater moral evil. Thus, the exerciſe of natural conſcience in ſuch and ſuch degrees, wherein appears ſuch a meaſure of an awakening or ſenſibility of conſcience, though it be not of the nature of real poſitive virtue or true moral goodneſs, yet has a negative moral goodneſs; becauſe in the preſent ſtate of things, it is an evidence of the abſence of that higher degree of wickedneſs, which cauſes great inſenſibility or ſtupidity of conſcience. For ſin, as was obſerved, is not only againſt a ſpiritual and divine ſenſe of virtue, but is alſo againſt the dictates of that moral ſenſe which is in natural conſcience. No wonder, that this ſenſe, being long oppoſed and often conquered, grows weaker. All ſin has its ſource from ſelfiſhneſs, or from ſelf-love, not ſubordinate to regard to being in general. And natural conſcience chiefly conſiſts in a ſenſe of deſert, or the natural agreement between ſin and miſery. But if ſelf were indeed *all*, and ſo more conſiderable than all the world beſides, there would be no ill deſert in his regarding himſelf above all, and making all other intereſts give place to private intereſt.——And no wonder that men, by long acting from the ſelfiſh principle, and by being habituated to treat themſelves as if they were *all*, increaſe in pride, and come as it were naturally to look on themſelves as *all*, and ſo to loſe entirely the ſenſe of ill deſert in their making all other intereſts give place to their own.——And no wonder that men, by often repeating acts of ſin without puniſhment, or any viſible appearance of approaching puniſhment, have leſs and leſs ſenſe of the connection of ſin with puniſhment. That ſenſe which an awakened conſcience has of the deſert

deſert of ſin, conſiſts chiefly in a ſenſe of its deſert of reſentment of the Deity, the fountain and head of univerſal exiſtence. But no wonder that, by a long continued worldly and ſenſual life, men more and more loſe all ſenſe of the Deity, who is a ſpiritual and inviſible Being. The mind being long involved in, and engroſſed by, ſenſitive objects, becomes ſenſual in all its operations, and excludes all views and impreſſions of ſpiritual objects, and is unfit for their contemplation. Thus the conſcience and general benevolence are entirely different principles, and ſenſe of conſcience differs from the holy complacence of a benevolent and truly virtuous heart. Yet wickedneſs may by long habitual exerciſe greatly diminiſh a ſenſe of conſcience. So that there may be negative moral goodneſs, in ſenſibility of conſcience, as it may be an argument of the abſence of that higher degree of wickedneſs, which cauſeth ſtupidity of conſcience.

So with reſpect to natural *gratitude*, though there may be no virtue merely in loving them that love us, yet the contrary may be an evidence of a great degree of depravity, as it may argue a higher degree of ſelfiſhneſs, ſo that a man is come to look upon himſelf as all, and others as nothing, and ſo their reſpect and kindneſs as nothing. Thus an increaſe of pride diminiſhes gratitude.——So does ſenſuality, or the increaſe of ſenſual appetites, and coming more and more under the power and impreſſion of ſenſible objects, tends by degrees to make the mind inſenſible to any thing elſe; and thoſe appetites take up the whole ſoul; and thro' habit and cuſtom the water is all drawn out of other channels, in which it naturally flows, and is all carried as it were into one channel.

In like manner, natural affection, and natural pity, though not of the nature of virtue, yet may be diminiſhed greatly by the increaſe of thoſe two principles of pride and ſenſuality, and as the conſequence of this, being habitually diſpoſed to envy, malice, &c. Theſe luſts, when they prevail to a high degree, may overcome and diminiſh the exerciſe of thoſe natural princi-

ples; even as they often overcome and diminish common prudence in a man, as to seeking his own private interest in point of health, wealth, or honour, and yet no one will think it proves that a man's being cunning, in seeking his own personal and temporal interest, has any thing of the nature and essence of true virtue.

Another reason why these natural principles and affections are mistaken for true virtue, is, that in several respects they have the same effect which true virtue tends to; especially in these two ways——

1. The present state of the world is so ordered and constituted by the wisdom and goodness of its supreme Ruler, that these natural principles for the most part tend to the good of the world of mankind. So do natural pity, gratitude, parental affection, &c. Herein they agree with the tendency of general benevolence, which seeks and tends to the general good. But this is no proof that these natural principles have the nature of true virtue. For self-love is a principle that is exceeding useful and necessary in the world of mankind. So are the natural appetites of hunger and thirst, &c. But yet nobody will assert that these have the nature of true virtue.

2. These principles have a like effect with true virtue in this respect, that they tend several ways to restrain vice, and prevent many acts of wickedness.—— So natural affection, love to our party, or to particular friends, tends to keep us from acts of injustice towards these persons; which would be real wickedness. ——Pity preserves from cruelty, which would be real and great moral evil.—Natural conscience tends to restrain sin in general, in the present state of the world. ——But neither can this prove these principles themselves to be of the nature of true virtue. For so is this present state of mankind ordered by a merciful God, that mens self-love does in innumerable respects restrain from acts of true wickedness; and not only so, but puts men upon seeking true virtue: yet is not itself true virtue, but is the source of all the wickedness that is in the world.

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Another reaſon why theſe inferior affections, eſpecially ſome of them, are accounted virtuous, is, that there are affections of the ſame denomination which are truly virtuous. Thus, for inſtance, there is a truly virtuous *pity*, or a compaſſion to others under affliction or miſery from general benevolence. Pure benevolence would be ſufficient to excite pity to another in calamity, if there were no particular inſtinct, or any other principle determining the mind thereto. It is eaſy to ſee how benevolence, which ſeeks another's good, ſhould cauſe us to deſire his deliverance from evil. And this is a ſource of pity far more extenſive than the other. It excites compaſſion in caſes that are overlooked by natural inſtinct; and even in thoſe caſes to which inſtinct extends, it mixes its influence with the natural principle, and guides and regulates its operations. And when this is the caſe, the pity which is exerciſed, may be called a virtuous compaſſion.——So there is a virtuous *gratitude*, or a gratitude that ariſes not only from ſelf-love, but from a ſuperior principle of diſintereſted general benevolence. As it is manifeſt, that when we receive kindneſs from ſuch as we love already, we are more diſpoſed to gratitude, and diſpoſed to greater degrees of it, than when the mind is deſtitute of any ſuch friendly prepoſſeſſion. Therefore, when the ſuperior principle of virtuous love has a governing hand, and regulates the affair, it may be called a virtuous gratitude.—So there is a virtuous love of *juſtice*, ariſing from pure benevolence to being in general, as that naturally and neceſſarily inclines the heart, that every particular being ſhould have ſuch a ſhare of benevolence as is proportioned to its dignity, conſiſting in the degree of its being, and the degree of its virtue. Which is entirely diverſe from an apprehenſion of juſtice, from a ſenſe of the beauty of uniformity in variety: as has been particularly ſhewn already. And ſo it is eaſy to ſee how there may be a virtuous ſenſe of deſert different from what is natural and common. And ſo a virtuous *conſciouſneſs*, or a ſanctified conſcience.——And as when *natural affec-*

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*tions* have their operations mixed with the influence of virtuous benevolence, and are directed and determined hereby, they may be called virtuous; ſo there may be a virtuous love of parents to children, and between other near relatives; a virtuous love of our town, or country, or nation. Yea, and a virtuous love between the ſexes, as there may be the influence of virtue mingled with inſtinct, and virtue may govern with regard to the particular manner of its operation, and may guide it to ſuch ends as are agreeable to the great ends and purpoſes of true virtue.

Genuine virtue prevents that increaſe of the habits of pride and ſenſuality, which tend to overbear and greatly diminiſh the exerciſes of the forementioned uſeful and neceſſary principles of nature. And a principle of general benevolence ſoftens and ſweetens the mind, and makes it more ſuſceptible of the proper influence and exerciſe of the gentler natural inſtincts, and directs every one into its proper channel, and determines the exerciſe to the proper manner and meaſure, and guides all to the beſt purpoſes.

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## CHAPTER VIII.

### *In what reſpects* virtue *or moral good is founded in* ſentiment; *and how far it is founded in the* reaſon *and* nature *of things.*

THAT which is called *virtue*, is a certain kind of beautiful nature, form or quality, that is obſerved in things. That form or quality is called *beautiful*, to any one beholding it to whom it is beautiful, which appears in itſelf agreeable or comely to him, or the view or idea of which is immediately pleaſant to the mind. I ſay, agreeable *in itſelf*, and *immediately* pleaſant, to diſtinguiſh

diſtinguiſh it from things which in themſelves are not agreeable nor pleaſant, but either indifferent or diſagreeable, which yet appear eligible and agreeable indirectly for ſomething elſe that is the conſequence of them, or with which they are connected. Such a kind of indirect agreeableneſs or eligibleneſs in things not for themſelves, but for ſomething elſe, is not what is called beauty. But when a form or quality appears lovely, pleaſing, and delightful in itſelf, then it is called beautiful; and this agreeableneſs or gratefulneſs of the idea is what is called beauty. It is evident therefore by this, that the way we come by the idea or ſenſation of beauty, is by immediate ſenſation of the gratefulneſs of the idea called *beautiful*; and not by finding out by argumentation any conſequences, or other things that it ſtands connected with; any more than taſting the ſweetneſs of honey, or perceiving the harmony of a tune, is by argumentation on connections and conſequences. And this manner of being affected with the immediate preſence of the beautiful idea depends not, therefore, on any reaſonings about the idea, after we have it, before we can find out whether it be beautiful or not; but on the frame of our minds, whereby they are ſo made, that ſuch an idea, as ſoon as we have it, is grateful, or appears beautiful.

Therefore, if this be all that is meant by them who affirm virtue is founded in ſentiment and not in reaſon, that they who ſee the beauty there is in true virtue do not perceive it by argumentation on its connections and conſequences, but by the frame of their own minds, or a certain ſpiritual ſenſe given them of God, whereby they immediately perceive pleaſure in the preſence of the idea of true virtue in their minds, or are directly gratified in the view or contemplation of this object, this is certainly true.

But if thereby is meant, that the frame of mind, or inward ſenſe given them by God, whereby the mind is diſpoſed to delight in the idea or view of true virtue, is given arbitrarily, ſo that if he had pleaſed he might have given a contrary ſenſe and determination of mind,

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which would have agreed as well with the neceſſary nature of things, this I think is not true.

Virtue, as I have obſerved, conſiſts in the cordial conſent or union of being to being in general. And, as has alſo been obſerved, that frame of mind, whereby it is diſpoſed to reliſh and be pleaſed with the view of this, is benevolence or union of heart itſelf to being in general, or a univerſally benevolent frame of mind: becauſe he whoſe temper is to love being in general, therein muſt have a diſpoſition to approve and be pleaſed with love to being in general. Therefore now the queſtion is, Whether God, in giving this temper to a created mind, whereby it unites to or loves being in general, acts ſo arbitrarily, that there is nothing in the neceſſary nature of things to hinder, but that a contrary temper might have agreed or conſiſted as well with that nature of things as this?

And, in the *firſt* place, I obſerve, that to aſſert this would be a plain abſurdity, and contrary to the very ſuppoſition. For here it is ſuppoſed, that virtue in its very eſſence conſiſts in agreement or conſent of being to being. Now certainly agreement itſelf to being in general muſt neceſſarily agree better with general exiſtence, than oppoſition and contrariety to it.

I obſerve *ſecondly*, that God in giving to the creature ſuch a temper of mind, gives that which is agreeable to what is by abſolute neceſſity his own temper and nature. For, as has been often obſerved, God himſelf is in effect being in general; and without all doubt it is in itſelf neceſſary, and impoſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe, that God ſhould agree with himſelf, be united with himſelf, or love himſelf: and therefore, when he gives the ſame temper to his creatures, this is more agreeable to his neceſſary nature, than the oppoſite temper: yea, the latter would be infinitely contrary to his nature.

Let it be noted, *thirdly*, by this temper only can created beings be united to, and agree with one another. This appears, becauſe it conſiſts in conſent and union to being in general; which implies agreement

and

and union with every particular being, except ſuch as are oppoſite to being in general, or excepting ſuch caſes wherein union with them is by ſome means inconſiſtent with union with general exiſtence. But certainly, if any particular created being were of a temper to oppoſe being in general, that would infer the moſt univerſal and greateſt poſſible diſcord, not only of creatures with their Creator, but of created beings one with another.

*Fourthly*, I obſerve, there is no other temper but this that a man can have, and agree with himſelf, or be without ſelf-inconſiſtence, *i. e.* without having ſome inclinations and reliſhes repugnant to others; and that for theſe reaſons. Every being that has underſtanding and will neceſſarily loves happineſs. For, to ſuppoſe any being not to love happineſs, would be to ſuppoſe he did not love what was agreeable to him; which is a contradiction: or at leaſt would imply, that nothing was agreeable or eligible to him, which is the ſame as to ſay that he has no ſuch thing as choice, or any faculty of will. So that every being who has a faculty of will, muſt of neceſſity have an inclination to happineſs. And therefore, if he be conſiſtent with himſelf, and has not ſome inclinations repugnant to others, he muſt approve of thoſe inclinations whereby beings deſire the happineſs of being in general, and muſt be againſt a diſpoſition to the miſery of being in general: becauſe otherwiſe he would approve of oppoſition to his own happineſs. For, if a temper inclined to the miſery of being in general prevailed univerſally, it is apparent, it would tend to univerſal miſery. But he that loves a tendency to univerſal miſery, in effect loves a tendency to his own miſery: and as he neceſſarily hates his own miſery, he has then one inclination repugnant to another.—And beſides, it neceſſarily follows from ſelf-love, that men love to be loved by others; becauſe in this others love agrees with their own love. But if men loved hatred to being in general, they would in effect love the hatred of themſelves; and ſo would be inconſiſtent with themſelves,

ſelves, having one natural inclination contrary to another.

Theſe things may help us to underſtand why that ſpiritual and divine ſenſe, by which thoſe that are truly virtuous and holy, perceive the excellency of true virtue, is in the ſacred ſcriptures called by the name of light, knowledge, underſtanding, &c. If this divine ſenſe were a thing arbitrarily given, without any foundation in the nature of things, it would not properly be called by ſuch names. For if there were no correſpondence or agreement in ſuch a ſenſe with the nature of things, any more than there would have been in a diverſe or contrary ſenſe, the idea we obtain by this ſpiritual ſenſe could in no reſpect be ſaid to be a knowledge or perception of any thing beſides what was in our own minds. For this idea would be no repreſentation of any thing without. But ſince it is otherwiſe, ſince it is agreeable in the reſpects abovementioned to the nature of things, and eſpecially ſince it is the repreſentation and image of the moral perfection and excellency of the divine Being, hereby we have a perception of that moral excellency, of which we could have no true idea without it. And it being ſo, hereby perſons have that true knowledge of God, which greatly enlightens the mind in the knowledge of divine things in general, and does (as might be ſhewn, if it were neceſſary to the main purpoſe of this diſcourſe) in many reſpects aſſiſt perſons to a right underſtanding of things in general; to underſtand which our faculties were chiefly given us, and which do chiefly concern our intereſt; and aſſiſts us to ſee the nature of them, and the truth of them, in their proper evidence. Whereas, the want of this ſpiritual ſenſe, and the prevalence of thoſe diſpoſitions that are contrary to it, tends to darken and diſtract the mind, and dreadfully to delude and confound mens underſtandings.

And as to that moral ſenſe common to mankind, which there is in *natural conſcience*, neither can this be truly ſaid to be no more than a ſentiment arbitrarily given by the Creator, without any relation to the neceſſary

neceſſary nature of things: but is eſtabliſhed in an agreement with the nature of things; ſo as no ſenſe of mind that can be ſuppoſed of a contrary nature and tendency could be. This will appear by theſe two things.——

1. This moral ſenſe, if the underſtanding be well informed, and be exerciſed at liberty and in an extenſive manner, without being reſtrained to a private ſphere, approves the very ſame things which a ſpiritual and divine ſenſe approves; and thoſe things only; though not on the ſame grounds, nor with the ſame kind of approbation. Therefore, as that divine ſenſe has been already ſhewn to be agreeable to the neceſſary nature of things, ſo this inferior moral ſenſe, being ſo far correſpondent to that, muſt alſo ſo far agree with the nature of things.

2. It has been ſhewn, that this moral ſenſe conſiſts in approving the uniformity and natural agreement there is between one thing and another. So that, by the ſuppoſition, it is agreeable to the nature of things. For therein it conſiſts, *viz.* a diſpoſition of mind to conſent to, or like, the agreement of the nature of things, or the agreement of the nature and form of one thing with another. And certainly ſuch a temper of mind as likes the agreement of things to the nature of things, is more agreeable to the nature of things than an oppoſite temper of mind.

Here it may be obſerved——As the uſe of *language* is for mankind to expreſs their ſentiments or ideas to each other, ſo that thoſe terms in language, by which things of a moral nature are ſignified, are to expreſs thoſe moral ſentiments or ideas that are common to mankind; therefore it is that moral ſenſe which is in natural conſcience that chiefly governs the uſe of language among mankind, and is the mind's rule of language in theſe matters among mankind; it is indeed the general natural rule which God has given to all men, whereby to judge of moral good and evil. By ſuch words, right and wrong, good and evil, when uſed in a moral ſenſe, is meant in common ſpeech, that

which deſerves praiſe or blame, reſpect or reſentment. But as has been often obſerved, mankind in general have a ſenſe of deſert, by this natural moral ſenſe.

Therefore here may ariſe a queſtion which may deſerve to be conſidered, *viz.* Seeing it is thus that ſentiment among mankind is the rule of language, as to what is called by the name of good and evil, worthy and unworthy; and it is apparent that ſentiment, at leaſt as to many particulars, by ſome means or other is different, in different perſons in different nations; that being thought to deſerve praiſe by one, which by others is thought to be worthy of blame; how therefore can virtue and vice be any other than arbitrary, not at all determined by the nature of things, but by the ſentiments of men with relation to the nature of things?

In order to the anſwering this queſtion with clearneſs, it may be divided into two: *viz.* Whether mens ſentiments of moral good and evil are not arbitrary, or rather caſual and accidental? And whether the way of their uſing words in what they call good and evil is not arbitrary, without reſpect to any common ſentiment in all, conformed to the nature of things?

As to the *firſt*, I would obſerve, that the general diſpoſition or ſenſe of mind exerciſed in a ſenſe of deſert of eſteem or reſentment may be the ſame in all: though as to particular objects and occaſions with regard to which it is exerciſed, it may be very various in different men or bodies of men, through the partiality or error that may attend the view or attention of the mind. In all, a notion of deſert of love or reſentment may conſiſt in the ſame thing, in general, *viz.* a ſuitableneſs, or natural uniformity and agreement between the affections and acts of the agent, and the affections and treatment of others ſome way concerned; or the natural agreement between love (or ſomething that ſome way implies love, or proceeds from it, or tends to it) and love; a natural agreement between treating well, and being well treated; the natural agreement between hating (or ſomething that ſome way

way partakes of the nature of hatred) and being hated, &c. I ſay, this general notion of deſert may be the ſame: and yet occaſions and objects through variety of apprehenſions about theſe occaſions and objects, and the various manner in which they are viewed, by reaſon of the partial attention of the mind, may be extremely various; and example, cuſtom, education, and aſſociation may have a hand in this, in ways innumerable. But it is needleſs to dwell long on this, ſince things which have been ſaid by others (Mr *Hutchiſon*, in particular) may abundantly ſhew, that the differences which are to be found among different perſons and nations, concerning moral good and evil, are not inconſiſtent with a general moral ſenſe, common to all mankind.

Nor, *ſecondly*, is the uſe of the words, good and evil, right and wrong, when uſed in a moral ſenſe altogether unfixed and arbitrary, according to the variety of notions, opinions, and views, that occaſion the forementioned variety of ſentiment. For though the ſignification of words is determined by uſe, yet that which governs in the uſe of terms is general or common uſe. And mankind, in what they would ſignify by terms, are obliged to aim at a conſiſtent uſe: becauſe it is eaſily found that the end of language, which is to be a common medium of manifeſting ideas and ſentiments, cannot be obtained any other way than by a conſiſtent uſe of words; both that men ſhould be conſiſtent with themſelves, and one with another, in the uſe of them. But men cannot call any thing right or wrong, worthy or ill-deſerving, conſiſtently, any other way than by calling things ſo, which truly deſerve praiſe or blame, *i. e.* things, wherein (all things conſidered) there is moſt uniformity in connecting with them praiſe or blame. There is no other way that they can uſe theſe terms conſiſtently with themſelves. Thus, if thieves or traitors may be angry with informers that bring them to juſtice, and call their behaviour by odious names, yet herein they are inconſiſtent with themſelves; becauſe, when they put themſelves in the place

of

of thoſe that have injured them, they approve the ſame things they condemn. And therefore ſuch are capable of being convinced, that they apply theſe odious terms in an abuſive manner. So, a nation that proſecutes an ambitious deſign of univerſal empire, by ſubduing other nations with fire and ſword, may affix terms that ſignify the higheſt degrees of virtue, to the conduct of ſuch as ſhew the moſt engaged, ſtable, reſolute ſpirit in this affair, and do moſt of this bloody work. But yet they are capable of being convinced, that they uſe theſe terms inconſiſtently, and abuſe language in it, and ſo having their mouths ſtopped.—And not only will men uſe ſuch words inconſiſtently with themſelves, but alſo with one another, by uſing them any otherwiſe than to ſignify true merit or ill deſerving, as before explained. For there is no way elſe, wherein men have any notion of good or ill deſert, that mankind in general can agree in. Mankind in general ſeem to ſuppoſe ſome general ſtandard or foundation in nature for an univerſal conſiſtence in the uſe of the terms whereby they expreſs moral good and evil; which none can depart from but through error and miſtake.

This is evidently ſuppoſed in all diſputes they may have one with another about right and wrong; and in all endeavours uſed to evince or prove that any thing is either good or evil, in a moral ſenſe.

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FINIS.